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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has expanded the number of nuclear facilities using chemical 
processes to complete its waste management mission over the last decade. Recent facilities 
included the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side-solvent extraction Unit 
(ARP/MCU) at Savannah River, the processing plants for the deconversion of depleted uranium 
hexafluoride at Portsmouth, Ohio and Paducah, Kentucky, and others. These nuclear chemical 
facilities combine the hazards of radioactive materials with those of complex chemical 
operations; but presently use an approach to safety management that is rooted in nuclear hazards 
analysis techniques. This approach tends to provide adequate coverage of the hazards associated 
with the radioactive materials, but does not capture the same level of detail for chemical hazards, 
which, in some cases, could act as the primary risk drivers for the facility.  
 
At present, the nuclear industry and chemical industry each have their own approach to safety 
management. In a nuclear chemical facility, these two industries can be viewed as intersecting, 
and thus integrated safety measures to help ensure safe and efficient plant operations would be 
desirable. However, the inconsistency between the approaches of the two industries can pose a 
challenge for nuclear chemical facilities, which have many of the operational characteristics of a 
chemical plant but also must contend with radioactivity and other nuclear materials hazards (e.g. 
nuclear criticality). To date, the approaches of the industries are disparate. 
 
The overall goal of this research was to analyze accidents from the chemical industry (through 
the chemical industry accident reports) and DOE nuclear chemical facilities (a select group of 
 xvii 
DOE occurrence reports) for trends to develop a set of predictive or leading safety and 
performance measures applicable to nuclear chemical facilities; essentially, to use information 
from past events to derive a set of performance measures that can be used proactively to improve 
safety management in such facilities.  
 
This research mined the large database available in 60 published chemical industry accident 
reports and safety bulletins completed by the CSB, and relevant DOE occurrence reports over the 
past 15 years, representing accidents that have risen to reportable thresholds during that 
timeframe, as well as NRC abnormal occurrences reported to Congress during the same time 
frame. Analyzing the information presented in the accident reports through content analysis led 
to a list of issues common across many accidents that were used as focus areas for performance 
measure development. Each issue was used as the basis for the development of a theory about 
safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities, in a process of grounded theory 
development. Once the issues were translated into theories, these theories were combined with 
the data itself, including the issue and the textual associations of related issues, to postulate a set 
of recommended safety and performance measures. The inspiration for these performance 
measures came either from literature on leading performance measures referenced in the text, or 
the data itself.  
 
Once a set of potential performance measures was developed, subject matter elicitation was used 
to determine which performance measures were both practical and effective for implementation 
at a nuclear chemical facility. The first step in the subject matter elicitation was review of the 
proposed measures by several experts at a DOE site to eliminate any repetitive or impractical 
 xviii 
measures (i.e. no measurement possible given the current operations of a nuclear chemical 
facility). These experts reduced the list by more than half, leaving 17 potential performance 
measures for the second step, analytic hierarchy process. In the analytic hierarchy process, 
nuclear safety, operations, and engineering subject matter experts, 40 in total, went through a 
hierarchical ranking process to select those performance measures that were most impactful to 
nuclear chemical facility operations. After these subject matter expert elicitations, the following 
list of performance measures remained, where the bolded measures are those considered most 
impactful.  
 
• Engineering Controls: 
• Pertinent subject matter expert involvement in process design and/or review 
changes 
• Percentage of operators and technical staff who are able to identify controls 
and believe that they understand their operation 
• Amount of time in between inspections or tests of safety systems  
• Number of nuisance alarms or false alarms vs. number of valid alarms 
• Operating Procedures 
• Percentage of procedures reviewed for content in a year 
• Number of operators or maintenance technicians who believe that 
procedures are current, accurate, and effective (by survey) 
• Pertinent SMEs involved in drafting procedures 
• Maintenance 
• Percentage of all safety systems and safety controls planned maintenance 
accomplished 
• Number of past due maintenance requests as a percentage of total maintenance 
requests 
• Amount of time the plant is in operation with any safety system in an 
inoperable or degraded condition 
 xix 
• Hazards Analysis 
• Percentage of operators and/or maintenance techs who have formal training on the 
Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) 
• Pertinent subject matter expert involvement in the DSA development and 
maintenance 
• Number of operations and maintenance personnel involved in DSA development 
and maintenance 
• Number of past due safety action items vs. total number of safety action 
items stemming from previous occurrences  
• Emergency Planning 
• Number of local (county or city) Emergency Responders trained in facility (e.g. 
chemical or radiological) hazards and response 
• Number of emergency drills performed in a time period vs. number scheduled (or 
required) 
• Number of workers in an operating facility who believe that they can execute 
their responsibilities in the case of an emergency (by survey) 
 
A quantitative method was used to further analyze the impact of the performance measures on 
safety at a nuclear chemical facility. The performance measures were matched up to nodes in 
several accident progression event trees of the probabilistic risk assessment for a nuclear 
chemical facility. The nodes were then modeled with a reduction in the failure or error 
probability based on guidance from the PRA data source described in the chapter. This study 
provided a quantitative measure of the potential impact of the performance measures at a nuclear 
chemical facility, through the percentage reduction in the overall event probability. The 
maintenance, operating procedures, and engineering controls performance measures were the 
most impactful to the selected events.  
 
 xx 
Finally, guidance was provided for the 17 performance measures to assist in implementing the 
performance measures at a facility. This guidance included a discussion about data collection 
including additional setup requirements (such as additional training or documentation). Guidance 
was also provided to assist in setting a baseline for each of the performance measures. The next 
phase of this process will involve piloting the performance measures at nuclear chemical 
facilities. These leading, integrated safety and performance measures for nuclear chemical 
operations will provide warning in advance of an event of degraded safety conditions, and in 
doing so help ensure safe and efficient operations at these facilities.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Overview 
  
Regardless of the industry of origin of hazardous chemicals, a lack of proper control can result in 
an accident with serious consequences to workers, the environment and the public. Maintaining 
worker and public safety, along with protecting the environment, is a key priority in the chemical 
industry. Even prior to the advent of groups such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and industry groups such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS), unexpected releases of toxic, reactive or flammable liquids were reported, yet remained 
a recurring problem. The introduction of OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) Guidelines 
played a large role in helping to lower the incidence of unexpected releases and other accidents 
at chemical facilities (U.S. Federal Record, 2013). Meanwhile, industry groups, such as the 
CCPS and others, have also focused on improving safety internally, by sharing lessons learned 
from accidents and promoting safety management. Due to this focus on safety, the chemical 
industry is relatively safe compared to other high hazard industries, considering the materials 
handled by these facilities on a daily basis (U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2013).  
 
However, the overall relative safety of the chemical industry does not preclude the occurrence of 
accidents. Review of the recent accident records reveals that there have been accidents in the 
chemical industry ranging from combustible dust explosions, plant explosions and fires to 
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chemical releases and asphyxiation. The chemical industry accident report database used in this 
analysis contains 60 accident reports issued between 1998 and 2012. These accidents represent 
120 fatalities and 895 injuries, including chemical workers, first responders, and the public at 
large. At first glance, 60 accidents in 14 years may appear to be an acceptable rate (about 4 per 
year in a $769 billion industry in the U.S.); however, not all accidents involving injury are 
investigated by external groups and, consistent with the concept of continuous improvement, this 
research attempted to derive new insights from looking at this group of accidents as a whole. 
 
Studying accidents to determine their causes is fairly common in high hazard industries. There 
are several accident databases available for study, with varying degrees of information available.  
Studies have shown that analyzing these accidents and applying lessons learned from them helps 
to avoid future accidents and reduce risk (Meal et al, 2007).  The Environmental Protection 
Agency has a Risk Management Program that requires each facility under their purview submit a 
five-year accident history when they submit a Risk Management Plan (Kleindorfer et al, 2003). 
This database has been studied to find trends in the accidents at these facilities, including plant 
demographics, chemical inventories, and others (Kleindorfer et al, 2003). Some studies, such as 
Kahn and Abbasi, used several accident databases, worldwide to analyze the common causes 
which led to accidents at fixed chemical facilities (Kahn, F. and S.A. Abbasi, 1999). Kahn and 
Abbasi performed a statistical survey of a selection of chemical industry accidents over a 70 year 
period (1928 – 1997); as part of that analysis they assessed what they called ‘major factors’ that 
led to accidents at fixed chemical installations, such as those reviewed by the United States 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB).   
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The history of workplace safety has demonstrated a longstanding confrontation between 
productivity, profitability, and process and worker safety. For the most part, the historical 
practice had been to eschew process safety and the safety of workers in order to make gains in 
productivity and increase profitability, which arguably contributed to the creation of an 
organizational culture in which “productivity over safety” was the predominant mentality. 
However, focus on several high consequence incidents -- across many industries-- such as 
Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl, and more recently, the oil and gas industry’s BP Texas City 
Refinery Explosion, NASA’s Columbia Shuttle Disaster, and the nuclear industry’s Fukushima 
Daiichi, among others, has increased the focus on worker safety. This focus has led to an 
increased body of work dedicated to reducing worker risk in many industries. 
 
The nuclear industry in the United States has a safety record that demonstrates relative success 
over other high hazard industries. The DART rate for the Department of Energy in 2013 was 
0.44, and the TRC was 0.95 (CAIRS, 2013), compared to 1.1 and 2.0 for chemical 
manufacturing (Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). However, the favorable 
safety statistics do not preclude occurrences at DOE facilities; in the same year, 1,105 
occurrences were reported to the DOE from the sites (all DOE facilities) (ORPS, 2013). There is 
a wealth of information available for study from incidents in the nuclear and chemical industries. 
The 1,105 DOE occurrence reports are summaries of incidents, representative of the typical 
operations at nuclear chemical facilities. In contrast, the CSB produces accident reports for the 
most severe chemical industry accidents. The cost associated with the accident statistics 
described on page 1, combined with the increased focus on worker safety, has provided a partial 
motivation for this study, which is an evaluation of safety and health data, with an emphasis on 
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developing performance measures for nuclear chemical facilities, using quantitative and semi-
quantitative methods.  
 
1.2. Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has been expanding the number of nuclear facilities using 
chemical processes to complete its waste management mission over the last decade. Recent new 
facilities include the Actinide Removal Process/Modular Caustic Side-solvent extraction Unit 
(ARP/MCU) at Savannah River, the processing plants for the deconversion of depleted uranium 
hexafluoride at Portsmouth, Ohio and Paducah, Kentucky, the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit 
(IWTU) in Idaho, and others. These nuclear chemical facilities combine the hazards of 
radioactive materials with those of complex chemical operations; looking more closely at the 
ARP/MCU process for instance, the process flow sheet is more similar to a complex chemical 
operation than a nuclear reactor facility. The ARP uses adsorption of Sr-90, actinides and sludge 
solids onto MonoSodium Titanate and filtration through a cross-flow filter to decontaminate a 
low-curie salt solution. The MCU process involves caustic side-solvent extraction, in which a 
solvent is contacted counter-currently with the salt solution in centrifugal contactors to remove 
cesium and recycled using a second set of contactors and wash. 
 
The current approach to safety management at nuclear chemical facilities is rooted in nuclear 
hazards analysis techniques and tends to provide adequate coverage of the hazards associated 
with the radioactive materials, but does not capture the same level of detail for chemical hazards, 
which, in some cases, could act as the primary risk drivers for the facility.  
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At present, the nuclear industry and chemical industry each have their own approach to safety 
management. The current framework for eliciting feedback provided by incident reporting, 
evaluation and analysis at DOE nuclear facilities is one in which the DOE utilizes a systematic, 
detailed occurrence analysis categorization process (documented in DOE Order 232.2, 
Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information and DOE Standard 1197-2011, 
Occurrence Reporting Causal Analysis); the categorization process was informed by the 
practices of the commercial nuclear power industry and the Institute for Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO). This process involves the implementation of a formal Causal Analysis Tree 
(CAT) with predesigned headings to an accident. Each category is numbered and documented for 
ease of incident analysis.  
 
The main objectives of DOE O 232.2 are to keep the DOE and National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) informed about events that could cause potential negative effects to the 
health and safety of the public, the workers, the environment, DOE missions, or DOE credibility. 
It also serves to ensure that DOE uses organizational learning to enhance mission safety and 
share effective practices in order to continuously improve process safety and manage process 
changes (DOE, 2011c). 
 
Reporting under Order 232.2 is required for any occurrence that results from an activity 
performed by facility personnel; such occurrences must be reported by facility personnel in a 
timely fashion and investigated and analyzed by facility management as described in the 
Occurrence Reporting Model, using the cause codes provided in the CAT. This DOE approach to 
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occurrence reporting and categorization is used to write the DOE occurrence reports that have 
been studied in this dissertation.  
 
The chemical industry, on the other hand, combines the general regulations and guidance of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), proactive industry programs initiated 
by various industry groups (such as AIChE [CCPS], ASME and others) and individual 
companies,  and detailed investigations and safety bulletins released by the United States 
Chemical Safety Board (CSB). The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with 
investigation of industrial chemical incidents; the reports of this agency formed the database of 
chemical industry accident reports used in this analysis. The CSB performs investigations of 
chemical accidents at fixed industrial facilities1 and uses informal causal analysis to identify 
“Key Issues” in each incident. The investigations are published as written reports. The CSB also 
issues recommendations to enhance safety in the chemical industry and monitors the adoption of 
these recommendations.  
 
In a nuclear chemical facility, these two industries can be viewed as intersecting, and thus 
integrated safety measures to help ensure safe and efficient plant operations would be desirable. 
However, the inconsistency between the approaches of the two industries can pose a challenge 
for nuclear chemical facilities, which have many of the operational characteristics of a chemical 
plant but also must contend with radioactivity and other nuclear materials hazards (e.g. nuclear 
criticality). To date, the approaches of the industries are disparate. 
                                                 
1 The CSB defines the scope of their accidents as  those which result from the production, processing, handling 
or storage of a chemical substance which result in a death, serious injury, or substantial property damage at fixed 
industrial facilities. The definition of a fixed industrial facility is a permanent or semi-permanent facility on a fixed 
location; this distinction is made to clarify that the NTSB has jurisdiction over any transportation related accidents.  
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1.3. Motivation 
 
The overall goal of this research was to analyze accidents from the chemical industry (through 
the chemical industry accident reports) and DOE nuclear chemical facilities (a select group of 
DOE occurrence reports) for trends to develop a set of predictive or leading safety and 
performance measures applicable to nuclear chemical facilities; essentially, to use information 
from past events to derive a set of performance measures that can be used proactively to improve 
safety management in such facilities. This research mined the large database available in 60 
published chemical industry accident reports and safety bulletins completed by the CSB, and 
relevant DOE occurrence reports over the past 15 years, representing accidents that have risen to 
reportable thresholds during that timeframe, as well as NRC abnormal occurrences reported to 
Congress during the same time frame. Analyzing the information presented in the chemical 
industry accident reports through these varied lenses (i.e., OSHA PSM) led to the development 
of a series of theories about process safety at nuclear chemical facilities, and ultimately to the 
development of set of recommended safety and performance measures.  
 
These safety and performance measures were reviewed by subject matter experts to ensure that 
they were both practical—could be implemented at a nuclear chemical facility, and effective—
their implementation would provide useful information about the safety and operational status of 
the facility. Practical and effective integrated safety and performance measures for nuclear 
chemical operations will assist in monitoring the safety of facility operations, providing feedback 
before an accident or occurrence, and thus, help ensure safe and efficient operations.  
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1.4. Overview of Performance Measures 
 
The use of performance measures to track the safety and efficiency of operations at facilities is 
not a new idea in either the chemical or the nuclear industry. There are two types of indicators 
used by these industries: leading and lagging.  
 
Lagging indicators are the most commonly used performance measures. These are metrics based 
on incidents that meet the threshold for reporting by the industry, or based on the actuation of 
abnormal operating conditions-- they are retrospective. Lagging indicators could be determined 
through a causal analysis of an incident, or a review of a certain system (i.e. the number of times 
an alarm system has been actuated). Lagging indicators illustrate trends that may be ongoing that 
are contributing to multiple incidents at a facility or industry-wide. This type of indicator is 
useful in that it allows for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned from previous 
incidents, with the thought that it may prevent the same incident from occurring again, or at 
another facility.  
 
Leading indicators, on the other hand, could provide an alert to degraded conditions at the 
facility before an incident occurs, or an abnormal operating condition is reached. However, these 
are also the more difficult set to determine, and the set of practical and efficient leading 
indicators is small and can be facility-specific. A good safety management program will include 
both leading and lagging indicators to ensure safe and efficient operation of the facility.  
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The chemical industry Center for Chemical Process Safety has spearheaded this effort for the 
chemical industry with the development of a set of recommended leading and lagging indicators 
in their publication Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics – You Don’t Improve What You 
Don’t Measure (CCPS, 2011). CCPS states that in order to “continuously improve upon process 
safety performance, it is essential that companies in the chemical and petroleum industries 
implement effective leading and lagging process safety metrics (CCPS, 2011).” The CCPS also 
provides examples of lagging and leading metrics for the chemical industry in the guide, which 
have been used to help develop metrics recommended by this dissertation.  
 
1.5. Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The work presented in this dissertation represents a semi-quantitative analysis of accidents from 
the chemical industry and incidents from nuclear chemical facilities in the U.S., and the 
development of theories to improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities, as well as potential performance measures that could be used as leading indicators of 
the status and health of safety structures and programs at the facility.  
 
In Chapter 2, an overview of the current status of safety programs in the nuclear industry and 
chemical industry sets the backdrop for the study. The regulations and standards for process 
safety differ between the nuclear industry and the chemical industry, and enforcement of these 
regulations also differs. An overview of these standards and their enforcement is rounded out 
with a review of existing regulations relevant to nuclear chemical facilities, where they exist. 
10 
 
This analysis is complemented by a review of existing literature about safety in these industries, 
and how it differs, as well as literature about nuclear chemical facilities. 
 
In Chapter 3, the stage is set for studying accidents to develop performance measures. While 
accident analysis is typically used to track lagging indicators, its use in this study is to develop 
leading indicators. The methodology and rationale behind this unique study is described 
including the various methodologies used during the analysis: content analysis, development of 
grounded theory, analytic hierarchy process, and probabilistic risk assessment. The case is also 
made for content analysis, as opposed to the traditional use of root cause analysis.  
 
Chapter 4 provides the results of the analysis of chemical industry accidents. In this chapter, an 
overview of the chemical industry database leads into a discussion of the two distinct reviews of 
chemical industry accidents performed for this study, the Key Issues analysis, and the content 
analysis. The results from both reviews are presented and compared, providing the full picture of 
the studied accidents in the chemical industry.  
 
Chapter 5 contains the results of the analysis of nuclear chemical facilities accidents and includes 
information on the occurrences used from the DOE’s Occurrence Reporting and Processing 
System as well as the NRC’s Abnormal Occurrence Reports to Congress. Trends from the ORPS 
reports as well content analyses of both ORPS and NRC reports are included in this chapter and 
compared to the results from the chemical industry. 
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In Chapter 6, the development of the performance metrics is described, from reported data in 
Chapters 4 and 5 to theories for improving safety and efficiency of operations, to performance 
metrics recommended for nuclear chemical facilities. This chapter also contains the results of an 
expert review of the proposed performance metrics, weeding out those that were not considered 
practical or effective -- leaving a manageable set to be recommended to nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
 
Then performance measures were applied to a nuclear chemical facility, the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility, in Chapter 7, to test their impact represented by their quantitative reduction 
in risk at that facility, and what effects they might have on safety and efficiency of operations. 
Also in Chapter 7, the application of these metrics to nuclear chemical facilities is discussed in 
detail, with recommendations and caveats from interviews with subject matter experts. Chapter 8 
offers ideas for future work and provides a summary of the findings of this dissertation. 
 
1.6. Abbreviated Results 
 
This dissertation illustrated the use of qualitative and quantitative data from accidents in the 
chemical industry and at nuclear chemical facilities to develop theories and subsequent 
performance measures to improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities.  
 
The results from the dissertation showed that these performance measures had a positive impact 
on safety at nuclear chemical facilities. Review by safety and operations subject matter experts 
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using a survey illustrated that the performance measures above were both practical and effective 
for measuring the safety and health of a nuclear chemical facility. Further, the performance 
measures were applied to a probabilistic risk assessment and demonstrated a measurable 
reduction in the overall probability of three studied accidents. Finally, guidance was developed 
for implementing these performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility, making quantifiable 
metrics to determine degraded or degrading safety conditions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This work necessitated a literature and background survey of the current status of safety in the 
chemical industry and nuclear industry, both domestic and international. The goal of Chapter 2 is 
to provide an overview of this literature study, describing the most relevant and useful pieces of 
information to this work. The objectives of this chapter are to describe the current status of safety 
in the nuclear industry, the current status of safety at nuclear chemical facilities, the current 
status of safety in the chemical industry, and to provide an overview of the U.S. Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board. 
  
The literature survey conducted involves several categories of studies spread out over three 
distinct topics: safety in the nuclear industry, safety in the chemical industry and work that 
“bridges the gap” for safety in nuclear chemical operations. In the literature review for each of 
these sections, there are several sets of resources. In completing the review, special attention was 
paid to gathering industry standards and practices, as well as safety research from peer-reviewed 
journals and government reports.  
 
One of the distinct sets of documents that form the literature survey is the set of regulations that 
govern each industry. For safety in the nuclear industry, these are largely DOE and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, with some additional guidance provided at times by 
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the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and OSHA.  In the chemical industry, these 
regulations include OSHA regulations and standards as well as some EPA standards, along with 
recommendations from the CSB. For several of the more heavily documented regulations, there 
are also guidance documents, which detail more clearly the processes for adhering to the 
regulation.  
 
These are supplemented by government reports and audits detailing successes and shortcomings 
in safety, and agencies implementing safety practices, such as the EPA Inspector General’s 
audits of the CSB (e.g. EPA, 2013). These reports shed light on the efficacy of existing policy 
and guidance in both industries as well as provide insight into incidents and shortfalls. Also in 
the DOE nuclear industry, there are recommendations from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board (DNFSB) which provide a basis for revised practices such as safety management and 
culture improvements in the defense nuclear facilities of the DOE (DNFSB, 1995; DNFSB, 
2011). The commercial nuclear industry also has guidelines from INPO, however, for this 
analysis, the focus is on DOE nuclear, not commercial, facilities, as DOE is the primary owner of 
nuclear chemical facilities. 
 
A second set of documents that compose the literature survey are peer-reviewed journal articles 
relating to safety in the nuclear and chemical industries. In the chemical industry, this includes 
several articles on: trends and concerns in chemical safety, achieving stronger chemical safety, 
knowledge management and organizational learning, hazard evaluations and worker safety, 
among others. In the nuclear industry, the same topics as those in the chemical industry accident 
reports are covered, with the addition of some specific events and lessons learned at nuclear 
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facilities. Interestingly, several of the articles relating specifically to the nuclear industry address 
a perceived lack of coverage in fuel cycle facilities for chemical hazards2.  
 
The final classification of research in the literature survey includes interviews with experts in the 
field of nuclear safety and chemical safety. These interviews are particularly helpful in 
uncovering new potential sources and understanding the complexity of the regulatory process. 
They also provide the experience and feedback necessary to better understand the nuances of 
safety at nuclear and chemical facilities. 
 
2.2. Safety in the Nuclear Industry 
 
The following sections describe the current status of safety in various groups of the nuclear 
industry including the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  
 
2.2.1. Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities Safety 
 
One approach to managing risk in the nuclear industry is described as “operation as 
experimentation.” According to Perin, high-hazard industries have two contrary theories of risk: 
(1) organizational and technological complexities create blind spots that make the organization 
vulnerable to accidents, as any high-hazard operation produces risks through operation; and (2) 
high-hazard systems are demonstrably capable of high reliability with strict adherence to 
operating rules and procedures (Perin, 1998, Page 104). In particular, Perin stresses that while 
                                                 
2 Laul et. al., (2006), and Cournoyer et. al., (2013) among others.  
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control paradigms have limited the number of significant events, in some cases, they were 
ineffective at preventing accidents or mitigating their severity. Thus, rather than working solely 
from a pre-accident risk mitigation plan, she suggests using knowledge gained from accidents to 
find root causes and potential sources of error and transmit the results to future nuclear facilities 
with the hope of mitigating future risk (Perin, 1998, Page 107).  
 
The DNFSB made a recommendation to the DOE in 1995 that the DOE commit to upgrading its 
nuclear safety program to improve the integration of safety into work planning and performance 
(DNFSB Recommendation 95-2, Integrated Safety Management (ISM) (DNFSB, 1995, Page 
54066)). The main objective of this recommendation was to ensure that the operational controls 
for hazardous work and other operational commitments, identified through hazard analysis and 
related work-planning activities, are reflected in operational procedures and that operating 
personnel are trained and qualified to perform accordingly (DNFSB, 1997, Page 1-1). The 
DNFSB subdivides this work into three underlying concepts that are required for an organization 
to benefit from a formality of operations plan: safety culture, defense in depth and a framework 
of controls (DNFSB, 1997, Page 3-1). In this analysis, the focus of DOE related safety is 
Integrated Safety Management, and in particular, its application to DOE Office of Environmental 
Management (EM)3. 
 
EM owns the preponderance of nuclear chemical facilities in the DOE and has implemented 
DNFSB Recommendation 95-2 in its approach for ensuring that the public, workers, and 
                                                 
3 The focus of this literature review is the application of ISM to DOE EM, a simplification to the discussion as this is 
one particular application of ISM to a DOE Organization. However, this research and the results and conclusions are 
intended to provide safety and performance measures that are potentially applicable to all DOE nuclear chemical 
facilities.   
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environment are protected. EM also uses the term Integrated Safety Management (DOE ISM). 
All EM sites are required to adhere to two safety expectations for any work performed therein: 
(1) safety is the dominant characteristic and value of EM and (2) safety drives the business 
methodology for EM4. Safety culture within EM is founded on several values such as 
demonstrating a commitment to safety through decision-making and leaders’ actions, creating an 
environment in which each employee feels responsible for safety and embracing organizational 
learning, among others. EM believes that all accidents are preventable and an accident-free 
workplace can be achieved through careful planning, close attention to hazard controls, worker 
involvement in task planning, and stopping work where outcomes are uncertain5.  
 
A primary focus of DOE ISM is to prevent accidents from occurring in the first place. EM6 has 
found that this can be achieved through several Guiding Principles: (1) line management 
responsibility for safety, (2) clear roles and responsibilities, (3) competence commensurate with 
responsibilities, (4) balanced priorities, (5) identification of safety standards and requirements, 
(6) hazard controls tailored to the work being performed and (7) clear operations authorization of 
work prior to commencement (DOE, 2011a). In order to monitor occurrences at defense nuclear 
facilities, DOE ISM has a set of safety performance indicators that are maintained on a daily 
basis and summarized monthly. These include OSHA statistics such as: significant injuries, near 
misses, total recordable cases rate, days away restricted on job transfer case rate (DOE, 2008, 
Pages 7-8). In addition, DOE monitors incidents in the following categories: occupational 
safety/industrial hygiene, fire protection, electrical safety, authorization basis, nuclear criticality, 
                                                 
4 The EM Program Management Portion of the DOE webpage. Found at http://energy.gov/em/services/program-
management/safety accessed May 2013.  
5 This sentiment is expressed in the DOE Integrated Safety Management System Guide and can be found on DOE 
EM’s safety web page at http://energy.gov/em/services/program-management/safety. (Accessed September 2013).  
6 As well as NNSA and all DOE defense nuclear facilities. 
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radiological control, conduct of operations, equipment degradation or failure, and environmental 
releases (DOE, 2008, Page 8). DOE-EM also performs analyses on these categories periodically 
to identify incident trends for organizational learning (DOE, 2008, Page 8). As indicated in 
several conversations documented with a DOE- EM safety manager, a number of these 
performance indicators would also be of importance in the chemical industry and are of 
consequence in either type of facility, or as in the case of the proposed research, a nuclear 
chemical facility (Hutton, 2012). 
 
While the DOE’s ISM process, and several of the others discussed above, are focused on 
preventing accidents from occurring, if there is an occurrence7, the DOE turns to the accident 
investigation process described in DOE Order 225.1B and the subsequent causal analysis 
(through Order 232.2) to identify lessons to be learned (DOE, 2011e; DOE, 2011c).  
 
DOE Order 225.1B defines the process for accident investigation of DOE occurrences through 
the following steps: (1) determination of whether or not an accident is of the severity to warrant 
the appointment of an Accident Investigation Board (AIB), (2) notification of other agencies in 
accordance with public laws or regulations, (3) conducting the investigation, to be described in 
further detail below, and (4) closing out the investigation (DOE, 2011e, Pages 3-8). The first step 
in the investigation process is to evaluate the severity of an accident and appoint the AIB, which 
consists of a chairperson and 5-6 members, all DOE Federal employees with subject matter 
expertise and knowledge of DOE’s ISM program. During the investigation process, the AIB will 
                                                 
7 An occurrence is defined by DOE O 232.2 as follows: One or more (i.e., recurring) events or conditions that 
adversely affect, or may adversely affect, DOE (including NNSA) or contractor personnel, the public, property, the 
environment, or the DOE mission. Events or conditions meeting the criteria thresholds identified in this Order or 
determined to be recurring through performance analysis are occurrences. An accident is a high consequence 
occurrence, and the DOE has few occurrences in the ORPS that would be considered accidents. 
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examine the accident scene, investigate interested and/or impacted individuals, organizations, 
management systems or facilities, examine DOE and contractor documentation, interview 
witnesses or personnel associated with the accident and perform engineering tests and analyses 
as appropriate. From these data sources, the AIB will derive causal factors (direct, root and 
contributing causes) associated with human performance and safety management systems which 
will be used to support the development of an accident investigation report. In closing out the 
investigation, Lessons Learned will be formally distributed, and corrective actions must be 
approved, completed and implemented (DOE, 2011e, Pages 5-8). Only the most impactful 
accidents are assessed using the DOE O 225.1B process. DOE Order 232.2 defines the DOE 
method for occurrence reporting and processing of operations information. Essentially, this order 
lays out the mechanisms and methodologies that DOE sites are required to use when reporting 
and analyzing occurrences. It additionally designates how and under what circumstances an 
occurrence must be reported. In this context, “occurrence” is a DOE term of art encompassing 
ten major groups of events at facilities: operational emergencies; personnel safety and health 
accidents and illnesses; nuclear safety basis violations; facility status degradations; 
environmental releases; exceeding radioactive contamination/radiation control limits; nuclear 
explosive safety process issues; packaging and transportation anomalies; noncompliance  with 
Environmental Safety and Health (ES&H) notifications; and a “catch-all” category of 
management concerns/issues. Occurrence reports thus represent a category of off-normal events 
that are important for the purpose of continuous improvement but do not rise to the level of 
impact warranting a DOE O 225.1B accident investigation. 
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These major event categories are further segmented into subgroups. For example, the major 
category “Personnel Safety and Health,” is further divided into six subgroups: A) Occupational 
Injuries, B) Occupational Exposure, C) Fires, D) Explosions, E) Hazardous Electrical Energy 
Control, and F) Hazardous Energy Control (other than electrical). Within each subgroup, the 
Order sets forth criteria for categorizing occurrences within the scheme according to the 
“severity” of the occurrence as rated according to significance categories.  
 
These significance categories “provide a means to reflect perceived risk associated with a given 
occurrence… [and] take into consideration the potential consequence of an occurrence in terms 
of health, safety and security to personnel, the public, the environment, and the operational 
mission (DOE, 2011(c), Attachment 2 Page 1).” Significance categories decrease in severity 
from Operational Emergency to Significance Categories 1 through 4 (with the additional 
Category R reserved for recurring occurrences). 
 
Under the order, Operational Emergency (OE) and Significance Category 1 (SC1) occurrences 
“reflect management’s judgment that circumstances pose an immediate or near term potential for 
harm unless promptly mitigated or that the occurrence meets reporting thresholds established by 
other regulatory requirements.” An OE is defined as “major unplanned or abnormal events or 
conditions that: involve or affect DOE/NNSA facilities and activities by causing, or having the 
potential to cause, serious health and safety or environmental impacts; require resources from 
outside the immediate/affected area or local event scene to supplement the initial response; and, 
require time-urgent notifications to initiate response activities at locations beyond the event 
scene. SC1 categorization is reserved for those occurrences that are severe, yet do not fall within 
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the bounds of the OE definition. Less severe occurrences (SC2-SC4; SCR) still require 
mitigation, response and reporting, but do not necessitate the sort of emergency response 
necessitated by an OE/SC1 occurrence. 
 
In addition to laying out a categorization scheme, DOE Order 232.2 also sets forth occurrence 
report preparation guidelines that explain the required contents and details for each report.  
Finally, the Order includes an occurrence-reporting process that explains the timeline governing 
when notifications and reports must be provided, and to whom those reporting notifications and 
reports must be sent. 
 
DOE Standard 1197-2011, Occurrence Reporting and Causal Analysis describes a component of 
the occurrence reporting requirements set forth by DOE Order 232.2: causal analysis. As part of 
the occurrence reporting required by DOE Order 232.2, an occurrence report must contain a 
causal analysis: “apparent causes and causal factors, which include direct, root and contributing 
causes, should be identified as a result of these analyses.” The Standard contains a Causal 
Analysis Tree (CAT), see below, to be used to determine the appropriate cause codes applicable 
to an occurrence. The CAT consists of 7 main branches that divide possible causes for an 
occurrence as follows: Design/Engineering Problem (A1), Equipment/Material Problem (A2), 
Human Performance Less Than Adequate (LTA8) (A3), Management Problem (A4), 
Communication LTA (A5), Training Deficiency (A6), and Other Problem (A7). 
 
                                                 
8 LTA is a term applied to indicate less than adequate performance, or weakness in a given area. In DOE STD 1197 
this acronym is used to define breakdowns or gaps in a safety function.  
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In addition to DOE investigations of individual accidents at DOE facilities, the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) conducts investigations of individual accidents, or broader 
safety issues or concerns across the DOE complex, which may have adversely affected public 
health or safety (U.S.C. Ch. 42 No. 2286, 1989, Page 3). From these independent investigations, 
the DNFSB can issue recommendations, which must be addressed by the DOE through a formal 
response and implementation plan. Implementation progress is tracked by the DNFSB.  
 
2.2.2. Safety at NRC Nuclear Facilities 
 
The NRC regulates safety at commercial nuclear fuel cycle facilities (gaseous diffusion plants, 
highly enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities, low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication 
facilities, and uranium hexafluoride production facilities) in the U.S. using a series of inspections 
focused on reviews of safety, safeguards, and environmental protection, as well as reporting on 
abnormal occurrences at NRC licensed facilities. These inspections, which may occur multiple 
times in a year, cover activities such as nuclear criticality control, chemical process, emergency 
preparedness, fire safety, and radiation safety (NRC, 2014). The NRC may also enforce 
compliance to regulations using sanctions called enforcement actions which may take the form 
of notices, fines, or restriction/removal of operating licenses. Presently, the NRC is working to 
enhance oversight of fuel cycle facilities by developing a structured regulatory framework, the 
Revised Fuel Cycle Oversight Process (RFCOP) (NRC, 2015). The NRC purview over nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities is established in 10 CFR 70, which establishes the procedures and criteria for 
NRC issuance of licenses to receive title to, own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use, and 
transfer special nuclear material; and establishes and the terms and conditions upon which the 
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Commission will issue such licenses (CFR, 1991b), and 10 CFR 40, which establishes the 
procedures and criteria for source and byproduct materials licensing (CFR, 1991a). 
 
Abnormal occurrences are defined by Public Law 93-438 as an unscheduled incident or event 
that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines to be significant from the 
standpoint of public health or safety (U.S. Public Law, 1974). These abnormal occurrences are 
reported to Congress annually by the NRC. The NRC considers an event to be an abnormal 
occurrence if it involves a “major reduction in the degree of protection of public health or safety” 
and could include: “moderate exposure to, or release of, radioactive material licensed by or 
otherwise regulated by the Commission; major degradation of essential safety-related equipment; 
and major deficiencies in design, construction, use of, or management controls for facilities or 
radioactive material licensed by or otherwise regulated by the Commission (NRC, 2014b, 
Appendix A).”  
 
Aside from abnormal occurrences, the NRC has technical specifications to review the required 
Safety Analysis Report provided by the facility during the licensing process. These specifications 
are facility specific; for example, the Light Water Reactor safety analysis must include review of 
the site characteristics, design of the structures, components, equipment and systems, engineered 
safety features, conduct of operations, accident analysis, and severe accidents, among other 
topics (NRC, 2014c). 
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2.2.3. Safety Guidance from International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Facilities 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publishes a set of international safety 
standards that provide guidance that can be applied to facilities in the U.S. According to the 
IAEA, these international safety standards “provide support for States in meeting their 
obligations under general principles of international law, such as those relating to environmental 
protection and promote and assure confidence in safety (IAEA, 2009, Page vii).” These standards 
“establish fundamental safety principles, requirements and measures to control the radiation 
exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment, to restrict the 
likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain 
reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation, and to mitigate the consequences of 
such events if they were to occur (IAEA, 2009, Page viii).” Such safety standards and subsequent 
guides exist for a wide array of safety topics including radiation protection, radioactive waste 
management, maintenance, surveillance, training, commissioning, among many others.  
 
Similar to the DOE’s ISM, IAEA Safety Requirement GS-R-3, The Management System for 
Facilities and Activities provides the requirements for a management system that integrates 
safety, health, environmental, security, quality, and economic elements with safety being the 
fundamental principle. The requirement states that process requirements, such as applicable 
regulatory, statutory, legal, safety, health, environmental, security, quality and economic 
requirements, are specified and addressed, and hazards and risks are identified, together with any 
necessary mitigatory actions (IAEA, 2006, Page 11). 
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The IAEA staff also investigates international accidents and produces reports to distribute 
lessons learned to an international audience. These reports may take the form of short accident 
overviews with and overview and lessons learned, or longer accident reports with a synopsis of 
accidents and recommendations, as well as lessons learned. The main goal of these investigations 
is to disseminate information about the accidents to potentially prevent future recurrence at 
similar facilities. For example, the IAEA developed a special report to cover a radiological 
accident that occurred in 1993 at the reprocessing plant at Tomsk, Russia (IAEA, 1998). The 
recommendations of this investigation included similar themes to those discussed in this research 
including a recommendation that plant managers “ensure that operational procedures are 
continually appraised, equipment is updated and personnel adequately trained for the type of 
work involved;” and to “check continuously the equipment at their disposal for monitoring the 
effects of their operations and ensure that it is suitable for both normal and emergency situations 
(IAEA, 1998, Pages 72-73)”.  The IAEA may also determine the necessity of a topic-specific 
meeting based on an accident type or theme to provide more general lessons learned to the 
industry. 
 
2.3. Safety at Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
The following sections describe the current status of safety at nuclear chemical facilities, where 
information is available, including the Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and safety culture. 
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2.3.1. DOE Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
Chemical safety at DOE facilities is guided by two handbooks. DOE HDBK 1101-2004, Process 
Safety Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals provides the information required to 
determine if a chemical process is covered by OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) rule 
and gives an interpretation of the PSM rule, describing DOE programs that may satisfy the 
requirements of the rule (DOE, 2004a). DOE HDBK 1100-2004 Chemical Process Hazard 
Analysis facilitates the performance of process hazard analyses (required under PSM) at DOE 
facilities (DOE, 2004b). Each facility must prepare a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) in 
accordance with DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility 
Documented Safety Analysis, which provides documentation of the safety basis on which the 
facility will operate (DOE, 2014b). The development of the DSA for nonreactor facilities is 
similar to that of reactor facilities and requires site characterization, identification of the scope of 
work and process characteristics, hazard evaluation, accident analysis, control selection, 
derivation of technical safety requirements and safety management programs, among other goals 
(DOE, 2014b). 
 
The DOE has a Chemical Safety Program and a Chemical Safety Topical Committee (CSTC), 
cosponsored by the DOE Office of Worker Safety and Health Policy and the ESH Workgroup of 
the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG). The purpose of the Chemical Safety Program 
is to provide a forum for the exchange of best practices, lessons learned, and guidance in the area 
of chemical management. The CSTC provides a forum for DOE and DOE Contractor personnel 
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to identify chemical safety-related issues of concern and find solutions to these issues (DOE, 
2014a). 
 
2.3.2. Safety at NRC Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
Some work has been completed in the nuclear industry defining specific ways with which to deal 
with the chemical hazards within a nuclear facility that also contains chemical hazards. One such 
document is NUREG 1601, Chemical Process Safety at Fuel Cycle Facilities (NRC, 1997b). 
This report was designed to provide some broad guidance on chemical process safety issues that 
could arise at a fuel cycle facility and provide potential mitigation techniques for chemical 
incidents to decrease the potential for radiological and chemical exposure to workers, the public 
and the environment. NUREG 1601 lists four types of hazards that are generally associated with 
a fuel cycle facility: (1) radiation risk from radioactive materials, (2) chemical risks from 
radioactive materials, (3) plant conditions which affect the safety of radioactive materials and (4) 
plant conditions which result in an occupational risk. Hazards 1-3 are the responsibility of the 
NRC; Hazard 4 is typically the responsibility of OSHA.  
 
There are several requirements for chemicals at an NRC regulated nuclear facility. The first 
requirement is the collection of chemical process information and the second, the availability of 
such information to the employees responsible for chemical process safety in the facility. This 
information should include at minimum a process description, purpose, material form, process 
chemicals, process variables, process control, materials of construction, safety features, and a 
discussion of auxiliary systems such as bulk chemicals, utilities, ventilation, traps and filters and 
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emergency systems (NRC, 1997b). A third requirement states that a hazard audit should be 
performed that includes a system review to address process chemistry, the effects of variable 
chemical additions, energy sources, materials of construction and others (NRC, 1997b). 
 
2.3.3. Guidance from IAEA for Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
Safety Requirements NS-R-5, the Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities also describes the 
IAEA requirements for chemical safety. The requirement states that some facilities may use 
“large quantities of hazardous chemical substances and gases, which may be toxic, corrosive, 
combustible, reactive (i.e. give rise to exothermic reactions) or explosive, and consequently may 
give rise to the need for specific safety requirements in addition to requirements for nuclear 
safety (IAEA, 2008, Page 1).” Further, the requirement states that in the context of fuel cycle 
facilities, “the control of events initiated by chemical hazards can have a significant bearing on 
achieving the fundamental safety objective and events initiated by chemical hazards shall be 
considered in the design, commissioning and operation of the facility (IAEA, 2008, Page 4).” 
Guidance related to the chemical hazards is offered in several IAEA Safety Guides (e.g. IAEA, 
2010), and the requirement also recommends standards from the chemical industry. NS-R-5 also 
requires the use codes and standards for chemical hazard protection.  
 
For example, Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-5, Safety of Conversion Facilities and Uranium 
Enrichment Facilities considers some of the chemical hazards associated with conversion and 
enrichment facilities and discusses the importance of covering chemical hazards: Along with 
UF6, large quantities of hazardous chemicals such as HF are present, therefore, safety analyses 
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for conversion facilities and enrichment facilities should also address the potential hazards 
resulting from these chemicals (IAEA, 2010, Page 4).” The publication then provides 
recommendations for the construction, commissioning, and operation of conversion and 
enrichment facilities with a focus on chemical hazards.  
 
2.3.4. Safety Culture at Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
Another topic that nuclear chemical facilities must contend with is safety culture, defined by the 
DOE as “the organization’s values and behaviors modeled by its leaders and internalized by its 
members, which serve to make safe performance of work the overriding priority to protect the 
workers, public, and the environment (DOE, 2011a, Page 6).” Several reviews of safety culture 
at nuclear waste processing facilities in particular illustrate the commonalities between the 
chemical and nuclear industries and pose several important findings that provide perspective for 
this research. One such analysis suggests that the three major drivers for safety culture include 
management engagement, effective work planning and procedures, and procedure adherence 
with a questioning attitude to ensure procedural problems are identified and fixed (Lowes, 2012, 
Page 8).  
 
Many experts recommend the use of organizational learning and knowledge management as a 
way to use accident precursors and experience in high-hazard industries as a way to avoid 
accidents in the future. One such expert is John Carroll from the MIT Sloan School of 
Management. His work defines accident precursors as events that have to occur for an accident 
to happen but have not yet resulted in an accident (Carroll, 2004, Page 127). His research 
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emphasizes the values of using precursor events as a test of the adequacy of the system defenses 
and a way to collect knowledge about events (Carroll, 2004, Page 127). In particular, his research 
focuses on problem investigation teams at nuclear and chemical facilities, studying how team 
learning, organizational learning and individual learning are connected in these environments. 
One of the problems he cites with these investigation teams is that the causes found are typically 
those that are most familiar to the analysts themselves. Typically the investigation teams see 
what they expect to see, rather than what might be less obvious (Carroll, 2002, Page 10). This 
could illustrate an inherent difficulty in incident investigation. Investigators are industry experts 
and may be expecting a certain outcome to the investigation; thus, there is a chance they might 
find what they are expecting rather than what is there. However, in the context of this research, 
as the CSB uses independent subject matter experts rather than industry experts working at the 
facility which is being investigated, the effects of this phenomenon should be minimized. 
 
2.4. Safety in the Chemical Industry 
 
The following sections describe the current status of safety in the chemical industry including 
OSHA Process Safety Management, the EPA’s Risk Management Plan, the American Chemistry 
Council, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and academic chemical safety research. 
 
2.4.1. OSHA Process Safety Management 
 
Process Safety Management (PSM), a program of OSHA, was created in 1992 because 
unexpected releases of toxic, reactive or flammable liquids had been reported for years and 
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continued to occur. Regardless of the industry of origin of these highly hazardous chemicals, a 
lack of proper control can result in an accident with serious consequences (OSHA, 2000, Page 
1). The PSM program emphasizes the management of hazards associated with these highly 
hazardous chemicals and establishes a management program complete with integrated 
technologies, procedures and management practices.  
 
OSHA regulations and the PSM Guidelines are frequently cited as the reason the chemical 
industry is comparatively safe, considering the high hazard materials handled by these facilities 
on a daily basis9. The PSM Guidelines were created to prevent unwanted releases of hazardous 
chemicals and prevent exposures to employees, the public or the environment. The chemical 
industry (through these guidelines) predicts that, similarly to the nuclear industry, the most 
effective PSM program requires a systematic approach of evaluating the entire chemical process 
(OSHA, 1994, Page 1). Important review categories for PSM include: chemical hazards, process 
technology and equipment, process safety information, employee involvement, process hazard 
analysis, operating procedures, employee training, contractor requirements and responsibilities, 
pre-startup safety reviews, hot work permitting, management of change, incident investigation, 
emergency planning and response, compliance audits, trade secrets, and mechanical integrity 
(OSHA, 1994, Pages 3-16). 
 
In the aftermath of accidents such as the BP (formerly British Petroleum) Texas City refinery 
explosion of 2005, OSHA created a special emphasis program (SEP) on the national level, the 
National Emphasis Program. In the case of the BP Texas City refinery explosion, the refinery 
                                                 
9 Citations include successes of OSHA’s PSM cited in 78FR236 (2013), Pages 73756-73768, NEP Program 
highlighted by Barab (2012), Ozog et. al., (2012) among others. 
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National Emphasis Program was created to evaluate the implementation of existing PSM 
programs within the refinery industry (Ozog and Forgione, 2012, Page 27). After this pilot scale 
program demonstrated some level of success, OSHA rolled out a chemical National Emphasis 
Program to shift the focus onto any PSM covered facility10. During this program, OSHA found 
that although the PSM programs were formally in place at all covered facilities, their 
implementation is often either incomplete or insufficient (Ozog and Forgione, 2012, Page 27). 
Thus, OSHA’s chemical National Emphasis Program will allow for the investigation (either 
planned or unplanned) of PSM at facilities to determine to what degree the plan is implemented. 
These investigations are to be performed in addition to the CSB investigations at the same sites. 
In a similar fashion to the CSB recommendations, OSHA releases action items and identifies 
corrective actions. However, since OSHA is the regulator, these action items must be completed 
for the facility to be in compliance with the required PSM guidelines. After the completion of the 
Chemical NEP pilot in 2011, 173 inspected sites were issued citations, with approximately 60% 
of the citations relating to PSM. The most frequent PSM citations were Mechanical Integrity 
(23%), Process Safety Information (21%) and Process Hazard Analysis (16%) (Barab, 2012, 
Page 3). 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 The following is the definition of a PSM covered facility: A process which involves a chemical at or above the 
specified threshold quantities listed in an appendix; A process which involves a Category 1 flammable gas (as 
defined in 1910.1200(c)) or a flammable liquid with a flashpoint below 100 °F (37.8 °C) on site in one location, in a 
quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9 kg) or more except for: Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace 
consumption as a fuel (e.g., propane used for comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle refueling), if such fuels are not a 
part of a process containing another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard; Flammable liquids with a 
flashpoint below 100 °F (37.8 °C) stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred which are kept below their normal 
boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration. OSHA. 2012.  
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2.4.2. EPA Risk Management Plan 
 
The EPA also has a requirement for risk management at high hazard facilities. The Risk 
Management Plan (RMP) implements Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments and 
requires facilities that maintain an inventory above a certain threshold of particular hazardous 
substances (a list is maintained by the EPA) to submit and update a risk management plan to the 
EPA at least every 5 years. The RMP is made accessible to members of the community, and can 
be particularly useful to local emergency responders who may respond to emergencies and 
accidents at the facility.  
 
The RMP for each facility must include: a hazard assessment that details the potential effects of 
an accidental release, an accident history of the last five years, and an evaluation of worst-case 
and alternative accidental releases; a prevention program that includes safety precautions and 
maintenance, monitoring, and employee training measures; and an emergency response program 
that spells out emergency health care, employee training measures and procedures for informing 
the public and response agencies (e.g. the fire department) should an accident occur (EPA, 
2015).  
 
2.4.3. American Chemistry Council Responsible Care 
 
Along with OSHA and EPA regulations, there is industry guidance for safety at chemical 
facilities. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) provides such guidance for the global 
chemical industry to improve employee safety, and work towards improving the health of the 
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environment as a whole through the Responsible Care Program. Established in 1984, the 
Responsible Care program was adopted by the U.S. in 1988, and participation is mandatory in 
order to be a member of the ACC. The relevant guiding principles of Responsible Care are as 
follows (ACC, 2015): 
 To work with customers, carriers, suppliers, distributors and contractors to foster the safe 
and secure use, transport and disposal of chemicals and provide hazard and risk 
information that can be accessed and applied in their operations and products.  
 To design and operate facilities in a safe, secure and environmentally sound manner.   
 To instill a culture throughout all levels of the organizations to continually identify, 
reduce and manage process safety risks.   
 To cooperate with governments at all levels and organizations in the development of 
effective and efficient safety, health, environmental and security laws, regulations and 
standards.   
 To make continual progress toward a goal of no accidents, injuries or harm to human 
health and the environment from products and operations and openly report health, 
safety, environmental and security performance.   
The Responsible Care Management System is a key piece of the Responsible Care program, that  
provides a management approach to improve company performance in the areas of community 
awareness and emergency response; security; distribution; employee health and safety; pollution 
prevention; and process and product safety. Participation in the system requires an auditor to 
assure there is a structure in place to measure, manage, and verify performance meeting the 
standards of Responsible Care.  
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A part of the management system, the Process Safety Code is a set of management practices that 
address leadership and culture, accountability; knowledge, expertise and training; understanding 
and prioritization or process safety risks; comprehensive process safety management system; 
information sharing; and monitoring and improving performance (ACC, 2012, Pages 1-2). The 
Process Safety Code is designed to work in concert with the other branches of the Responsible 
Care program, as well as OSHA’s PSM and EPA’s RMP, both discussed previously.   
 
Responsible Care participation also requires the monitoring of performance measures including 
environmental metrics such as hazardous air pollutants released, SOx and NOx emissions and net 
water consumption; energy metrics such as greenhouse gas emissions and energy efficiency; 
safety metrics such as the number of process safety incidents, DOT-reportable distribution 
incidents, OHSA recordable lost workday incidence and fatalities; and accountability metrics 
such as community outreach and emergency response initiatives.  
 
2.4.4. American Institute of Chemical Engineers Center for Chemical Process Safety 
 
Aside from the work of OSHA, the EPA, and the ACC, there are industry groups, such as the 
American Institute for Chemical Engineers’ (AIChE) Center for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS), which dedicate their research to the analysis of safety in the chemical industry, both in 
terms of accident prevention and accident investigation. CCPS is a corporate membership 
organization composed of some members of AIChE that addresses process safety needs through 
developing guides, courses, and literature to improve industrial process safety. One area of CCPS 
work of particular utility to this study was the guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, 
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which provided current hazard analysis methodologies (CCPS, 2008). CCPS also has a guide 
written about performance measure use which had several leading performance indicators that 
inspired those developed later in this study (CCPS, 2011). 
 
2.4.5. Academic Chemical Safety Research 
 
Chemical safety is a field which has been studied in great detail in the last several decades, 
largely due to the high consequences of accidents at chemical facilities such as the BP Texas 
City Refinery Explosion, and the Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) release. The three main 
categories of safety topics in this industry have been described as: hazard identification, risk 
assessment and accident prevention (Kharbanda and Stallworthy, 1988, Page 3). Researchers 
agree that despite the highly hazardous nature of the materials used in the chemical industry, 
overall, it has an excellent safety record. In their book, Kharbanda and Stallworthy define five 
(5) major elements to safety in the chemical industry. The first is that experience is the best 
teacher—the best way to increase safety is to learn and apply lessons learned from accidents that 
have already occurred. This speaks to the importance of the investigation side of safety 
management in the chemical industry as a primary change maker. The second is that 
management is responsible for minimizing risk. This is consistent with the principle in the 
nuclear industry that the manager must illustrate dedication to safety management (stated in 
DOE ISM—line management is responsible for safety)11. Although in many instances, 
equipment failure is seen as the proximate cause of an accident, failures of safety management 
programs are of equal importance. The third is loss prevention. As the chemical facilities studied 
                                                 
11 This study was published in 1988, and thus predates much of the nuclear industry safety culture/safety conscious 
work environment work, so while the issues addressed are similar to the DOE or NRC approach, the terminology 
differs to a degree. 
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were all businesses, the primary goal is to make a profit. Thus, loss prevention can also become a 
major motivator for safety in the chemical industry. Kharbanda and Stallworthy suggest that this 
loss prevention can be thought of as a combination of developments in operational and 
diagnostic technology, insurance, and regulatory control (Kharbanda and Stallworthy, 1988, 
Pages 3-38). 
 
A study at several chemical agent destruction pilot plants contains information about the 
application of process safety metrics to these high-hazard facilities. For instance, several of the 
key causes of process safety accidents identified include standard operating procedure 
deficiencies, equipment malfunction, human factors and communications deficiencies (National 
Research Council, 2011, Page 4). These are typically thought of as lagging metrics, or after-
accident metrics for safety. The study also looked at what were believed to be several leading 
metrics including: process safety near-miss events, closure of action items, completion of 
emergency response drills, management of change, and others (National Research Council, 2011, 
Page 4). In addition to discussing leading and lagging performance metrics, this report also 
emphasized the importance of managerial leadership in these facilities, citing their role in setting 
the tone and articulating performance expectations. The study of managerial leadership yields an 
important factor, highlighted in much of the literature with regards to safety at nuclear facilities: 
safety culture. The safety culture is a way in which safety is managed in the workplace, which 
focuses on the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values that are embodied by the employees 
during their tenure.  
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Other studies of incidents in the chemical industry work to illustrate how accidents can be used 
to gather helpful evidence and develop lessons learned for future operations. One such study by 
Hendershot, et al, discusses the importance of a seemingly small and insignificant incidents, for 
example a pipe rupture at a small plant to the chemical industry (Hendershot et al, 2003, Page 
48). The importance of even a small incident is echoed by Marcus and Nichols in their work 
about the importance of warnings in accident prevention. Through a study of several major 
accidents, they discuss missed warning signs, misapplied knowledge, and the ways that 
information could have changed the face of the chemical industry (Marcus and Nichols, 1999, 
Page 483). Marcus and Nichols go on to address the importance of behaviors and capabilities, 
typically regarded in the nuclear industry as the safety culture of the facility, which led to 
potential accidents (Marcus and Nichols, 1999, Page 496). 
 
2.5. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
 
The United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is an advisory group charged by Congress with 
the investigation of chemical accidents at fixed chemical facilities. Authorized by the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990, the CSB became operational in January of 1998.12 The role of the 
CSB, as defined by Congress, is to investigate accidents to determine the conditions and 
circumstances which led up to the event and identify the causes so that similar events could be 
prevented. The operations of the CSB are similar to the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB); any investigation by the CSB is independent of rulemaking, inspection and enforcement 
of the EPA and OSHA, just as the NTSB’s work is independent of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). Although the CSB was created to function independently of these 
                                                 
12  Specifically, the authorizing legislation is in Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  
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agencies, it typically cooperates with the EPA and OSHA to complete investigations and then 
provide independent recommendations to these agencies and industry.  
 
The CSB performs root cause investigations of chemical accidents. In CSB reporting, a “root 
cause” can be any factor that might have prevented the accident if it had been effectively 
implemented prior to the accident13. The CSB was established as an independent agency in the 
Executive Office of the President specifically so that it might review the effectiveness of 
regulations and regulatory enforcement at several agencies, where applicable. The investigation 
process in the CSB includes investigators from various backgrounds: mechanical and chemical 
engineers, industrial safety experts, and other specialists with experience in the public or private 
sectors. Most of the investigators involved in the CSB have years of experience with safety in the 
chemical industry.  
 
The investigation process used by the CSB is similar to that described by DOE O 225.1B above. 
Upon reaching the site of a chemical incident, the investigators begin to conduct detailed 
interviews of witnesses including plant employees, managers, and neighbors to the plant. 
Chemical samples and any equipment obtained from the site of the accident are sent to an 
independent laboratory for testing. Company safety records, inventories, and operating 
procedures are examined, as investigators begin the process of searching for the cause of the 
accident. In a process that can last several months, the investigators will evaluate the evidence 
                                                 
13 Both definitions provided by the U.S. CSB on their “About the CSB” History Page: http://www.csb.gov/about-
the-csb/ (Accessed September 2013). It is noted that in DOE and NRC usage, “root cause” has a more precise 
definition. For instance, in DOE space, a root cause is defined as: “the cause that, if corrected, would prevent 
recurrence of this and similar occurrences. The root cause does not apply to this occurrence only, but has generic 
implications to a broad group of possible occurrences, and it is the most fundamental aspect of the cause that can 
logically be identified and corrected. There may be a series of causes that can be identified, one leading to another. 
This series should be pursued until the fundamental, correctable cause has been identified (DOE-NE-STD-1004-
92).” 
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collected, consult with CSB Board members and review any applicable regulations and industry 
practices before drafting the key findings, root causes and recommendations into a report.  
Typically this process takes from 6 to 12 months before a draft report is submitted to the CSB 
Board members for consideration; comments are resolved and then these draft reports are voted 
upon and accepted. Differences between this process and the DOE O 225.1B include the level of 
independence (DOE appoints the AIB, which is still composed of DOE Federal Employees 
versus CSB independent investigation team), the timeframe for completing investigations, and 
the ability to drive change (CSB issues recommendations, which are tracked but not enforced 
while DOE issues corrective actions which are tracked and enforceable).  
 
In addition to investigations of particular incidents, the CSB can also conduct evaluations or 
assessments of more general chemical hazards, whether or not they are directly related to an 
accident, similar to the DNFSB’s investigations of DOE facilities. In several cases, these 
evaluations lead to new recommendations for chemical facilities and regulatory bodies such as 
OSHA and the EPA. Some examples of hazards that have resulted in more general hazard 
investigation include combustible dust and reactive chemicals. Typically these investigations 
involve several incidents at different facilities. For instance, the reactive hazards investigation 
looked at 150 incidents involving uncontrolled chemical reactions in industry14. 
 
Another major function of the CSB is the process by which recommendations are made and 
monitored throughout their lifetime, from issuance to closure. Recommendations made by the 
Board are to be justified and supported by the findings of incident or hazard investigations, the 
                                                 
14 US CSB. Improving Reactive Hazard Management. A hazard investigation released October 2002. Accessed via 
the CSB website at: http://www.csb.gov/improving-reactive-hazard-management/  
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review of accident trends or the conclusions of results of safety studies. These recommendations 
are first presented to the Board as a part of draft reports, at which point they are voted upon. By 
definition, a recommendation is a course of action that has been adopted by the Board and 
transmitted to correct an identified deficiency. Once approved, each recommendation is tracked 
until it is closed. Each recommendation receives follow-up activity from the CSB 
recommendations staff every 6 months (CSB, 2013b). Closure of a recommendation may only be 
achieved through voting by the Board. The recommendation process is of high importance to the 
CSB as it is the major tool used to transmit potential corrective actions to industry (CSB, 2013b).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the general methodologies applied to this study to develop 
recommendations for performance measures and improvements in safety at nuclear chemical 
facilities. The goal of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with the methodologies employed 
in this research. The objectives of the chapter are to provide an overview of the database, to 
discuss the rationale for going beyond typical root cause analysis, to provide an overview of 
grounded theory development and qualitative research, and to familiarize the reader with content 
analysis, analytic hierarchy process, and probabilistic risk assessment.  
 
The overall goal of this work is to create a set of potential performance and safety measures, 
based on past performance, the input of subject matter experts, and quantitative analysis, to help 
improve operating efficiency and safety at nuclear chemical facilities; thus, using data and trends 
analyzed from chemical industry accident reports and DOE and NRC occurrence reports to 
develop leading performance indicators that could drive improvements in operations. The overall 
framework of this study combines qualitative and quantitative insights and involves detailed 
review of chemical industry accident reports and DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrence 
reports. The goals of applying the methods described in this chapter were to develop of a 
comprehensive understanding of chemical and nuclear industry accidents and their most 
common causes, to identify commonalities and disparities in causes of accidents in the chemical 
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industry and the nuclear industry, to develop theories from the accident database about ways to 
improve safety and efficiency at nuclear chemical facilities, and to identify and validate the 
safety and performance measures.  
 
The most common method for accident analysis in both the chemical and nuclear industries is 
root cause analysis (RCA). In RCA, the person investigating and reporting on the accident 
typically uses causal analysis techniques to determine the causes of the accident. Root cause 
analysis is a process in which relevant events and conditions are identified, causal factors are 
identified, the deep underlying causes of the causal factors (root causes) of the causal factors are 
identified, and the focus is put on effective, long term solutions to these root causes (Vanden 
Heuvel, 2008, Page 9). Root cause analysis typically provides several areas of focus for 
improvement or prevention from similar causal factors recurring. All CSB accident reports 
contain root causes, it is one of the primary methods employed by the CSB accident investigation 
team. 
 
However, RCA may not uncover the full range of causes in an accident scenario. This method 
may be limited by the team involved in the analysis—the outcomes of the RCA may be 
dependent upon the team composition, and the expertise of the individual members. For 
example, an expert in ergonomics may find the ergonomics of the control room to be a root cause 
because that is his area of expertise, while another person may find a different root cause 
depending on his or her expertise. Further, the root cause analysis method may oversimplify 
causality and the accident process or omit any indirect interactions among events (Leveson, 
2011).  
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Therefore, while root cause analysis provides insight into some of the causes of the accident, for 
this study, it was necessary to go beyond the investigator identified root causes and Key Issues 
and examine the full text of the report to gain a full picture of the accident using the methods 
described in this chapter. In doing so, factors that were not previously identified root causes but 
contributed to the accident came to light.  
 
This chapter is broken down into several sections that describe the methods applied in this work 
as follows: 
 3.2 Database Overview 
 3.3 Grounded Theory Development 
 3.4 Content Analysis 
 3.5 Analytical Hierarchy Process 
 3.6 Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
 
3.2. Database Overview 
 
While much can be gained from studying successful facility operations, it can be difficult to 
ascertain what problems might be lurking under the surface until these problems result in an 
accident. The database used for this study is composed of accident reports from the chemical 
industry as reported by the CSB, and occurrence reports from selected DOE and NRC nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
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3.2.1. CSB Accident Reports 
 
60 chemical industry units of analysis were included in this work, composing the available 
database of chemical industry accident reports and safety bulletins released from 1998 to 2012. 
These chemical industry accident reports are written by the CSB staff, a combination of chemical 
and mechanical engineers, industrial safety experts, and other specialists with experience in the 
chemical industry. The reports are written as: a summary of evidence collected; applicable 
regulations and industry practices; interviews with plant managers, workers, labor groups, and 
government authorities; and root cause analysis; and recommendations (after interactions with 
board members).  
 
The reports are divided into two distinct types of documents (as mentioned above): (1) the final 
incident reports and (2) safety information sheets and bulletins. The final incident reports include 
a set of Key Issues determined by the CSB and listed on the front cover of the final report, as 
well as: a full incident analysis, information on processes at the plant, relevant standards or 
regulatory analyses, findings and recommendations. These incident reports range from 10 to 300 
pages, and as such, the level of detail is variable. The safety information sheets and bulletins are 
characterized by the combination of several incidents into one document that typically includes 
some lessons learned and brief summaries of the incidents. The information contained in a safety 
information sheet varies, depending on the timeframe in which it was written and its purpose. 
Some safety sheets contain Key Issues and others do not. Some go into detail about specific 
incidents; others are merely a general overview of a safety issue with recommendations. They 
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address incidents that are described in detail in other final incident reports as well as some 
incidents for which there is no full report. 
 
In a final chemical industry accident report, the information includes Key Issues, an introduction, 
details of operations, a report of any physical evidence from the accident site, an incident 
analysis, an overview of lessons learned and several recommendations for the industry. Safety 
bulletins on the other hand are more variable investigations of general chemical accident hazards. 
These safety bulletins typically involve the review of several previous accidents and can also 
lead to new safety recommendations. Recommendations are the CSB’s primary method for 
achieving industry change and as such, the CSB maintains a record of the implementation of 
each recommendation and can vote to close a recommendation if its actions have been 
satisfactorily completed.15  
 
3.2.2. DOE Occurrence Reports 
 
The other major unit of analysis for this research was occurrence reports, from ORPS. For 
consistency, the occurrence reports analyzed represent the same time frame as the chemical 
industry accident reports, 1998 to 2012, and are associated with a nuclear chemical facility, for 
relevance to the overall research objective. The analysis included 47 DOE ORPS reports. The 
generic parts of an ORPS report include: a summary section with the name of the facility, its 
function, basic facility information, a significance category and building details; a notifications 
section with the HQ notification and other notifications organized by date and time; occurrence 
                                                 
15 The current status of these recommendations includes 74% closed and only 26% open. 64% of the closed 
recommendations are closed by an acceptable action, and those open recommendations are largely awaiting response 
or evaluation (17%).  CSB. (2013). Recommendations. 
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information including a subject or title, reporting criteria, criteria, operating conditions at the 
time of occurrence and immediate actions taken; an Integrated Safety Management System 
(ISM) section including cause codes, and a description of causes; a section for corrective actions; 
lessons learned; and a field to identify similar incidents or events.  
 
3.2.3. NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports 
 
The final category of reports included in this analysis were NRC abnormal occurrence (AO) 
reports to Congress from fuel cycle facilities between 1998 and 2012 (to maintain consistency of 
the dates). During this time period, there were only four (4) abnormal occurrences reported to 
Congress. These abnormal occurrence reports include the criteria by which the event was 
deemed an AO, the date and place, the nature of the event and probable consequences, an 
analysis of key causes identified by the NRC, and actions taken to prevent recurrence for both 
the facility and the NRC. 
 
3.2.4. Process Safety Incidents 
 
Before being analyzed, the reports were screened to determine relevance to process safety (as 
opposed to industrial safety) which was used in this study to screen for significance to operations 
at nuclear chemical facilities. This screening was achieved through the application of the CCPS 
Process Safety incident guidance (CCPS, 2011). The CCPS defines an incident as a “process 
safety incident” if it meets all of the following criteria: 1) process involvement; 2) above 
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minimum reporting threshold; 3) location; and 4) acute release. A flowchart CCPS recommends 
for identifying Process Safety Incidents is also included in Figure 3.1 (from CCPS, 2011).   
 
 
 
3.3. Qualitative Analysis and Grounded Theory 
 
Qualitative analysis, which forms a significant portion of the initial analysis used in this study, is 
defined as any kind of analysis that produces findings or concepts and hypotheses, as in 
grounded theory, that are not arrived at by statistical or quantitative methods (Glaser, 1992, Page 
11). The thrust of qualitative analysis, using grounded theory, is the ability to absorb the data as 
data, step back and distance oneself from it, and then conceptualize the data to form theory 
(Glaser, 1992, Page 11). 
 
At the most basic level, grounded theory stands in contrast to a typical research approach. Using 
grounded theory, the theory is developed based on data collected, as opposed to using the data to 
Figure 3.1 | Process Safety Incident Flowchart (CCPS, 2011) 
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test a theory that has already been developed. This form of research is typically used in 
sociology, which is its primary use in Glaser and Strauss’s The Development of Grounded 
Theory, but its use in this study fits well with the context; evaluating extensive amounts of 
textual data from accidents to develop theories on safety and efficiency of operations at similar 
facilities. The position of Glaser and Strauss is that generating grounded theory is a way to arrive 
at theory that fits its supposed uses, rather than generating theory from deduction based on 
previously held assumptions.  
 
Grounded theory prevents the phenomenon described by Glaser and Strauss as exampling. In 
exampling, it is easy for a researcher to find several examples for any logically deduced theory, 
but because the idea was not derived from the examples (or a comprehensive set of data), the 
examples can seldom correct or change the idea. For instance, if one approached the chemical 
industry accident reports with the theory that a majority of accidents are caused by operator 
error, you could find enough accidents to prove such a theory right or wrong, but are unlikely to 
correct, challenge, or change this assumption. Taking the grounded theory perspective, if one 
takes all of the accident reports and code them, finding that a majority of the accidents are caused 
by operator error, you are able to develop a theory inductively, that is based on evidence and not 
a preconceived assumption.  
 
In this instance, the development of theory is based on a content analysis of a comprehensive set 
of accident reports from the CSB, DOE ORPS, and NRC AOs. The process of content analysis 
and the development of theory from this review of the data is described in more detail as follows.  
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3.4. Content Analysis 
 
In this implementation of grounded theory, the data was collected from each accident report 
using content analysis. Content analysis is a “systematic research method for analyzing textual 
information in a standardized way” that allows the evaluator to develop grounded theory using 
inferences from the information (GAO, 1996, Page 6). The main idea of content analysis is to 
classify and sort textual data, in this case from accident reports, into key ideas or “themes” that 
can be used to develop theory. This is achieved through a process of data labeling and indexing 
known as coding, or marking textual passages with shorthand notations that represent the content 
of original verbal information.  
 
There were several advantages to using content analysis methodology in this study. Content 
analysis procedures allow for a consistent review of a large volume of material. The accidents 
were reported over thousands of pages of text, and content analysis allowed for consistent 
analysis from page to page. Further, content analysis is a systematic process—while a casual 
study of the material might provide insights, this methodology facilitated the consistent 
extraction of information. One downside of content analysis methodology is the use of judgment 
when coding data. It is possible that one reviewer may code a document differently than another 
reviewer, depending on judgments and background, leading to an inconsistency in analysis. In 
the case of this study, the same reviewer completed content analysis of all documents, ensuring 
consistency of application. The results of the content analysis were then verified using alternative 
means, which included: the comparison to root cause and Key Issue data, review by a second 
researcher, and subject matter expert review.  
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The following paragraph described the content analysis process. The data from the accident 
reports was coded16 into distinct concepts17 which were grouped into categories18 and then used 
to form theories19. Codes are shorthand designations used in the set of data for the identification 
of key points. Analysis of these codes led to the formation of concepts which are collections of 
codes that can be logically grouped. Groups of similar concepts compose categories and it was 
these carefully constructed categories that explain the subject of the research in various theories. 
The theories developed to explain categories of concepts were used to develop performance 
measures for nuclear chemical facilities.  An example of this structure can be seen in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2 | Content Analysis Structure 
 
                                                 
16 The process of assigning shorthand designations to a concept which can be used in the text to demarcate the 
presence of that concept throughout the unit of analysis. 
17 The concept is the secondary unit of description used in this analysis and represents a group of codes. Several 
concepts make up a category.  
18 A category is a group of concepts that share similar descriptive characteristics and thus can be grouped for 
enhanced explanatory power.  
19 A theory is an overall assessment formed from the data in the category form. Theory is the big picture 
understanding that will be developed from this research. Theories are distinguished from themes in this work as 
theory is developed formally using the data collected and themes are an informal representation of the data and can 
be derived from external sources, such as OSHA’s Process Safety Management Guide.  
Maintenance and 
Operations 
CODE CONCEPT CATEGORY THEORY 
Ensuring timely 
correction of 
deficiencies will 
improve safety 
and efficiency of 
operations at 
nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
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The coding process was performed using ATLAS.ti, a software program for maintenance of 
coding, document searches and its many other functions. The content analysis software has 
several features which will prove useful in this analysis including: intelligent data management 
with external source referencing; a code manager with unlimited color-coded applications; 
annotated memoing functions; and auto search functions (among many others). The main 
advantage of using the content analysis software is that the program does the record keeping for 
the process. The following Figure 3.3 contains screenshot of the software program that illustrates 
the coding process.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 | Screenshot of Atlas.ti Coding Process 
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The text of the accident report, on the left, was coded using the code headings on the right with 
stars, and memos defining the specific instance of that code, the red notebook icons. The 
software program maintained the record of the selected text, the code, and the memo and then 
provided that information from all reports. It also maintained the frequencies of occurrence of 
the codes and memos. Coding the documents was an iterative process, and each report was coded 
and then checked for consistency with the other reports. Counting the frequency of the codes in 
the content analysis software simply involves running the program across the different units of 
analysis and summing total occurrences.  
 
Finding associations between the various codes requires studying carefully the proximity of 
wording (or codes) in the report. The content analysis software also allows for searching various 
combinations of codes at a given time. This data will then also be evaluated by analyzing 
frequency of occurrence. For instance, in the text of the reports, a code related to hazard 
recognition was often followed by a code related to training. This means that these two issues are 
associated in the text, and may be connected. This process is more thoroughly described in 
Chapter 5 of GAO Guidance 10.3.1.  
 
Ensuring a high-quality content analysis involves evaluating attributes. In selecting categories to 
use during the process, it is important to be exhaustive. An insufficient number of categories 
could lead to missing important information that could be essential to developing performance 
measures. Developing a coding structure from the categories also must be mutually exclusive for 
similar reasons. Each code will represent a single potential occurrence from a single category 
and there should be no overlap between codes. This can be checked by reviewing the coding 
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manual developed during this process. There may also be inconsistencies between the types of 
chemical industry reports being analyzed. For instance, the safety bulletins will discuss one 
issue, such as reactivity, throughout the entire document which might skew the results. Thus, the 
frequency data of words and codes in the two types of documents is analyzed separately. Further 
details on final reporting of the coding process and more specific code creation methodology are 
described in chapter 5 of GAO Guidance 10.3.1. In order to ensure that a comprehensive set of 
categories have been created, the categorization process will be reviewed by a second researcher 
with experience in qualitative/semi-quantitative analysis.  
 
The details of the coding process used for the chemical industry accident reports is described in 
Chapter 4. The process for the nuclear chemical facility accident reports is described in Chapter 
5.  
 
One tool of the methodology for this research was the maintenance of a thorough research 
journal in which detailed information about coding and memoing20 was tracked back to the 
original coding structure. This research journal was maintained throughout the research phases. It 
served as a way to maintain a descriptive log of work to ensure consistency throughout each of 
the research objectives. A further goal of this journal was to have a record of decisions that were 
made regarding data collection and assignment to provide for a review by a second researcher for 
quality assurance purposes. Aside from consistency and maintaining a record of decisions, this 
journal served to record the process of the development of grounded theory through note keeping 
and facilitation of grouping.  The research journal is summarized in Appendix A; the research 
                                                 
20 Memoing is the process of writing up ideas about codes and their associations during the process of coding. This 
process facilitates the development of theory later in the process and serves as a way to keep track of ideas as they 
occur rather than attempting to recreate them after the research has been completed.  
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journal itself was reviewed by a second researcher with experience in qualitative/ semi-
quantitative analysis.   
 
The establishment of this coding structure followed the general analytical guidelines from Glaser 
and Strauss on developing theory. Substantive theory was developed from the data collected in 
previous research objectives. In evaluating the content of the accident reports, certain themes 
emerged and defined the categories that frequented the data set. Examining these categories and 
associations in the text, it was be determined whether a substantive theory for the major themes, 
within the context of nuclear and chemical facilities, could be developed. The substantive 
theories were area specific, while formal theories were for a conceptual area of inquiry. For 
instance, a substantive theory may have been specific to fire safety or emergency crew response. 
From these two substantive theories, we could then determine if a formal theory of emergency 
planning emerged. The precise application of theory development is described in Chapter 6.  
 
3.5. Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 
Once the theories had been developed, and potential performance measures based on these 
theories proposed, the next step was to elicit feedback from nuclear safety and operations subject 
matter experts on the potential performance measures to determine whether they were both 
practical and effective. To do this, we used a method known as Multi-Attribute Decision 
Analysis, and specifically, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). AHP is a methodology of 
structuring, measuring, and synthesizing a decision making process, in this case used to select 
among competing alternatives in a multi-objective environment (Forman, 1999, Page 469). AHP 
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was used to evaluate and prioritize the potential performance measures. It allows us to take a 
complex, unstructured set of decisions and break them into more manageable components, 
arrange them into a logical hierarchy, and compare them one by one, assigning numerical values 
to the variables, and synthesizing these values to determine which components have the higher 
value to the subject matter experts (Saaty, 2001).  The hierarchy used to elicit subject matter 
expert feedback on the proposed performance measures had the structure illustrated in Figure 
3.4, with the addition of several more categories.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 | Proposed Performance Measure Structure 
 
 
In this hierarchy, the subject matter experts first analyze which categories of process safety 
performance measures they would prefer to use to measure safety and efficiency of operations at 
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a nuclear chemical facility. Each of the categories, 1-3, are compared to one another. Then, under 
each category, they compare the proposed performance measures to one another. This process is 
facilitated using a computer software program, which performs the numerical calculations of the 
SME valuation. The software program used was Comparion by Expert Choice. This online 
elicitation tool is a web based program which collects input from those individuals surveyed and 
uses AHP to calculate group preferences based on their input. Each individual was surveyed one 
on one and identified by a participant number. Comparion will maintain the data and ID number 
of the individual participant and provide one excel file at the end of data collection with the 
collective comments from all users sans identifiers.  
 
3.6. Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
 
In order to test whether the proposed performance metrics provided a measurable reduction of 
risk at nuclear chemical facilities, the metrics were applied in the probabilistic risk assessment 
performed for the Defense Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site. PRA is a tool 
that quantifies the outcomes of three key risk inputs—the potential failure or problem, the 
likelihood of that failure occurring, and the consequences if it were to occur. The tool is often 
used to determine the risk of operation at a specific facility, and the highest risk nodes—which 
may later become focus areas for risk reduction. The tool may also be used to assess adequacy of 
plant design and operation—it allows for the identification of potential events that dominate risk 
and the features of the plant that contribute to the frequency of these events. The features of the 
plant may be a wide array of issues such as: potential hardware failures, common-mode failures, 
human errors during testing and maintenance, or procedural inadequacies leading to human 
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errors (NUREG CR-2300, 1983, Page 1-5). The following diagram in Figure 3.5 illustrates the 
PRA process for a nuclear reactor facility (NUREG CR-2300, 1983, Page 2-5):  
 
 
Figure 3.5 | PRA Process for a Nuclear Reactor Facility (NUREG CR-2300, 1983, Page 2-5) 
 
 
The performance measures resulting from the analysis were applied to the quantification of 
accident sequences, and provided reduction in likelihood or consequence of the selected accident 
sequences for the facility, reducing the overall risk in operating the facility. The PRA for DWPF 
was developed and edited in this setting using a Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis (CAFTA) 
program developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). CAFTA includes and event 
tree modeling feature as well as a database in which to insert reliability data. Both features were 
helpful during this analysis. A more detailed description of the application of PRA to this study 
can be found in Chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The following chapter outlines the results from two analyses of the chemical industry accident 
reports. The goal of Chapter 4 is to describe the common causes and themes of process safety 
accidents in the chemical industry. This is achieved through three objectives, an analysis of the 
CSB identified Key Issues from the accident reports, the content analysis of chemical industry 
accidents, and finally, the comparison of these results.  
 
The Key Issues analyses looked at the CSB staff identified Key Issues in chemical industry 
accidents with two separate lenses. The first analysis looked at the Key Issues naturalistically, 
using the text of the issues as they were reported. The second analysis used an OSHA Process 
Safety Management-centered structure to sort the Key Issues into groups based on phrasing and 
textual similarities. The content analysis used the methodology discussed in Chapter 3, with an 
OSHA PSM inspired coding structure to extract relevant data from the text of the chemical 
industry accident reports. The data from this analysis was then compared to the Key Issues data.  
 
This chapter provides the chemical accident analysis results and data, as well as discussion of the 
trends in the chemical industry accidents studied. The data from this analysis will be combined 
with the data from nuclear chemical facilities, contained in Chapter 5, to develop theories about 
safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities with the goal of developing 
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performance measures to improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows: 
4.2 Key Issues Analyses of Chemical Industry Accident Reports 
4.3 Content Analysis of Chemical Industry Accident Reports 
4.4 Overall Results from Chemical Industry Accident Reports 
 
4.2. Key Issues Analyses of Chemical Industry Accident Reports 
 
Chemical industry accident reports provide a wealth of information that can be used to develop 
lessons learned to improve safety and efficiency of operations at chemical industry facilities. The 
CSB is one source of these accident reports. As a part of an investigation and causal analysis 
process, CSB investigators identify “Key Issues” for each chemical accident. This research 
evaluated trends in those Key Issues by applying two distinct analyses of these issues. The first 
analysis assessed the Key Issues naturalistically, as reported by the expert investigation team; 
however, this result was problematic, as about 2/3 of all Key Issues, as described in the chemical 
industry accident reports, occurred only once. In the second analysis, the Key Issues were sorted 
thematically to capture insights from the many single-occurrence issues. This thematic analysis, 
using categories drawn from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) 
Process Safety Management (PSM) guidance, allowed for a more comprehensive understanding 
and grouping of the issues behind the chemical accidents studied. The findings of this research 
identified several accident themes that can be used to develop a better understanding of chemical 
industry accidents and potentially improve safety and efficiency of operations at chemical 
facilities. 
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4.2.1. Key Issues Introduction 
 
One common form of analyzing individual accidents is a causal analysis, or the determination of 
problems, without which the accident would not have occurred. The lessons learned through 
such causal analysis can be collected and shared through regulatory and industry groups to raise 
awareness of certain types of events with the hope of preventing similar events from occurring in 
the future. The CSB is an advisory group that performs a causal analysis and drafts a thorough 
accident report, sharing recommendations with regulators and industry and tracking the 
implementation of these recommendations (CSB, 2013). These chemical industry accident 
reports compose the database that the present work evaluated. 
 
As a part of each accident report, and consistent with the CSB’s congressional tasking to 
“identify contributing causes,” each investigation team defines “Key Issues” which contributed 
to the accident. The Key Issues identified are an expert summary of the major factors 
contributing to the accident; they can include procedural issues ranging from the permitting of 
hot work to specific maintenance problems, or management issues such as a lack of 
organizational learning. These Key Issues are identified through a causal analysis (formal or 
informal), and represent factors that contributed significantly to the accident (CSB, 2013). The 
Key Issues act as a snapshot of the analysis from the investigation team concerning the 
contributing factors to each accident; as such, they provide information which can be used by 
chemical facilities to identify accident reports that may be applicable to their facilities, to help to 
improve process safety. The catalogue of Key Issues, or contributing factors, that has 
accumulated over the years 1998-2012 can be analyzed to identify areas of vulnerability and to 
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develop improvement actions to enhance safety and efficiency of operations at chemical 
facilities.   
 
4.2.2. Key Issues Methodology 
 
The objectives for this work were: to analyze the Key Issues based on their qualitative 
characteristics, quantify the number of occurrences of Key Issues, and search for common Key 
Issues in chemical industry accident reports in order to potentially identify lines of inquiry to 
improve safety and efficiency of operations at chemical facilities. In order to accomplish these 
objectives, this research involved two separate analyses of the Key Issues identified in chemical 
industry accident reports: naturalistic and thematic. The naturalistic analysis involved a 
qualitative categorization of the chemical industry accident report Key Issues, verbatim. In the 
second analysis, a thematic analysis was performed to determine common themes that branch 
across several Key Issues and bring to bear more explanatory power than those developed during 
the first analysis. In the present study, the naturalistic analysis served as a precursor to the 
thematic analysis, and only the results of the thematic analysis were carried forward. 
 
The methodology for this study used a qualitative analysis technique to initially gain insight into 
the causes of accidents in the chemical industry. Similar qualitative analyses have been 
performed on accident documentation (i.e., Gephart, 1993; Roberts, 1990; Vaughan, 1990), and 
provided valuable insight. The most relevant study to this work was Gephart, 1993. Gephart used 
qualitative data analysis facilitated by a computer to develop key word lists for study, a similar 
methodology to the Key Issues analysis described herein (Gephart, 1993). Another study used 
63 
 
qualitative data available through interviews from the chemical industry security field to provide 
recommendations to consider for security improvements (Genserik, 2011). The results of these 
studies provided trends that can be used to recommend improvements, similar to the analysis 
described herein. 
 
4.2.2.1. Naturalistic Analysis 
 
In the naturalistic analysis, the Key Issues were studied as they occurred in the chemical industry 
accident reports; that is, exactly as they were described by the investigation team. The number of 
occurrences of each individual Key Issue was tallied in an attempt to identify Key Issues that 
were potentially common across several incident reports. It was anticipated that these commonly 
occurring Key Issues have the potential to offer clear and significant targets to address in 
working to prevent future accidents. This first analysis involved using a naturalistic qualitative 
method in which the unit of analysis was one chemical industry accident report. Data collection 
consisted of the identification of Key Issues for each document, dividing the Key Issues into 
related concepts and then further subdividing the identified concepts into categories. For this 
approach, the words in the Key Issues were used verbatim, without making any changes or 
assumptions. This naturalistic approach to data analysis is further described in Patton (1987).  
The main objective was to refrain from manipulating the data in any way during this initial 
evaluation, but rather to allow the data to fall into natural groupings based on similarities in 
wording. Performing the Key Issues analysis with a naturalistic approach was intended to capture 
slight differences in terminology and phrasing resulting from differences in accident 
circumstances. This naturalistic method is often used for the analysis of expert opinions (Glaser 
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and Strauss, 1967). A preliminary assessment of frequently occurring Key Issues was 
accomplished (see Table 1 below). Unfortunately, the Key Issues from the chemical industry 
accident reports contain inconsistent terminology and phrasing; the naturalistic approach to the 
Key Issues analysis yielded over 60 distinct single occurrence Key Issues. In other words, from 
the reports evaluated in this research, there are 92 total identified Key Issues, 65% of which 
occurred only once. Examination of many single occurrence issues illustrated that numerous 
variations in description complicated analysis; however, similarity in overall concepts addressed 
indicated that more detailed evaluation of the data could produce valuable trends. 
 
4.2.2.2. Thematic Analysis 
 
In response to the high number of single occurrence Key Issues, a second analysis was 
performed in which the Key Issues were analyzed using thematic grouping. This secondary 
analysis smoothed out major variations in wording, and evaluated the context of the Key Issues 
in the reports, which allowed single occurrence Key Issues to be grouped into appropriately 
themed categories. By combining these categories into logical groups based on similar wording 
and contextual clues, clearer trend information could be extracted concerning the major foci of 
accidents in the chemical industry. 
 
The focus of the thematic analysis was to develop categories based on similar wording, and then 
group these categories into clearly related, higher-level themes. This phase involved the 
development of categories that were both appropriate and meaningful. The Process Safety 
Management (PSM) guidelines were suggested to the authors by subject matter experts in the 
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field, as a logical source for themes in this methodology (Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, 2012). As the chemical industry is required to adhere to these OSHA guidelines, 
which have been in place since 2000, the PSM major headings lent themselves well to a sorting 
approach for the Key Issues identified in the final accident reports.  
 
In addition, several Key Issues suggested additional themes, derived from PSM themes and 
refined through interviews with several industry experts. These additional themes were 
developed by grouping together similar issues and discussing the common themes among the 
groups with several industry experts.  The theme of hazard recognition was derived from the 
naturalistic analysis as a combination of hazard recognition and hazard awareness key issues that 
appeared in the text. Standards issues were grouped together as a combination of standards 
implementation, recognition, oversight, and others. Design and engineering contemplated both 
engineering controls and safety systems, not covered by PSM, but a Key Issue in many accidents 
from the naturalistic analysis. Maintenance issues were derived from the PSM theme of 
Mechanical Integrity and include Key Issues of housekeeping, less than adequate maintenance, 
and planning of maintenance activities based on industry expert input. The themes of human 
factors21 and management oversight were developed after the naturalistic analysis as well, and 
determined to be themes of their own. The thematic analysis structure is illustrated in Figure 4.1, 
and each theme is attributed to either the PSM guidelines (identified by (PSM)) or created based 
on naturalistic analysis with refinement from industry experts (identified by (NA)). 
 
                                                 
21 The human factors code is not an exhaustive set of human factors issues, but rather a set of issues covered by PSM 
and through the chemical industry accident reports. 
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Figure 4.1 | Thematic Key Issues Analysis Structure 
 
 
Once the set of themes was developed, the Key Issues data from the chemical industry accident 
reports were sorted into the appropriate theme. This sorting process was iterative and the 
placement of each topic within a theme was determined by the use of wording or phrasing 
similar to Key Issues in the PSM guide under the section of the rule from which the thematic 
heading was derived. The next step in this process involved looking for “convergence” of Key 
Issues; that is, those topics that could be logically grouped based on a final analysis of the Key 
Issue, its context in the report, and related concepts and topics identified (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). 
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4.2.3. Results 
 
The results for both the Naturalistic Analysis and the Thematic Analysis of the chemical industry 
accident report Key Issues are described below. The two analyses of Key Issues shared some 
similar results. The more detailed results achieved in Thematic Analysis suggested that the more 
frequently occurring themes could be used as lines of inquiry for potential improvement actions. 
 
4.2.3.1. Results for Naturalistic Analysis 
 
Sorting the Key Issues in the first naturalistic approach yielded 93 distinct issues, 60 of which (or 
roughly 2/3) were represented by only one occurrence throughout the 60 reports. The results for 
Key Issues with a frequency of 6 or more (10%) are presented in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 | Naturalistic Key Issue Frequencies 
 
 
Table 4-1 illustrates the distribution of the most frequently occurring Key Issues and the 
relatively low number of occurrences of similarly worded Key Issues. Emergency planning, 
Key Issue Number of 
Occurrences in CSB 
Reports 
Percentage of Reports 
Containing Key Issue (%) 
Emergency Planning, Response, and 
Notification 
15 25.0 
Equipment (or Process) Design and Scale Up  15 25.0 
Regulatory Oversight 7 11.7 
Process Hazards Analysis 7 11.7 
Reactive Hazards and Safeguards 7 11.7 
Operating Procedures 6 10.0 
Accident Investigation and Lessons Learned 6 10.0 
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response and notification, along with equipment or process design and scale up, were both 
represented in the reports with a frequency of 15, meaning that these topics were considered to 
be Key Issues in the accident in approximately 25% of the accidents reported in the database. 
The next tier, with only 7 occurrences, included regulatory oversight, process hazards analysis 
and reactive hazards and safeguards. With 7 occurrences, these issues were prevalent in 
approximately 12% of the accidents reported. Other issues of note included accident 
investigation and lessons learned, and operating procedures in 10% of the accidents.  
 
It is also important to note, as mentioned above, that there were 60 Key Issues with only one 
occurrence which led to the desire to more closely analyze this very large group of Key Issues. 
Many of these Key Issues appeared to share common ideas; either with more frequently 
encountered Key Issues or among others in this “once only” group, based on similar wording. 
Thus it was determined that more detailed analysis was needed, so that clearer trend information 
could be extracted.  
 
4.2.3.2. Results for Thematic Analysis 
 
In an initial, revised thematic sorting of the Key Issues, the data was placed into themes based on 
textual clues, and several themes were created to sort the Key Issues; the preliminary results of 
this thematic analysis have been presented at a conference (Morgan et al., 2012). These findings 
have since been refined, based on feedback received at that conference, using the PSM 
guidelines as the primary source of categories and combining these with several themes 
developed through industry experience (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2012). 
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As discussed previously, the Key Issues were then sorted into each of these new themes. The 
results from this analysis are presented in Table 4-2. Results presented include themes with 
greater than 6 occurrences (10%) in the chemical industry accident reports (as in the naturalistic 
analysis, above). It should be noted that twice as many themes (14) reached this frequency of 
occurrence in this revised analysis.  
 
Table 4-2 | Thematic Key Issues Frequencies 
Theme Total Number 
of Key Issue 
Occurrences 
Percentage of 
Reports 
Containing 
Key Issue (%) 
Design and Engineering 27 45.0 
Standards 24 40.0 
Process Hazard Analysis 23 38.3 
Emergency Planning and Response 22 36.7 
Hazard Recognition 21 35.0 
Operating Procedures 14 23.3 
Maintenance 12 20.0 
Management of Change 11 18.3 
Mechanical Integrity 9 15.0 
Process Safety Information 8 13.3 
Employee Participation 7 11.7 
Accident Investigation 7 11.7 
Training 6 10.0 
Human Factors/Management Oversight 6 10.0 
 
 
As illustrated by the data in Table 4-2, the results from the thematic placement of the Key Issues 
differ from the previous naturalistic analysis. Design and engineering, as well as emergency 
planning and response, still represented two of the most frequently occurring issues; however, 
standards, hazard recognition, and process hazard analysis emerged as among the five (5) most 
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frequently occurring themes in the chemical industry accident reports – each occurring in more 
than one-third (33%) of the reports analyzed. 
 
Once the most common themes were identified, a closer examination of the phenomena 
represented in each of the Key Issues that fall under each theme was used to identify particular 
focus areas in which changes in process safety management could be considered. The following 
five (5) Key Issue themes with more than 20 occurrences, appeared in around 33% of all final 
accident reports in the database, and are examined more closely in what follows.   
 
The most common theme, with occurrences in nearly half of all final accident reports studied 
was design and engineering. Topics in the design and engineering theme can be further divided 
into several phenomena. One of the typical topics in the chemical industry accident reports under 
this theme was a lack of a layered protection system; for instance, the existence of a single alarm 
system which could be compromised in an accident scenario, or a fence with no warning signs or 
locks. Other design and engineering topics included not incorporating accident analysis insights 
into design (e.g., no relief valves on pressurized tanks, no secondary alarm system), specific 
problems with equipment design, and scale up concerns with processes.  
 
The standards theme was also determined to be a common theme in the chemical industry 
accident reports. In this theme, topics addressed were typically split between: insufficient or 
nonexistent regulations (with instances of enforcement issues) and a lack of oversight to ensure 
the standards are being followed.  
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Topics identified under the process hazard analysis theme related to the OSHA-prescribed 
process hazard assessment (PHA) which each facility is required to undergo at a minimum of 
every 5 years. In general, phenomena relating to the PHA were subdivided as follows: the PHA 
was incomplete or lacked required information, the PHA was out of date, or the PHA was not 
performed by an appropriate team of knowledgeable employees. The most common of these 
topics was the lack of information in the PHA.  
 
In the emergency planning and response theme, the most common topics identified were related 
to the responsibilities of the on-site staff/management and emergency crews responding to the 
accident. On site, the most common topics included a lack of planning or guidance for 
employees and managers on proper management of emergency situations, along with instances 
in which the planning and guidance were in place but employees and management were not 
familiar with or did not adhere to the plan. Problems associated with emergency crews typically 
centered on a lack of understanding of reactive chemical management, a lack of preparation, or a 
lack of knowledge about the accident unfolding at the plant. 
 
Hazard recognition was the final theme with more than 20 (33%) occurrences in the reports. This 
particular theme involved instances in which the staff and management were unable to recognize 
and properly respond to potential hazards at the facility. Some of the most common occurrences 
of this include the lack of recognition of combustible dust hazards, boiling liquid expanding 
vapor explosion (BLEVE) hazards, and hot work hazards. 
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4.3. Content Analysis of Chemical Industry Accident Reports 
 
The Key Issues analysis provided an overview of areas deemed important by the CSB 
investigators, but this root cause analysis may have left out some issues important to this 
research. The following sections describe the content analysis of the chemical industry accident 
reports.  
 
4.3.1. Content Analysis Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, causal analysis has some flaws; most significantly for this analysis, 
there could be bias introduced into the causal analysis and identification of Key Issues by the 
investigator. He or she may have been more inclined to find and report causes and Key Issues 
that were more familiar to them or their background. Further, the nature of these accident reports 
could lend them to bias based on the focus of safety in the chemical industry. For instance, safety 
culture, did not become an identified theme in the chemical industry accidents until its 
emergence after the BP Texas City Refinery incident.  
 
In light of these potential biases, the best potential course of action determined was to perform a 
content analysis using the full text of the accident reports, to extract information that was of 
importance, but may not have been highlighted by the causal analysis or identification of Key 
Issues. This process produced results that both complemented the Key Issues analysis and 
provided additional insights to provide a full picture of the chemical industry accidents studied.  
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The following sections describe the specific application of content analysis methodology to the 
chemical industry accident reports, as well as the results of this analysis. The results of both 
analyses have been compared with those from nuclear chemical facilities, described in Chapter 5, 
and used to develop theories about increasing safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
 
4.3.2. Content Analysis Methods 
 
The methodology for this analysis involved performing a content analysis on the chemical 
industry accident incident reports to provide insight into safety themes of chemical industry 
accidents. In content analysis, the goal was to independently identify important instances of the 
themes using the entire text of the reports, and then subdivide the data into codes, discussed 
below. This was completed in a process known as data labeling or indexing, described in detail 
in Chapter 3. 
 
For this task, the unit of analysis was one chemical industry final incident report. Each report 
was uploaded into the content analysis software (ATLAS.ti) and coded manually.  The content 
analysis software has several features which were useful in this analysis including: intelligent 
data management with external source referencing; a code manager with unlimited color-coded 
applications; annotated memoing functions; and auto search functions (among many others). The 
main advantage of using the content analysis software was that the program did the record 
keeping for the process. Once the chemical industry accident incident report was uploaded into 
the data base, automatic text searches and coding were possible. All work was auto-saved and 
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codes (see below) documented. A single code could be run through the entire body of data with 
one click and the frequency of use analyzed. 
 
A coding structure was created for this analysis and applied to each document manually using 
the content analysis software. Maintenance of the coding structure was essential to this work. A 
coding manual was maintained in the content analysis software with a list of codes and 
definitions as well as a document containing overall coding guidance from the process. By 
definition, codes are abbreviations or shorthand versions of the concepts to mark a series of text.  
 
The coding structure for this analysis was developed using OSHA PSM and input from the Key 
Issues analysis and industry experts.  Each code is broken down further using memos, which 
describe the particular issues associated with that code that can be applied in the text. The coding 
structure and associated memos follow over the next several pages in Tables 4-3 through 4-9. 
The first category of codes described relates to hazards and includes the industry expert 
identified code of hazard recognition, as well as the PSM code of hazards assessment (the 
completion of process hazards assessments and their periodic updates are required by PSM). The 
memos represent a catalogue of issues discovered in the data under these codes.  
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Table 4-3 | Hazard Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Hazards Hazard 
Recognition HR1- Employees not made aware of hazards 
HR2- Hazards in design not understood 
HR3- Local potentially impacted people not aware of facility hazards 
HR4- No system or inadequate system to control hazards 
HR5- Hazard understood but not lessened 
 Hazards 
Analysis 
PHA1- Risks associated with the process not well analyzed 
 
PHA2- PHA inadequate 
 
PHA3- PHA does not involve literature review 
 
PHA4- PHA results not used 
 
PHA5- PHA process not defined 
 
PHA6- PHA requires revision or out of date 
 
PHA7- No PHA performed 
 
PHA8- PHA team not qualified to perform review 
 
 
The second category of codes used in the analysis was standards, which was derived based on 
the preliminary review of the data and conversations with industry experts. Standards was the 
only code from this category, with many memos to represent the issues related to standards that 
occurred in the data.  
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Table 4-4 | Standards Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Standards Adequacy 
ST1- Guidance for review of facility is insufficient 
ST3- Standards do not address all relevant issues 
ST4- Standards are not up to date 
ST5- Standards not well enforced 
ST7- Standard does not apply to a facility but should 
ST9- Standard does not exist 
 
 Facility 
Implementation 
ST2- Standards are not implemented at facility 
ST6- Facility or building siting 
ST8- Standard not applied consistently throughout facility operations and 
facilities 
ST10- Design standards not recognized or understood 
ST14- Standard compliance 
 Oversight 
ST5- Standards not well enforced 
ST11- Fire protection organizations do not monitor adherence to fire codes 
and standards 
ST12- No inspections to ensure implementation 
ST13- No actions taken from enforcement 
 
 
The safety management category has several codes, all of which were derived from PSM. Pre-
startup safety reviews, incident investigation, process safety information, and compliance audits 
all have requirements under PSM for reporting or collecting information. The memos represent 
the more detailed description of the issues in the data.  
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Table 4-5 | Safety Management Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Safety 
Management 
Pre-Startup 
Safety Review  PSSR1- Confirmation of safety systems performed LTA 
PSSR2- PSSR staff not experienced or knowledgeable 
PSSR3- Not signed off on 
PSSR4- Accident occurs during PSSR 
 
 Incident 
Investigation 
 
I1- Previous accidents were ignored 
 
II2- Lessons learned applied to new situations 
 
II3- Actions taken based on investigation 
 
II4- Not timely in investigation and communication 
 
II5- Other facility incidents not looked into 
 
II6- Investigations into incidents were not thorough 
 
II7- Actions and recommendations are not thorough 
 
 Process Safety 
Information PSI1- PSI not available to relevant people 
PSI2- PSI not used in design 
PSI3- PSI not comprehensive 
PSI4- PSI out of date 
 
 Compliance 
Audits COM1- Audits not timely 
COM2- Recommendations from audit not utilized 
COM3- Audit fails to address issue 
COM4- Audits not performed by knowledgeable people 
COM5- No program for audits exists 
 
 
The maintenance and operations category contains several codes, some of which are derived 
from PSM and others from the data and industry experts. Hot work permitting is a PSM 
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requirement, as is mechanical integrity, management of change, and operating procedures. 
Maintenance is not specifically called out in PSM, but the differentiation between maintenance 
and mechanical integrity was necessary to bring out important issues in the data. The memos 
represent the more specific issues for each code.  
 
Table 4-6 | Maintenance and Operations Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Maintenance 
and 
Operations 
Hot Work 
Permitting HW1- Flammable conditions inside a container 
HW2- Permits signed and checked 
HW3- Lack of controls for HW 
 
 Mechanical 
Integrity MI1- Inoperable equipment 
MI2- Lack of preventative maintenance program 
MI3- Equipment issues caused by accident worsened accident conditions 
MI4- Inspections and tests performed after the fact 
MI5- No MI procedures in place 
MI6- Equipment repeatedly causes issues 
MI7- Inspections and tests too infrequent 
MI8- Corrosion or degradation of materials 
MI9- Lack of inspection plans 
MI10- Deficiencies corrected in timely manner 
MI11- Inspections and tests did not find issues 
MI12- No inspections performed 
MI13- Equipment or conditions not checked before startup 
 
 Management 
of Change MOC1: Shift turnover changes 
MOC2- reconfiguration without instructions 
MOC3- Employees informed of changes 
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MOC4- incorrect characterization of big change as subtle change 
MOC5- Prompt MOC process 
MOC6- Change effects not fully understood 
MOC7- Procedures not established 
MOC8- Procedures adjusted with changes 
MOC9- MOC review not performed 
 Maintenance 
MA-1: Maintenance not alerted of issue 
MA-2 Maintenance software issues 
MA-3 Maintenance plan is LTA 
MA4- Performance of maintenance LTA 
MA5- Housekeeping is LTA 
MA6- Communication about maintenance tasks 
MA7- Maintenance spending 
MA8- Endangerment of maintenance workers 
 
 Operating 
Procedures OP1- Inadvertent addition of material not in procedure 
OP2- Procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the process 
OP3- Procedure not followed by operators 
OP4- Procedures rely on memory of facility workers and are not written 
OP5- No procedure for abnormal conditions 
OP6- Procedure does not contain PSI 
OP7- Procedure includes equipment no longer in service or obsolete 
OP8- Inconsistent procedures used by different operators 
OP9- Revisions to operating procedures 
OP10- Procedures not analyzed for safety 
OP11- No written procedure 
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Engineering controls are not expressly covered under PSM, but there were two clear 
demarcations of engineering controls issues in the text: engineering controls and safety systems. 
These two codes were derived from the data and input from industry experts. The memos 
represent the associated issues in the text.  
 
Table 4-7 | Design and Engineering Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Engineering 
Controls 
Engineering 
Controls EC1- System does not contain design features necessary for safe operation 
EC2- Physical failure due to underdesign 
EC3- Failure to control equipment 
EC4- Materials or equipment design issues 
EC5- Represented need for more engineer participation in design or process 
EC6- Design drawings or information not complete 
EC7- System to correct design deficiencies 
EC8- Design hazard recognition 
EC9- System not installed according to design or other requirements 
EC10- Engineers or professionals participation in design process and 
knowledge of design standards 
EC11- Scale up issues 
EC12- Computer Controls 
EC13- Building siting 
EC14- Manufacturing defect 
 Safety 
Systems SS1- Failure to wear PPE 
SS2- Lack of remote equipment for process safety 
SS3- Ventilation system insufficient 
SS4- Failure of a backup safety system (cooling) 
SS5- Lack of controls (layers of protection) 
SS6- Lack of alarm system 
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SS7- Reliability of safety controls 
SS8- Nuissance alarms or desensitization to alarms 
SS9- Pressure relief devices 
SS10- Fire protection systems 
SS11- Vehicle controls 
SS12- Emergency lights 
SS13- Personnel safety equipment (safety showers) 
 
The human factors category includes four codes. Contractors, training, and employee 
participation are covered by PSM. Management oversight is not directly covered by PSM, but 
was an issue in the data. The memos represent the associated issues in the text. 
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Table 4-8 | Human Factors Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Human 
Factors 
Contractors 
CON1- Poor communication between contractors and operators 
CON2- Contractor understanding of process safety 
CON3- Unauthorized contractor work 
 Training 
TR1- Employees not trained in use of maintenance requests or maintenance 
TR2- Training lacks process safety information (use of cautions and 
warnings, equipment purposes etc) 
TR3- Refresher training provided for hazards 
TR4- MOC training 
TR5- Training is largely informal and may not cover all situations 
TR6- Training not offered with enough frequency 
TR7- Lack of training records 
TR8- No training offered on a particular piece of equipment or process 
TR9- Training not well planned or designed 
TR10- Inspector training for compliance 
TR11- Simulation training or training methods 
ERT1- Emergency response crews participate in training with real drills and 
process information 
 Management 
Oversight MO1- Managers on site 
MO2- Manager knowledge of process and design 
MO3- Manager sign off and approve process 
MO4- Management implements process safety actions 
MO5- Managers lack safety concern 
 Employee 
Participation EP1- Employees participate in incident investigation and planning of actions 
to correct incident conditions 
EP2- Employees participate in work planning 
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The final category used in the content analysis of chemical industry accident reports was 
emergency planning and response. This category was covered in PSM, both the planning and 
response. For the sake of the analysis, the data was coded separately for the two issues, 
emergency planning and emergency response. The associated memos detail the issues for these 
codes in the text. 
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Table 4-9 | Emergency Planning and Response Codes and Associated Memos 
Category Codes Associated Memos 
Emergency 
Planning and 
Response 
Emergency 
Planning EPP1- Lack of emergency plan 
EPP2- Drills relating to plan performed 
EPP3- Plan clarifies roles and responsibilities 
EPP4- Failure to account for all personnel 
EPP5- Failure to sound alarm system 
EPP6- Community and other responders aware of and involved in emergency 
planning 
EPP7- Failure to follow plan 
EPP8- Information for response and treatment of injured 
 
 Emergency 
Response ERR1- Failure to establish safety of environment at facility 
ERR2- Offsite responders participate in drills 
ERR3- Site information shared with emergency responders  
ERR4- Community evacuation issues 
ERR5- Communication issues with local emergency response 
ERR6- Assistance necessary from additional emergency crews 
ERR7- No one assigned to point person 
ERR8- Offsite crews injured 
ERR9- Insufficient resources  
ERR10- Desire to help others overwhelms training or response instinct 
 
 
 
In the semi-quantitative data analysis, the frequency of codes and memos were studied. Counting 
the frequency of the codes in the content analysis software involved running the program across 
the different units of analysis and summing total occurrences. The total occurrences for each 
85 
 
individual report were also be investigated as some reports had many occurrences of a word or 
phrase, indicating its importance in that incident, but due to the length of the report, or number of 
times the code occurred, it seemed more important than other codes that appeared in more 
incidents.  
 
Associations between codes were also analyzed. Associations are defined as relationships 
between codes in the database, typically determined by the content analysis software. Finding 
associations manually between the various codes required studying the proximity of wording (or 
codes) in the report. The content analysis software also allows for searching various 
combinations of codes at a given time.  
 
Content analysis of the chemical industry accident reports was an iterative process. The reports 
were coded multiple times to ensure consistency and eliminate double counting. The coding 
guide, provided in Appendix A, was refined as the coding process went on, and relied upon to 
maintain consistency during the iterations of the process.   
 
4.3.3. Content Analysis Results 
 
The overall results of the content analysis are illustrated in the following Figure 4.2. The results 
illustrate the percentage of chemical industry accident reports in which each code occurred. 
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Figure 4.2 | Overall Results of the Content Analysis 
 
 
In Figure 4.2, many of the codes are represented in more than half (50%) of the chemical 
industry accidents. These codes include Emergency Planning and Response (78%), Design and 
Engineering (98%), Hazard Recognition (76%), Incident Investigation (61%), Maintenance 
(59%), Management of Change (63%), Mechanical Integrtiy (73%), Operating Procedures 
(68%), Process Hazards Analysis (83%), Standards (90%), and Training (73%). The high 
prevalence of the represented codes in the chemical industry accident reports was illustrative of a 
coding structure that encompasses a large section of the issues in chemical industry accident 
reports. The codes listed above were identified as issues in more than half of the process safety 
accidents studied, and provided a starting point for the development of theories about accidents 
and safety at facilities with complex chemical operations.  
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The more detailed results of the content analysis are presented in the following sections by 
category. 
 
4.3.3.1. Content Analysis Codes for Hazards 
 
The following sections describe the results for Hazards Codes.  
 
4.3.3.1.1. Content Analysis Results for Hazards Recognition 
 
Hazard Recognition codes appeared in 76% of the studied chemical industry accidents. These 
codes were further broken down using the memos described in the methodology as follows in the 
chart in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 | Hazard Recognition Code and Associated Memos 
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The most common issue associated with hazard recognition, which composed a large portion of 
the instances of the code, was HR1- Employees not aware of hazards. This issue was found in 
66% of the chemical industry accidents and was frequently associated with training codes, 
process hazards analysis codes, and process safety information codes. Also of note, with 22% 
was HR2- Hazards in design not understood. This typically was associated with Design and 
Engineering codes and related to a lack of understanding of innate hazards in the design of the 
system or facility.  
 
4.3.3.1.2. Content Analysis Results for Hazards Analysis 
 
Hazards Analysis codes appeared in 83% of the studied chemical industry accidents. These codes 
were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as follows 
in the chart in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 | Hazards Analysis Code and Associated Memos 
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The most frequently occurring memo related to hazards analysis was PHA7- No PHA performed 
on the system. This memo occurred in 46% of the reports and illustrated a lack of planning and 
consideration for hazards at the facility. This issue should be less of a problem at nuclear 
chemical facilities, which are required to undergo hazards analysis in order to operate. The more 
likely issue for nuclear chemical facilities, which occurred in 41% of the chemical industry 
accidents studied, was an inadequate PHA that did not cover the relevant hazards. This may be 
particularly useful at nuclear chemical facilities where the focus tends toward radioactivity 
hazards rather than chemical hazards. Associations with hazards analysis codes tended to be 
safety systems and training.  
 
4.3.3.2. Content Analysis Results for Standards 
 
Standards codes appeared in 90% of the studied chemical industry accidents. This is a logical 
place for the CSB to spend some time in the content of their reports, as they make many 
recommendations to regulators concerning the content and enforcement of standards, as well as 
to sites about adhering to regulations. These codes were further broken down into issues using 
the memos described in the methodology as follows in the charts in Figures 4.5-4.7. 
 
Standards codes tended to be strongly associated with other standards codes in the analysis.  
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4.3.3.2.1. Content Analysis Results for Standards Adequacy 
 
The standards adequacy code is further broken down into issues, using the memos described in 
the methodology, as follows in the chart in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 | Standards Adequacy Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Standards Adequacy issues were represented by two major codes. ST3- Standards do not address 
all relevant or necessary issues also occurred in over half (51%) of the chemical industry 
accident reports. This memo indicated that the issues were not solely the fault of the facility, but 
may also be a problem with the regulator. ST7- Standard does not apply to a facility but should 
was also a frequently occurring code, occurring in 46% of the chemical industry accident reports.  
 
Associations with Standards- Adequacy codes included Design and Engineering and other 
Standards issues.  
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4.3.3.2.2. Content Analysis Results for Standards Facility Implementation 
 
The standards facility implementation code is further broken down into issues, using the memos 
described in the methodology, as follows in the chart in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 | Standards Facility Implementation Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
One standards issue stood out from the others in its presence in 88% of the chemical industry 
accidents studied in this analysis: ST2- Relevant standards are not implemented at this facility. 
For the majority of the accidents studied, this memo was the effect of PSM or RMP not being 
implemented at a facility in which it should have been implemented, or not fully implemented 
(the facility followed outdated regulations).  
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Associations with Standards-Facility Implementation codes included Design and Engineering, 
and Process Hazard Analysis.  
 
4.3.3.2.3. Content Analysis Results for Standards Oversight 
 
The standards oversight code is further broken down into issues, using the memos described in 
the methodology, as follows in the chart in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 | Standards Oversight Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Standards Oversight memos were less common in the chemical industry accidents studied. ST5- 
standards not well enforced, was the most frequently occurring memo (29%).  The other memos 
were less prevalent, occurring in no more than 10% of the analyzed chemical industry accidents. 
There were few associations with Standards-Oversight codes, mainly including other Standards 
issues.  
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4.3.3.3. Content Analysis Results for Safety Management 
 
The following sections describe the results for Safety Management codes.  
 
4.3.3.3.1. Content Analysis Results for Pre-startup Safety Review 
 
Pre-startup Safety Review codes appeared in 29% of the chemical industry accident reports. 
These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the 
methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 4.8. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 | Pre-startup Safety Review Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
The most common issue associated with a pre-startup safety review, occurring in 27% of the 
chemical industry accidents studied, was PSSR1- the confirmation of safety systems was 
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performed less than adequately. This code was associated with safety systems. The issue other 
issue that occurred in the chemical industry accident reports was PSSR2- the staff performing the 
review was not knowledgeable about the process.  
 
This issue was associated with training and human factors codes.  
 
4.3.3.3.2. Content Analysis Results for Incident Investigation 
 
Incident Investigation codes appeared in 61% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.9. 
 
 
Figure 4.9 | Incident Investigation Code and Associated Memos 
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Occurring in 39% of the studied chemical industry accident reports was memo II1- Previous 
accidents were ignored. In other words, in about 1/3 of the accidents studied, there was a 
precursor accident, or several, that occurred leading up to the event that was reported on, that 
could have been studied to improve process safety, and apply lessons learned that might prevent 
recurrence, but these events were not adequately evaluated and/or corrective actions were 
ineffective.  
 
II2- Lessons learned applied in new situations occurred in 32% of the studied accidents. This 
informed us that in another 1/3 of the accidents studied, precursor accidents had been 
investigated, and lessons learned developed, that were then not applied to the facility. This 
happened in a combination of ways, the most common being the facility did not use the 
operational experience obtained by its company, or it did not research prior incidents at similar 
facilities, where information was available. 
 
The most common associations with II codes tended to be process hazard assessments and 
process safety information. 
 
4.3.3.3.3. Content Analysis Results for Process Safety Information 
 
Process Safety Information codes appeared in 46% of the chemical industry accident reports. 
These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the 
methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10 | Process Safety Information Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Process Safety Information codes were fairly evenly split between PSI1- Process safety 
information not available to relevant people (27%) and PSI3- Process safety information not 
comprehensive (32%).  
 
The most common associations with PSI codes tended to be operating procedures and hazard 
recognition. In some cases, without process safety information, the operators were unable to 
make a determination about the operations of the facility, or made an assumption about operating 
conditions, such as temperature or pressure, which resulted in the accident.  
 
4.3.3.3.4. Content Analysis Results for Compliance Audits 
 
Compliance Audits codes appeared in 44% of the chemical industry accident reports. In the 
analysis, the compliance audit code was used to signify any audit (not just OSHA PSM audits, as 
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the code name might imply). The audits referenced may have been performed by OSHA, the 
company management, or another party. These codes were further broken down into issues using 
the memos described in the methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 4.11. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 | Compliance Audit Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
COM1- Audit not timely was an issue in 29% of the studied chemical industry accident reports. 
Under PSM, OSHA has the capability to perform audits at a facility; but, due to staffing 
limitations and the sheer number of facilities addressed, OSHA and affiliated state agencies do 
not have the resources to perform these reviews. In many of the accidents studied, the audit had 
been scheduled for a time after the accident occurred.  
 
The other common issue within the compliance audits code, COM3- Audit fails to address issue, 
occurred in 24% of the studied accidents. This memo marked situations in which an audit did 
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occur in a timely fashion, but was not thorough, or in some way missed a problem, which 
ultimately resulted in the accident.  
 
Audit issues were associated with standards codes and in some cases, training codes.  
 
4.3.3.4. Content Analysis Results for Operations and Maintenance 
 
The following sections describe the results for Operations and Maintenance codes: mechanical 
integrity, management of change, maintenance, operating procedures, and hot work permitting.   
 
4.3.3.4.1. Content Analysis Results for Mechanical Integrity 
 
Mechanical Integrity codes appeared in 73% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos, described in the methodology, as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12 | Mechanical Integrity Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Mechanical integrity issues were fairly widespread and evenly split in the chemical industry 
accident reports, representing a broad range of mechanical integrity problems that could occur in 
a chemical facility. The most common issue was MI8- Corrosion or degradation of materials 
which occurred in 37% of the studied chemical industry accidents. MI10- Deficiencies not 
corrected in timely manner occurred in 29% of the studied accidents; MI5- No MI procedures in 
place occurred in 27%; and MI6- Equipment repeatedly causes issues occurred in 24%.  Two of 
these top occurring mechanical integrity issues (MI8 and MI6) shed light on an issue that is also 
common at nuclear chemical facilities— aging and degrading facility conditions and equipment.  
The others, (MI10 and MI5) are tied to planning procedures and scheduling mechanical integrity 
checks and replacement of necessary components. Further, three issues related to inspections and 
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tests: MI1- Inspections and tests did not find issues, MI9- Lack of inspection plans, and MI12- 
No inspections performed all occurred in 22% of the studied accidents.  
 
Mechanical integrity issues were associated with maintenance and management oversight.  
 
4.3.3.4.2. Content Analysis Results for Management of Change 
 
Management of Change codes appeared in 63% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.13. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 | Management of Change Code and Associated Memos 
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By far, the most common issue associated with management of change codes was MOC9- MOC 
review not performed which occurred in 54% of the studied chemical industry accidents. This 
highlighted a major issue in chemical facilities, where processes and procedures can shift over 
time. MOC6- Change effects not fully understood occurred in 22% of the studied accidents, and 
MOC8- Procedures adjusted with changes occurred in 20%.  MOC2- reconfiguration without 
instructions and MOC7- Procedures not established both occurred in 17%.  
 
Management of change codes tended to be associated with engineering design codes, training 
codes, and operating procedures. 
 
4.3.3.4.3. Content Analysis Results for Maintenance 
 
Maintenance codes appeared in 59% of the chemical industry accident reports. These codes were 
further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as follows in the 
chart in Figure 4.14. 
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Figure 4.14 | Maintenance Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Two maintenance issues, MA3- MA-3 Maintenance plan is LTA and MA4- Performance of 
maintenance LTA each occurred in 41% of the studied chemical industry accident reports. These 
two issues highlighted the necessity for maintenance planning and to ensure that right resources 
(both staff and finances) were focused on maintenance.  
 
Also of note, some of the instances of maintenance were combustible dust explosions, in which 
housekeeping plays an integral role, thus the inclusion of MA5- Housekeeping LTA which 
occurred in 12% of the studied accidents. In these cases, the LTA housekeeping was an 
identified root cause of the accident.  
 
The maintenance issues were most frequently associated with mechanical integrity codes. 
Maintenance of systems plays a large role in maintaining the mechanical integrity, and a system 
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with poor maintenance processes tended to face the mechanical integrity issues described 
previously. 
 
4.3.3.4.4. Content Analysis Results for Operating Procedures 
 
Operating Procedures codes appeared in 68% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues, using the memos described in the methodology, as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.15. 
 
 
Figure 4.15 | Operating Procedure Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Occurring in 34% of the studied chemical industry accident reports, OP3- Procedure not 
followed by operators and OP5- No procedure for abnormal conditions highlight the necessity of 
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including operators in the procedure process. When operators did not follow procedures, there 
was no written instruction for how to complete the work, and therefore no consistency, and no 
record of any changes that may have been made. Where procedures did not contain information 
for abnormal operation conditions, such as elevated temperature or pressure in a reactor vessel, 
the operators were left using process knowledge or education to develop a fast response, rather 
than clear, fact based instructions.  
 
OP2- Procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the process and OP6- Procedure 
does not contain PSI were also high frequency issues, occurring in 29% of the studied chemical 
industry accident reports. These two issues highlight the need for procedures that contain all 
relevant operational information. The procedures should contain step by step instructions for the 
process, as well as information about the process that may be required.  
 
Operating procedures issues were typically associated with training, process safety information, 
and employee participation, as well as hazards recognition.  
 
4.3.3.4.5. Content Analysis Results for Hot Work Permitting 
 
Hot Work Permitting codes appeared in 10% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos, described in the methodology, as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.16. 
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Figure 4.16 | Hot Work Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Hot work issues were evenly divided among 3 areas, although they occurred in less than 10% of 
the total chemical accidents studied. Occurring in 7% of the accidents, HW1- Flammable 
conditions inside a container and HW3- Lack of controls for HW were the most common, with 
HW2- Permits not signed and checked occurring in only 5% of the accidents. Hot work issues 
were not frequently the cause of the accident itself, but were going on when the accident 
occurred.  
 
HW1 and HW3 issues tended to be associated with hazard recognition; the person performing 
the hot work was not aware of the flammable conditions and therefore did not apply any standard 
hot work controls to the process.  
 
4.3.3.5. Content Analysis Results for Design and Engineering 
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Overall, Design and Engineering codes appeared in 98% of the chemical industry accident 
reports. These codes include both Engineering Controls, and Safety Systems.  
 
4.3.3.5.1. Content Analysis Results for Engineering Controls 
 
Engineering controls appeared in 90% of the chemical industry accident reports. These codes 
were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as follows 
in the chart in Figure 4.17. 
 
 
Figure 4.17 | Engineering Control Codes and Associated Memos 
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A wide range of issues composed the engineering controls code, from the design process to the 
capabilities of the process equipment. Occurring in 63% of the studied chemical industry 
accidents, EC1- System does not contain design features necessary for safe operation was the 
most common engineering controls issue. This issue highlights the necessity of the design 
process and focusing the right resources on the front-end to ensure a safe, operational system on 
the back-end. This issue is echoed in EC4- Materials or equipment design issues, EC9- System 
not installed according to design or other requirements, and EC10- Engineers or other 
professional participation in design process, which all occurred in about 30% of the accident 
reports.  
 
Strong associations with engineering controls included hazards recognition codes.  
 
4.3.3.5.2. Content Analysis Results for Safety Systems 
 
Safety systems codes appeared in 83% of the chemical industry accident reports. These codes 
were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as follows 
in the chart in Figure 4.18. 
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Figure 4.18 | Safety System Codes and Associated Memos 
 
 
SS5- Lack of controls occurred in 53% of the studied chemical industry accident reports. These 
issues were related to a lack of safety controls designed into the process, or insufficient layers of 
protection for the system. SS9- Pressure relief devices issues, and SS6- Lack of alarm systems 
were also noteworthy in 34% and 32% of the chemical industry accidents studied, respectively. 
These highlighted particular systems or subsystems which were insufficient at the facilities and 
either caused or worsened the effects of the accidents. A typical issue with pressure relief devices 
was their failure—they did not function as intended or designed. The most common issue with 
alarm systems was the lack of one where it was necessary.  
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Common associations with safety systems issues were hazards codes and engineering control 
codes.  
 
4.3.3.6. Content Analysis Results for Human Factors 
 
The following sections contain the results for Human Factors codes: Contractors, Training, 
Management Oversight, and Employee Participation.  
 
4.3.3.6.1. Content Analysis Results for Contractors 
 
Contractors codes appeared in 27% of the chemical industry accident reports. These codes were 
further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as follows in the 
chart in Figure 4.19. 
 
 
Figure 4.19 | Contractor Code and Associated Memos 
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CON2- Contractor understanding of process safety occurred in 15% of the studied chemical 
industry accident reports. This issue was related to contractors coming in to a facility and 
working without understanding the process and/or associated hazards. CON1- Poor 
communication between contractors and operators occurred in 12% of the studied chemical 
industry accident reports. In the accidents in which these contractor issues occurred, contractors 
typically wound up being injured or killed.  
 
Contractor issues had associations with training and hazard recognition.   
 
4.3.3.6.2. Content Analysis Results for Training 
 
Training codes appeared in 73% of the chemical industry accident reports. These codes were 
further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as follows in the 
chart in Figure 4.20. 
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Figure 4.20 | Training Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Training issues were numerous in the chemical industry accident reports (73%). TR2- Training 
lacks process safety information (use of cautions and warnings, equipment purposes etc.) 
occurred in more than half (51%) of the studied chemical industry accidents. In this issue, the 
association between training and process safety information highlights the importance of workers 
understanding the process and hazards associated with it. TR5- training is largely informal and 
may not cover all situations occurred in 24% of the studied chemical industry accidents. This 
issue highlighted the necessity of formal training programs to ensure comprehensive coverage 
and adequate completion.  
 
Codes associated with training were process safety information, operating procedures, and 
hazard recognition. 
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4.3.3.6.3. Content Analysis Results for Management Oversight 
 
Management Oversight codes appeared in 24% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.21. 
 
 
Figure 4.21 | Management Oversight Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Management oversight issue MO3- Manager sign off and approve process occurred in 15% of 
the studied chemical industry accident reports. This issue represented a lack of management 
participation in process development and operation.  MO1- Managers never on site occurred in 
12% of the student reports. This issue represented a lack of management time spent in the field, 
or on the floor with the operators.  
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Associations with management oversight codes included operating procedures, hazard 
recognition, and employee participation.  
 
4.3.3.6.4. Content Analysis Results for Employee Participation 
 
Employee Participation codes appeared in 12% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.22. 
 
 
Figure 4.22 | Employee Participation Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
The majority of instances of the employee participation code were EP2- Employees participate in 
work planning, which was an issue in 10% of the studied chemical industry accidents. Typically, 
employees were not allowed the opportunity to participate in work planning which resulted in an 
error in the performance of the work.   
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Associations with employee participation codes included management oversight and hazard 
recognition. 
 
4.3.3.7. Content Analysis Results for Emergency Planning and Response 
 
Emergency Planning and Response codes appeared in 78% of the chemical industry accident 
reports. The codes were divided into two areas, Emergency Planning, and Emergency Response.  
 
4.3.3.7.1. Content Analysis Results for Emergency Planning 
 
Emergency Planning codes appeared in 39% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.23. 
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Figure 4.23 | Emergency Planning Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
In 24% of the studied chemical industry accident reports, EPP1a-Lack of emergency plan was 
the most common emergency planning issue. In other words, 25% of the facilities involved in 
accidents did not have an adequate emergency plan. While this would be less of an issue at 
nuclear chemical facilities, at which emergency plans are required by DOE O 151.1, 
Comprehensive Emergency Management System, there may be some value in updating the plan 
(also required by DOE O 151.1) and ensuring the plan adequately covers potential accidents.  
 
EPP1b- Drills relating to plan performed and EPP3c- Community and other responders aware of 
and involved in emergency planning were also important issues in this area, occurring in 17% of 
the studied accidents. These two areas are intertwined with the importance of including local 
emergency responders and site emergency responders in drilling and planning.  
 
Associated codes with emergency planning included training and hazard recognition.  
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4.3.3.7.2. Content Analysis Results for Emergency Response 
 
Emergency Response codes appeared in 71% of the chemical industry accident reports. These 
codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the methodology as 
follows in the chart in Figure 4.24. 
 
 
Figure 4.24 | Emergency Response Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
The most common issue in emergency response was ERR6- Assistance necessary from 
additional emergency crews which occurred in 51% of the chemical industry accidents. This was 
indicative of the lack of onsite emergency response capability, and subsequently, reiterated the 
importance of working with the local emergency responders, such as fireman, policeman, and 
hospitals, to ensure a well-practiced and smooth response. This was further highlighted in ERR5-
Communication issues with local emergency response and ERR8-Offsite crews injured at 22%. 
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Local responders need to be aware of the hazards at the facility and how to respond to them, and 
communication with them needs to ensure safety for them and the community. This is a 
particularly important area in the analysis, as emergency responders made up a majority of the 
fatalities and injuries in the studied reports.  
 
Codes most frequently associated with emergency response codes were hazard recognition and 
training.  
 
4.4. Overall Results from Chemical Industry Accident Analysis 
 
The overall results from the Key Issues and content analysis of the chemical industry accident 
reports are compared in the following Figure 4.25. 
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Figure 4.25 | Comparison of Key Issues and Content Analysis Results 
 
 
Looking at the comparative results, several codes occurred with high frequency both in the Key 
Issues analysis (Key Issues collected by the accident investigator and report writer, discussed in 
Section 4.2) and the content analysis just described in Section 4.3. These include: emergency 
planning and response, design and engineering, hazard recognition, process hazards analysis, and 
standards. The agreement of the two analyses in these top areas indicates that these are most 
likely important factors in chemical industry accidents.   
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Emergency planning and response occurred in 37% of chemical industry accident reports studied 
as an identified Key Issue, and 78% identified during the content analysis. The top emergency 
planning issues included a lack of an emergency plan, a lack of drills, and a lack of involvement 
from the local community in emergency planning and drilling. The top emergency response 
issues included the need of assistance from local community responders (insufficient site 
response capabilities), and communication issues with local emergency responders. These two 
issues likely contributed to the third emergency response issue: offsite crews injured responding 
to accident.  
 
Design and engineering occurred in 45% of chemical industry accident reports studied as an 
identified Key Issue and 98% identified during the content analysis. The most common 
engineering controls issues included a lack of proper design features to ensure safe operation, 
materials or equipment design issues, professional participation in the design process, and the 
system not being installed according to design. The most frequent safety systems issues were a 
lack of controls followed by a lack of alarm systems or pressure relief valve issues.  
 
Hazard recognition occurred in 35% of chemical industry accident reports studied as an 
identified Key Issue and 76% identified during the content analysis. The top hazard recognition 
issues included the employees not being aware of latent hazards and the hazards innate to the 
design not being understood.  
 
Process hazard analysis occurred in 38% of chemical industry accident reports studied as an 
identified Key Issue and 83% identified during the content analysis. The most common hazard 
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analysis issues included no hazard assessment performed or an inadequate hazard assessment 
performed.  
 
Standards occurred in 40% of chemical industry accident reports studied as an identified Key 
Issue and 90% identified during the content analysis. The most common standards issues were 
implementation issues with the standards at the facility. Other standards issues included 
insufficiencies in the standards themselves or their enforcement at the facilities.  
 
These top areas were also frequently associated with each other in the chemical industry 
accidents studied. Issues with hazard recognition were often strongly associated with design and 
engineering, and also had ties to hazard assessments. Standards and Design and Engineering 
were also strongly associated. The emergency planning and response codes were strongly 
associated with hazard recognition. These associations suggest that improvements in these areas 
might be impactful not only in the area itself, but in other problem areas as well.  
 
Some areas, such as training, operating procedures, and mechanical integrity, among others, 
were much more prevalent in the detailed content analysis, 73%, 68%, and 73%, respectively. 
Prevalence in the content analysis over the Key Issues analysis does not necessarily indicate less 
of an impact on process safety at a facility, but rather that the investigator and report writer did 
not pull this issue out as a Key Issue of the accident. In some cases, these were identified root 
causes, but not Key Issues. The content analysis highlights the areas that warranted mention in 
the text of the reports and the frequencies of even the top 5 themes in the Key Issues analysis 
were much higher in the content analysis.  
121 
 
The two analyses presented in this chapter, the Key Issues analysis and the content analysis 
provide the data that are used in Chapter 6 of this study to develop theories to improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities, and subsequent performance measures to 
monitor performance in these areas.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
NUCLEAR CHEMICAL FACILITY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Nuclear chemical facilities combine the hazards of radioactive materials with complex chemical 
operations. Because the nuclear and chemical industries use distinct approaches to safety 
management, chemical hazards, which are commonly addressed in the chemical industry, may 
receive less coverage in nuclear facilities where radiological hazards have been the predominant 
focus.  
 
The goal of Chapter 5 is to identify the common causes and themes of occurrences in nuclear 
chemical facilities. This is divided into three objectives, to describe the content analysis of DOE 
occurrence reports, to describe the content analysis of NRC abnormal occurrence reports, and to 
provide a comparison of these results to highlight the most important causes and themes.  
 
This chapter presents a content analysis of accident reports at nuclear chemical facilities (DOE 
Occurrence and Reporting System Reports and NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports to Congress) 
using a coding structure focused on chemical hazards derived from the content analysis in 
Chapter 4. This content analysis yields data that can be used to improve process safety 
management at these facilities, and highlights areas from the chemical industry accident analysis 
that are particularly important at nuclear chemical facilities. The occurrence reports contain 
potential trend information that can be used to determine lessons learned in the nuclear industry 
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that could be applied to nuclear chemical facilities to improve process safety. There were 47 
occurrence reports included from the DOE database in this analysis. Only four reports about 
nuclear chemical facilities were included in the NRC’s abnormal occurrences report to congress 
between the years 1998 and 2012. 
 
The outline of Chapter Five is as follows: 
5.2 Content Analysis of the DOE Occurrence Reports 
5.3 Content Analysis of the NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports 
5.4 Overall Results from Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
5.2.  Content Analysis of the DOE Occurrence Reports 
 
The following sections describe the content analysis of the select DOE Occurrence Reports from 
Nuclear Chemical facilities.  
 
5.2.1. Introduction 
 
The Department of Energy (DOE) has recently expanded the number of nuclear chemical 
facilities associated with its waste management mission. There are a number of facilities already 
in operation, such as the plants for processing depleted uranium hexafluoride at Portsmouth and 
Paducah and the actinide removal process/ modular caustic side solvent solution (ARP/MCU) at 
Savannah River. While these facilities process radiological material, and thus must contend with 
the hazards of a typical nuclear facility, there is a key difference in their operating hazards from 
other types of facilities: complex chemical operations. In many cases, the process flow diagram 
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for these nuclear chemical facilities more closely resembles a complex chemical operation than a 
nuclear reactor facility. The current approach for safety management at these nuclear chemical 
facilities is rooted in nuclear industry hazards analysis techniques and could benefit from lessons 
learned particular to chemical operations at nuclear chemical facilities. This research mined the 
data available in the DOE Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) through content 
analysis in order to extract themes and trends in occurrences at nuclear chemical facilities. 
 
Discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the DOE’s safety management processes are focused on 
preventing accidents from occurring. However, if there is an occurrence, the DOE turns to the 
accident investigation process described in DOE Order 225.1B (DOE, 2011e) and the subsequent 
causal analysis through Order 232.2 (DOE, 2011c) to identify lessons to be learned. In general, 
the number of accident investigations is few compared to the number of occurrence reports. 
Accident investigations are also documented in occurrence reports, making the ORPS database 
an ideal database for the analysis.  
 
DOE Order 225.1B defines the process for accident investigation of DOE occurrences. The first 
step in the investigation process is to appoint the Accident Investigation Board, which consists of 
a chairperson and 5-6 members, all DOE Federal employees with subject matter expertise and 
knowledge of DOE’s ISM program. During the investigation process, the AIB will examine the 
accident scene, investigate interested and/or impacted individuals, organizations, management 
systems or facilities, examine DOE and contractor documentation, interview witnesses or 
personnel associated with the accident and perform engineering tests and analyses as appropriate. 
From these data sources, the AIB will derive causal factors (direct, root and contributing causes) 
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associated with human performance and safety management systems which will be used to 
support the development of an accident investigation report. In closing out the investigation, 
lessons learned will be formally distributed, and corrective actions must be approved, completed 
and implemented.   
 
The current framework for eliciting feedback provided by incident reporting, evaluation and 
analysis at DOE nuclear facilities is one in which the DOE utilizes a systematic, detailed 
occurrence analysis categorization process (documented in DOE Order 232.2, Occurrence 
Reporting and Processing of Operations Information and Standard 1197-2011, Occurrence 
Reporting Causal Analysis) (DOE, 2011b; DOE, 2011c); the categorization process was 
informed by the practices of the commercial nuclear power industry and the Institute for Nuclear 
Power Operations (INPO). This process involves the application of a formal Causal Analysis 
Tree (CAT) with predesigned headings to an accident. Each category is numbered and 
documented for ease of incident analysis.  
 
The main objectives of DOE O 232.2 are to keep the DOE and National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) informed about events that could cause potential negative effects to the 
health and safety of the public, the workers, the environment, DOE missions, or DOE credibility 
and to ensure DOE uses organizational learning to enhance mission safety and share effective 
practices in order to continuously improve process safety and manage process changes. 
 
Reporting under Order 232.2 is required for any occurrence that results from an activity 
performed by facility personnel; such occurrences must be reported by facility personnel in a 
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timely fashion and investigated and analyzed by facility management as described in the 
Occurrence Reporting Model, using the cause codes provided in the CAT. This DOE approach to 
occurrence reporting and categorization is used to write the DOE occurrence reports that will be 
studied in this analysis.  
  
5.2.2. Methods 
 
The objective of this analysis is to develop an understanding of occurrences at DOE nuclear 
chemical facilities and their major causes and themes. The methodology for this work involved 
performing a content analysis of the occurrence reports to identify coherent and important 
themes using the entire text of the reports and then subdividing the data into categories, patterns 
and themes, using the methodology described in Chapter 3, and reported in Chapter 4 for 
chemical industry accident reports. This was completed in a process known as data labeling or 
indexing which is detailed in the 1996 GAO Guide 10.3.1 (GAO, 1996). During this analysis, 
content analysis software was again used to allow for automatic text searches and coding. The 
semi-quantitative data assessment from the content analysis of this research involved studying 
the occurrence of categories through codes.  
 
For this task, the unit of analysis is one occurrence report from a nuclear chemical facility. The 
methodology involved the application of a content analysis software for maintenance of coding, 
document searches and its many other functions.  
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Previous work described in Chapter 4 involved performing a content analysis of chemical 
industry accident reports to determine common causes and themes of incidents in the chemical 
industry. As a part of this analysis, a coding structure was developed based on the OSHA 
chemical industry standard for Process Safety Management (PSM). In a similar fashion to the 
nuclear industry, the chemical industry applies a systematic review of chemical processes with 
emphasis on the following categories: chemical hazards, process technology and equipment, 
process safety information, employee involvement, process hazard analysis, operating 
procedures, employee training, contractor requirements and responsibilities, pre-startup safety 
reviews, hot work permitting, management of change, incident investigation, emergency 
planning and response, compliance audits, trade secrets, and mechanical integrity. From these 
categories, and their application to chemical facility process safety, a coding structure was 
created and applied to the chemical industry accident reports. DOE has accepted the importance 
of PSM and has promulgated two (2) technical standards (DOE STD 3009 and DOE HDBK 
1101-2004) dedicated to its implementation. In order to maintain consistency in coding and 
better understand the chemical hazards associated with nuclear chemical facilities, and consistent 
with DOE’s stated commitment to PSM, this coding structure based on OSHA PSM review 
categories formed the basis for coding the occurrence reports in this work as well.  
 
In this analysis, the frequency of codes were studied and associations monitored in the text. 
Counting the frequency of the codes in the content analysis software simply involved running the 
program across the different units of analysis and summing total occurrences. Finding 
associations between the various codes required studying carefully the proximity of wording (or 
codes) in the report. The content analysis software also allowed for searching various 
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combinations of codes at a given time. This data was also evaluated by analyzing frequency of 
occurrence. For instance, if a code related to chemical leakage was often followed by a code 
related to fires, the instances of fires after chemical leaks might be an important result from the 
data. This process is more thoroughly described in Chapter 3.  
 
Figure 5.1 contains the generic coding structure for the content analysis. The more detailed 
description of the codes and memos applied to the text is contained in Chapter 4.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 | Generic Coding Structure for the Content Analysis 
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5.2.3. Results 
 
In total, 47 DOE occurrence reports from the ORPS database were analyzed including 
occurrences between 1998 and 2012 at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and 
Actinide Removal Process/ Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU) at SRS, 
the LosAlamosTA-55 Facility, the Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Plants at Portsmouth and 
Paducah, and the Hanford high level waste treatment facilities. The overall results of the content 
analysis of the DOE ORPS reports are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The results are reported as the 
percentage of DOE ORPS reports that contained codes from each category listed.   
 
 
Figure 5.2 | Percentage of DOE Occurrence Reports that Contain each Code 
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Due to the transition from chemical industry reporting (solely PSM based) to nuclear industry 
reporting (DOE or NRC guidelines), some codes were not discussed in the occurrence reports, 
such as compliance audits or contractor issues, among others. This does not imply that there are 
or are not contractor and/or audit issues involved in the occurrences, but these topics were not 
covered in the text of DOE occurrence reports. However, contractors play an integral role in 
performing the work at DOE facilities.  
 
Further, several codes that were prevalent in many of the DOE ORPS reports, such as Design 
and Engineering (70% of the studied ORPS reports) and Mechanical Integrity (62% of the 
studied ORPS reports), were also important in the chemical industry accident reports, indicating 
their overall value to operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
A more detailed examination of the results for the top occurring DOE issues (occurring in more 
than ¼ or 25% of the analyzed occurrence reports) follows in sections 5.2.3.1- 5.2.3.6.  
 
5.2.3.1. Content Analysis Results for Design and Engineering 
 
Design and Engineering codes were the most prevalent codes in the DOE Occurrence Reports, 
occurring in 70% of the analyzed occurrences. These codes were broken down by engineering 
controls and safety systems. 
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5.2.3.1.1. Content Analysis Results for Engineering Controls 
 
The engineering controls code appeared in 21% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility 
occurrence reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos 
described in the methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 | Engineering Controls Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
The memos for engineering controls illustrated in Figure 5.3 demonstrate that the DOE 
occurrence engineering controls issues were diverse. However, clearly the most common issue 
associated with engineering controls codes was EC4- Materials or equipment design issues in 
15% of the studied occurrences. EC6- Design drawings or information not complete, EC8- 
Design hazard recognition and EC9- System not installed according to design or other 
requirements were also prevalent, though they only occurred in 4.5% of the studied occurrences.  
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Associations with engineering control codes were related to hazard recognition and mechanical 
integrity.  
 
5.2.3.1.2. Content Analysis Results for Safety Systems 
 
The safety systems code occurred in 57% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility 
occurrence reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos 
described in the methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 | Safety Systems Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
SS5- Lack of controls (layers of protection) and SS7- Reliability of safety controls occurred in 
19% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrences. These issues are both indicative 
of issues in these instances relating to the DOE safety management system. In the design of 
systems and through the completion of hazards analysis, sufficient layers of protection should be 
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identified and their reliability studied. These codes are accompanied by SS1- Failure to wear 
PPE which occurred in 13% of the studied occurrences. In some cases, this issue was related to a 
lack of appropriate PPE for the hazards, an issue with job planning.  
 
Associations with safety systems codes were hazard recognition, hazards analysis, and training.  
 
5.2.3.2. Content Analysis Results for Operations and Maintenance 
 
The following sections contain the results for the content analysis of DOE ORPS in the areas of 
Operations and Maintenance.  
 
5.2.3.2.1. Content Analysis Results for Maintenance 
 
The maintenance code occurred in 38% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrence 
reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the 
methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 | Maintenance Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Issues in maintenance were most strongly related to MA3- Maintenance plan is LTA in 23% of 
the studied nuclear chemical facility occurrences, and MA8- Endangerment of maintenance 
workers in 19% of the studied occurrences. The most common issue was a less than adequate 
plan to accomplish maintenance. This LTA work planning may have also had an effect on the 
endangerment of maintenance workers metric, putting workers in less than ideal safety situation.  
 
Common associations with maintenance codes were hazard recognition, operating procedures, 
and mechanical integrity.   
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5.2.3.2.2. Content Analysis Results for Mechanical Integrity 
 
The mechanical integrity code occurred in 29% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility 
occurrence reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos 
described in the methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 | Mechanical Integrity Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
The two most common issues, MI1- Inoperable equipment and MI8- Corrosion or degradation of 
materials both occurred in 32% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrences. These 
two issues were indicative of a problem discussed often during conversations with DOE subject 
matter experts of the aging infrastructure and degradation of equipment and materials installed 
during the 1950s and 1960s, which has reached the end of, or exceeded in some cases, its 
recommended life cycle (Omnibus Risk Review Committee, 2015).  MI4- Inspections and tests 
performed after the fact occurred in 11% of the studied occurrences. This issue referred to an 
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inspection which was likely to have turned up an issue occurring too late, once the occurrence 
had happened.  
 
Common associations with mechanical integrity issues include hazards analysis and 
maintenance.  
 
5.2.3.2.3. Content Analysis Results for Operating Procedures 
 
The operating procedures code occurred in 40% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility 
occurrence reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos 
described in the methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.7. 
 
 
Figure 5.7 | Operating Procedure Code and Associated Memos 
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Two main issues were highlighted in the operating procedures category of analysis. OP2- 
Procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the process occurred in 26% of the 
studied DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrences. This issue highlighted the need for thorough 
operating procedures that are maintained current with the operating conditions of the system. 
OP3- Procedure not followed by operators in 17% of the occurrence reports also highlighted the 
need for current and accurate procedures, so that operators would follow them as necessary to 
ensure safe and consistent operations.  OP9- Revisions to operating procedures occurred in 11% 
of the studied chemical industry accidents and reiterated the need for revisions to operating 
procedures to keep them up to date.  
 
Associations with operating procedures included process safety information, management of 
change, and training.  
 
5.2.3.3. Content Analysis Results for Standards 
 
The standards code occurred in 30% of the studied DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrence 
reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the memos described in the 
methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.8. Only one area of standards codes was 
represented in the DOE ORPS reports, facility implementation. 
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5.2.3.3.1. Content Analysis Results for Standards Facility Implementation 
 
The following Figure 5.8 illustrates the Standards-Facility Implementation Code and Associated 
Memos.  
 
Figure 5.8 | Standards-Facility Implementation Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Only two standards issues occurred in the DOE occurrence reports, which is indicative of the 
highly regulated environment under which these facilities operate. The standards codes included 
ST14- Standard compliance which occurred in 28% of the occurrence report, a large portion of 
the total 30% of standards issues coded. This code indicated that the facility may have been out 
of compliance with a standard. ST2- the only other standards issue coded occurred in 2% of the 
studied occurrences.  
 
There were no noteworthy associations for the standards codes in the DOE occurrence reports.  
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5.2.3.4. Content Analysis Results for Human Factors 
 
The following sections contain the results from the content analysis of the DOE ORPS with 
respect to the Human Factors codes. 
 
5.2.3.4.1. Content Analysis Results for Training 
 
The training code occurred in a little over a quarter, or 26%, of the studied DOE nuclear 
chemical facility occurrence reports. These codes were further broken down into issues using the 
memos described in the methodology as follows in the chart in Figure 5.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 | Training Code and Associated Memos 
 
 
Training issues in the DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrence reports were fairly evenly 
divided, and no single issue occurred in more than 10% of the studied occurrences. One memo, 
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TR3- Refresher training provided for hazards occurred in 9% of the occurrences and was thus the 
most likely issue to be carried forward from this analysis. This memo highlighted the importance 
of refresher training at nuclear chemical facilities to remind the operators and maintenance 
technicians about the hazards involved in the process.  
 
Associations with training codes were related to hazard recognition. The other training issues 
involved issues with training planning, ensuring proper information was included, the training 
was formal and records maintained, and training was thorough.  
 
These results will be combined with insights from the NRC Abnormal Occurrence results 
described in Section 5.3, and used to develop a tool to compare chemical industry accident issues 
against those of nuclear chemical facilities. The comparison is described in Chapter 6.  
 
5.3. Content Analysis of the NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports 
 
The following sections describe the content analysis of the NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports 
to Congress.  
 
5.3.1. Introduction 
 
Another source of information about occurrences at nuclear chemical facilities was four 
abnormal occurrence reports provided to Congress by the NRC between 1998 and 2012. These 
reports, which detail information about occurrences at NRC licensees and occurrences at their 
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nuclear chemical facilities were also used to perform a content analysis. The abnormal 
occurrences were analyzed using the same content analysis procedure described in section 5.2.2, 
above. More information about the NRC abnormal occurrence reporting process and the 
abnormal occurrence reports can be found in Chapters 2 and 3 of this study. Due to the small 
number of abnormal occurrences reported during the given time period at nuclear chemical 
facilities, this analysis provides only a resource to verify that information from the other analyses 
would apply to nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
5.3.2. Methodology 
 
The objective of this analysis was to develop an understanding of abnormal occurrences at NRC 
licensed nuclear chemical facilities and their major causes and themes. Similarly to the analysis 
of DOE Occurrence Reports, the methodology for this work involved performing a content 
analysis of the abnormal occurrence reports to identify coherent and important themes using the 
entire text of the reports and then subdividing the data into categories, patterns and themes, in the 
same way described in Chapter 3, and reported in Chapter 4 for chemical industry accident 
reports. 
 
The same coding structure was applied to the NRC abnormal occurrences, and the frequencies of 
codes and memos in the text were studied to identify key themes and issues in abnormal 
occurrences at commercial nuclear chemical facilities. The more detailed description of the 
codes and memos applied to the text is contained in Section 5.2.2, and Chapter 4, for reference. 
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5.3.3. Results 
 
The following sections contain the results from the content analysis of NRC abnormal 
occurrence reports at nuclear chemical facilities. Only four reports about nuclear chemical 
facilities were included in the NRC’s abnormal occurrences report to congress between the years 
1998 and 2012. Due to the small number of reports analyzed, the percentages only mark which 
issues were prevalent, and should not be taken to indicate a representative issue with a high 
frequency of occurrences at commercial nuclear chemical facilities as a whole.   
 
The overall results of the content analysis of the NRC Abnormal Occurrence reports are 
illustrated in Figure 5.10. The results are reported as the percentage of NRC Abnormal 
Occurrence reports that contained codes from each category listed.   
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Figure 5.10 | Percentage of NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports for Each Code 
 
 
According to Figure 5.10, there are 6 codes which occurred in more than 2 of the studied NRC 
abnormal occurrence reports: Emergency planning and response, design and engineering, 
incident investigation, management of change, mechanical integrity, and operating procedures.  
 
It was not worthwhile to include full details of all the memos associated with each code, but the 
following memos for each category listed in Table 5-1 were identified during the content 
analysis of NRC abnormal occurrence reports.  
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Table 5-1 | Memos Appearing in NRC Abnormal Occurrence Reports 
Code Memos 
Engineering Controls 
EC1- System does not contain design features necessary for safe operation 
EC2- Physical failure due to underdesign 
EC3- Failure to control equipment 
Safety Systems 
SS1- Failure to wear PPE 
SS2- Lack of remote equipment for process safety 
SS3- Ventilation system insufficient 
SS4- Failure of a backup safety system (cooling) 
SS5- Lack of controls (layers of protection) 
SS6- Lack of alarm system 
Emergency Planning 
EPP1a- Lack of emergency plan 
EPP3a- Failure to account for all personnel 
EPP3b- Failure to sound alarm system 
EPP3c- Community and other responders aware of and involved in emergency 
planning 
EPP3d- Failure to follow plan 
Emergency Response 
ERR1- Failure to establish safety of environment at facility 
ERR2- Offsite responders participate in drills 
ERR3- Site information shared with emergency responders  
ERR4- Community evacuation issues 
ERR5- Communication issues with local emergency response 
Incident Investigation II1- Previous accidents were ignored 
II2- Lessons learned applied to new situations 
Maintenance 
MA-1: Maintenance not alerted of issue 
Mechanical Integrity 
MI1- Inoperable equipment 
MI2- Lack of preventative maintenance program 
MI3- Equipment issues caused by accident worsened accident conditions 
MI4- Inspections and tests performed after the fact 
145 
 
MI5- No MI procedures in place 
Management of Change 
MOC1: Shift turnover changes 
MOC2- Reconfiguration without instructions 
 
Operating Procedures 
OP1- Inadvertent addition of material not in procedure 
OP2- Procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the process 
OP3- Procedure not followed by operators 
OP4- Procedures rely on memory of facility workers and are not written 
OP5- No procedure for abnormal conditions 
Process Hazards 
Analysis 
PHA1- Risks associated with the process not well analyzed 
Standards 
ST1- Guidance for review of facility is insufficient 
Training 
TR1- Employees not trained in use of maintenance requests or maintenance 
TR2- Training lacks process safety information (use of cautions and warnings, 
equipment purposes etc) 
 
 
5.4. Overall Results from Nuclear Chemical Facilities 
 
The overall results from the analysis of DOE nuclear chemical facility occurrence reports and 
NRC abnormal occurrence reports are compared in Figure 5.11. The percentage of NRC reports 
should again be approached with caution due to the very small number of reports from 
commercial nuclear chemical facilities that are included in the analysis.  
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Figure 5.11 | Comparison of DOE and NRC Nuclear Chemical Facility Occurrence Report 
Content Analysis Results 
 
 
Figure 5.11 illustrates the areas which were mutually important issues in the DOE and NRC 
occurrences at nuclear chemical facilities. Looking at the comparison, several codes were 
important factors in all studied occurrences at nuclear chemical facilities, including design and 
engineering, maintenance, mechanical integrity, and operating procedures. Although the DOE 
Occurrences covered a broader set of occurrences, the spikes for DOE occurrence reports 
147 
 
coincide with the presence of many of the issues at NRC commercial nuclear chemical facilities 
as well, with the exception of incident investigation which is less prevalent in the content of 
DOE occurrence reports, but appeared in all 4 of the studied NRC accidents; this is not 
surprising, as the bar for what constitutes an Abnormal Occurrence for NRC fuel cycle and 
materials licensees is fairly high and normally involves site-wide impacts. 
 
The two analyses presented in this chapter, the content analysis of DOE nuclear chemical facility 
ORPS reports and NRC nuclear chemical facility abnormal occurrence reports provided data 
comparable to that developed in Chapter 4 for chemical facilities, to ensure that chemical facility 
data was representative of nuclear chemical facilities, which are targeted by this study.  This data 
is used comparatively in Chapter 6 to develop theories to improve safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear chemical facilities, and subsequent performance measures to monitor 
performance in these areas.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The data from Chapters 4 and 5 was analyzed with the goal to develop theories about safety and 
efficiency of operations. The goal of Chapter 6 is to detail the process involved in taking the 
results and translating them into theories about the safety and operation of nuclear chemical 
facilities and to postulate a set of performance measures for nuclear chemical facilities that 
utilize knowledge from the chemical industry and currently operational nuclear chemical 
facilities. The objectives of this chapter are to provide an overview of the results from Chapters 4 
and 5 highlighting the most important issues, to describe the development of theories about 
safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities, to describe the development of 
leading performance indicators to monitor these theories, and to describe the process of subject 
matter elicitation used to select the most impactful of these performance measures.  
 
The translation from data to theory to performance measures is described in this chapter, as well 
as the process of subject matter expert review of the performance measures. The focus of this 
subject matter expert elicitation was to ensure the performance measures recommended for use at 
nuclear chemical facilities are both practical, meaning that they could be measured, and 
effective, meaning that their measurement and subsequent tracking would provide usable 
information about the status of safety at the facility. The resulting recommended performance 
measures are presented at the end of this chapter for application to nuclear chemical facilities.  
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The process of development and selection of practical and effective performance measures is 
outlined in Chapter 6 as follows: 
6.2 Comparing the Results from Chemical Industry and Nuclear Chemical Facility Analyses 
6.3 Development of Theory 
6.4 Performance Measure Development 
6.5 Expert Review of Performance Measures 
6.6 Final Proposed Performance Measures. 
 
6.2. Comparing the Results from Chemical Industry and Nuclear Chemical Facility 
Analyses  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 detail the results of the analyses of the chemical industry accident reports and 
occurrences at nuclear chemical facilities, respectively. The analyses of the chemical industry 
accident reports and nuclear chemical facilities demonstrated that there were similar issues 
involved in incidents at both types of facilities. The similarities between the analyses are 
described in the graph and subsequent text below. These similarities indicated areas and issues 
that were consistently present in accidents in the chemical industry and occurrences at the 
analyzed nuclear chemical facilities. This presence in accidents and occurrences was theorized to 
indicate that improvement and/or monitoring of these areas would increase safety and efficiency 
of operations at nuclear chemical facilities. The following chart in Figure 6.1 illustrates the 
overall results from the analyses.  
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Figure 6.1 | Percentage of all Reports in which Code Appears 
 
 
Figure 6.1 indicates areas of importance that were used to develop theories about safety and 
efficiency and subsequent performance measures. These top occurrence codes include design and 
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engineering, both engineering controls and safety systems; operating procedures; maintenance; 
mechanical integrity; hazards analysis; incident investigation; and emergency planning and 
response.  
 
The most important memos from the chemical industry accident analysis, which were also shown 
to be important by the analysis of nuclear chemical facility occurrences are listed below.  
 
Design and Engineering: 
1. EC1- System does not contain design features necessary for safe operation 
2. EC4- Materials or equipment design issues 
3. EC9- System not installed according to design or other requirements 
4. EC10- Engineers or professionals participation in design process and knowledge of 
design standards 
5. SS5- Lack of controls and layers of protection 
6. SS6- Failure of or lack of alarm system 
7. SS9- Failure of or lack of pressure relief devices 
Operating Procedures: 
1. OP2- Procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the process (outdated or 
incomplete) 
2. OP3- Procedure not followed by operators 
3. OP5- No procedure for abnormal conditions 
4. OP6- Procedure does not contain PSI 
Maintenance: 
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1. MA3- Maintenance plan is LTA 
2. MA4- Performance of maintenance LTA 
Mechanical Integrity: 
1. MI5- No MI procedures in place 
2. MI6- Equipment repeatedly causes issues 
3. MI8- Corrosion or degradation of materials 
4. MI10- Deficiencies corrected in timely manner 
Hazards Analysis: 
1. PHA1- Risks associated with the process not well analyzed by team members 
2. PHA2- PHA inadequate- i.e. acceptance of lower tier safety controls 
3. PHA4- PHA results not used or updated 
4. PHA7- No PHA performed 
Incident Investigation: 
1. II1- Precursor accidents were ignored 
2. II2- Lessons learned not applied to new situations in a timely manner, or at all 
3. II3- No actions taken or tracked based on investigation of previous events 
Emergency Planning and Response: 
1. EPP1- Lack of emergency plan 
2. ERR5- Communication issues with local emergency response 
3. ERR6- Assistance necessary from additional local emergency crews that are untrained 
4. ERR8- Offsite crews injured due to inexperience with hazards or attempting to rescue 
others without planning 
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5. ERT1- Emergency response crews participate in training with real drills and process 
information 
 
6.3. Development of Theory 
 
Section 6.3 describes the methods and results for the development of theory based on the issues 
determined during the content analysis.  
 
6.3.1. Introduction 
 
Once the iterative content analysis was completed, and the results compiled for chemical 
industry accidents and nuclear chemical facility occurrences, the next step was to consider what 
theories could be developed based on this data to improve safety and efficiency of operations at a 
nuclear chemical facility. This process was completed using the Grounded Theory development 
processes described in Chapter 3 to translate the issues into theories about safety and efficiency 
of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
6.3.2. Methods 
 
The following steps summarize the process used in this study for theory development (a more 
detailed description of the concepts of Grounded Theory can be found in Chapter 3): 
• Start with the qualitative data 
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• Review the data collected 
• Repeated ideas, concepts or elements become apparent, and are tagged with 
codes, which have been extracted from the data 
• As more data is collected, and as data is re-reviewed, codes can be grouped into 
concepts, and then into categories 
• These categories may become the basis for a theory 
 
Once the data in Chapters 4 and 5 was finalized and occurrences of memos, codes, and 
categories tallied and compiled, the basis for theories about safety of operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities was established. In the following results section, theories discussed were 
developed for each of these categories and the highest frequency issues.  
 
6.3.3. Results 
 
The results for theory development are presented below. For each category, there is a section 
containing the Issue followed by the Theory. Each Issue and Theory is numbered for reference.  
 
6.3.3.1. Engineering Theories  
 
Issue 1: System does not contain design features necessary for safe operation. [EC1] 
Theory 1: Ensuring the application of industry standards or best practices in design will improve 
safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
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Issue 2: Materials or equipment have design issues which exacerbated or caused an accident or 
occurrences. [EC4] 
Theory 2: Ensuring the application of industry standards or best practices in material selection 
and equipment design will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
 
Issue 3: The system was not installed in accordance with design or other requirements, and 
therefore did not function as designed. [EC9] 
Theory 3: Ensuring that the design is followed during the installation of the facility, and 
checking to ensure it meets specifications will improve safety and efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 4: Lack of adequate participation from engineers and design experts in performing design 
calculations and developing the process design [EC10] 
Theory 4: Ensuring adequate participation from engineers and design experts in performing 
design calculations and developing the process design will improve safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear chemical facilities. 
 
Issue 5: Insufficient system controls and/or layers of protection resulted either exacerbated or 
caused an accident to occur. [SS5] 
Theory 5: Ensuring the system has been reviewed for safety and the hazards analysis process has 
tied safety systems to hazards where necessary will improve safety and efficiency of operation at 
nuclear chemical facilities.  
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Issue 6: Either the lack of an alarm system or the failure of an existing alarm system worsened 
the outcome of an occurrence. [SS6] 
Theory 6: Ensuring the existence and functionality of alarm systems, including their transmission 
in all locations of the facility will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 7: Either the lack of a pressure relief device, or the failure of such a device resulted in the 
occurrence, or worsened the outcome of the occurrence. [SS9] 
Theory 7: Ensuring the proper maintenance and application of pressure relief devices and safety 
systems in general will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
6.3.3.2. Operating Procedures Theories 
 
Issue 8: The procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the process, it is either 
outdated or incomplete and this resulted in an error that caused an occurrence. [OP2] 
Theory 8: Ensuring that procedures are up to date and cover the process step by step will 
improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 9: The procedure was not followed by operators, causing a misstep that resulted in an 
occurrence. [OP3] 
Theory 9: If operators follow procedures step by step, this action will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
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Issue 10: There was no procedure in place for abnormal operating conditions, such as higher 
temperature or pressure than anticipated. [OP5] 
Theory 10: If procedures are written to anticipate and provide instructions for abnormal 
operating conditions, it will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities.  
 
Issue 11: The procedures did not contains process safety information that would have aided 
operators in making decisions about the operations of the system. [OP6] 
Theory 11: If operating procedures contain process safety information, it will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
6.3.3.3. Maintenance Theories 
 
Issue 12: Maintenance planning is less than adequate, resulting in dangerous or abnormal 
conditions at the facility. [MA3] 
Theory 12: Adequate maintenance planning will improve safety and efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 13: The performance of maintenance tasks is less than adequate, resulting in an occurrence 
at the facility. [MA4] 
Theory 13: Ensuring maintenance tasks are carried out as planned will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
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6.3.3.4. Mechanical Integrity Theories 
 
Issue 14: There were no procedures for the completion of mechanical integrity requirements, 
such as inspections or tests in place, leading to degraded operating conditions at the facility. 
[MI5] 
Theory 14: Ensuring mechanical integrity procedures are in place will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities. 
 
Issue 15: A piece of equipment at the facility repeatedly causes issues, but nothing is done to 
resolve the problem, resulting in an issue or occurrence. [MI6] 
Theory 15: Ensuring the mechanical integrity of all systems will improve safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 16: There is corrosion or degradation of materials at the facility that results in a problem or 
occurrence. [MI8] 
Theory 16: Ensuring mechanical integrity programs monitor and correct corrosion and 
degradation problems in a timely manner will improve safety and efficiency of operations at a 
nuclear chemical facility.  
 
Issue 17: Deficiencies are identified at the facility, but not corrected in a timely manner resulting 
in degraded safety conditions. [MI10] 
Theory 17: Ensuring timely correction of deficiencies will improve safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
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6.3.3.5. Hazards Analysis Theories 
 
Issue 18: Risks associated with the process were not well analyzed by team members. [PHA1] 
Theory 18: Ensuring that the right subject matter experts are involved in the hazards analysis will 
improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 19: The hazards analysis was inadequate and may have resulted in the acceptance of lower 
tier safety controls than recommended. [PHA2] 
Theory 19: Reviewing the hazards analysis to determine if safety controls are appropriately 
matched to the hazards will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities.  
 
Issue 20: Hazards analysis results were not used or updated at the facility. [PHA4] 
Theory 20: Ensuring timely updates to the hazards analysis after changes have been made to the 
process will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
Issue 21: No hazards analysis was performed on the process involved in the occurrence or 
accident. [PHA7] 
Theory 21: Ensuring hazards analyses are performed on each process will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
 
160 
 
6.3.3.6. Incident Investigation Theories 
 
Issue 22: Precursor accidents were ignored or not studied. [II1] 
Theory 22: Ensuring accident history is studied and occurrences monitored at the facility, 
including near misses, will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities.  
 
Issue 23: Lessons learned from previous occurrences were not applied to the situations in a 
timely manner, or at all. [II2] 
Theory 23: Ensuring accident history is studied and used to improve existing operations will 
improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities. 
 
Issue 24: No actions were taken based on the investigation of previous events or action 
resolution was not tracked to ensure implementation. [II3] 
Theory 24: Tracking action items to ensure timely resolution will improve safety and efficiency 
of operations at nuclear chemical facilities.  
 
6.3.3.7. Emergency Planning and Response Theories 
 
Issue 25: There was no plan to handle emergency situations. [EPP1] 
Theory 25: Developing and updating a formal emergency plan, as well as ensuring employees 
are familiar with this plan, will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities.  
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Issue 26: Communication issues with local emergency responders cause a delay or worsening of 
accident conditions at the facility. [ERR5] 
Theory 26: Training and drilling with local emergency responders will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities, particularly in emergency situations.  
 
Issue 27: Assistance was necessary from additional local emergency crews that are untrained on 
the facility hazards and layout. [ERR6] 
Theory 27: Providing training to local emergency response crews will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities, particularly in emergency situations.  
 
Issue 28: Offsite crews are injured due to inexperience with hazards or attempting to rescue 
others without planning. [ERR8] 
Theory 28: Training offsite crews and communicating with them in advance will improve safety 
and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities, particularly in emergency situations. 
 
Issue 29: Lack of training and lack of resources for emergency responders, leaving them unsure 
of the hazards and not able to provide the most efficient assistance to the facility [ERT1] 
Theory 29: Providing training to offsite emergency responders on the facility hazards and 
response protocols will improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities. 
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6.4. Performance Measure Development 
 
The following sections in 6.4 describe the process of taking the theories developed in 6.3 and 
translating them into performance measures, as well as the performance measures, themselves.   
 
6.4.1. Introduction and Overview 
 
The theories developed in the previous section were used to postulate a set of performance 
measures for nuclear chemical facilities that utilize knowledge from the chemical industry and 
currently operational nuclear chemical facilities. Each proposed performance measure was tied to 
the particular issue and theory about its resolution. This process used the Center for Chemical 
Process Safety’s Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics (CCPS, 2011), as well as 
performance measures theorized by the data as inspiration for the proposed measures. 
  
6.4.2. Preliminary Proposed Performance Measures 
 
For each of the theories above, several performance measures were proposed to monitor the 
safety conditions at a nuclear chemical facilities. The following Tables, 6-1- 6-7 contain the 
proposed measures for each theory.  Table 6-1 presents the proposed performance measures for 
design and engineering issues.  
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Table 6-1 | Proposed Performance Measures for Design and Engineering Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated Codes Related Preliminary 
Proposed Performance 
Measures 
EC1- System does 
not contain design 
features necessary 
for safe operation 
Ensuring the application 
of industry standards or 
best practices in design 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
63.4% Hazard 
Recognition 
-How much time since 
previous reviews of 
process or system design 
-% of processes or 
systems reviewed in a 
year 
EC4- Materials or 
equipment design 
issues 
Ensuring the application 
of industry standards or 
best practices in 
material selection and 
equipment design will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
31.7% Hazard 
Recognition 
-How much time since 
previous reviews of 
process or system design 
-% of processes or 
systems reviewed in a 
year 
 
EC9- System not 
installed according 
to design or other 
requirements 
Ensuring that the design 
is followed during the 
installation of the 
facility, and checking to 
ensure it meets 
specifications will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
34.1% Hazard 
Recognition, 
Training 
- Percentage of operators 
and technical staff who 
are able to identify 
controls and feel that 
they understand their 
operation 
 
EC10- Engineers or 
professionals 
participation in 
design process and 
knowledge of 
design standards 
Ensuring adequate 
participation from 
engineers and design 
experts in performing 
design calculations and 
developing the process 
design will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
34.1% Hazard 
Recognition, 
Training 
-Pertinent 
engineer/technical 
specialists involved in 
process reviews or design 
changes 
- Percentage of operators 
and technical staff who 
are able to identify 
controls and feel that 
they understand their 
operation 
 
SS5- Lack of 
controls and layers 
of protection 
Ensuring the system has 
been reviewed for 
safety and the hazards 
analysis process has 
tied safety systems to 
hazards where 
necessary will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operation at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
53.7% Process Hazard 
Analysis, 
Engineering 
Controls, 
Maintenance, 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
-How much time since 
previous reviews of 
process or system design 
-% of processes or 
systems reviewed in a 
year 
- Number of identified 
hazards and controls 
reviewed in a given time 
(relatable to PHA) 
- Number of corrective 
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maintenance requests 
related to safety systems 
and controls 
 
SS6- Failure of or 
lack of alarm 
system 
Ensuring the existence 
and functionality of 
alarm systems, 
including their 
audibility in all 
locations of the facility 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
31.7% Process Hazard 
Analysis, 
Engineering 
Controls, 
Maintenance, 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
 
- Amount of time in 
between inspections or 
tests of required systems 
-Planned maintenance 
that occurs vs. actual 
maintenance completed 
-Number of nuisance 
alarms or false alarms vs. 
number of valid alarms 
- Number of corrective 
maintenance requests 
related to safety systems 
and controls 
 
 
SS9- Failure of or 
lack of pressure 
relief devices 
Ensuring the proper 
maintenance and 
application of pressure 
relief devices will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
34.1% Process Hazard 
Analysis, 
Engineering 
Controls, 
Maintenance, 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
- Amount of time in 
between inspections or 
tests of required systems 
- Planned maintenance 
that occurs vs. actual 
maintenance completed 
-Number of corrective 
maintenance requests 
related to safety systems 
and controls 
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Table 6-2 presents the proposed performance measures for operating procedures issues.  
 
Table 6-2 | Proposed Performance Measures for Operating Procedures Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated Codes Related Preliminary 
Proposed 
Performance 
Measures 
OP2- Procedure 
does not contain 
clear instructions 
for a part of the 
process (outdated or 
incomplete) 
Ensuring that 
procedures are up to 
date and cover the 
process step by step will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
29.3% Training, Process 
Safety 
Information, and 
Employee 
Participation, and 
Hazards 
Recognition 
-Number of operators 
or maintenance 
technicians involved in 
procedure reviews (as 
indicated by 
documentation of the 
review performed) 
-%  procedures 
reviewed for content in 
a year 
 
 
OP3- Procedure not 
followed by 
operators 
If operators follow 
procedures step by step, 
this action will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
34.1% Training, Process 
Safety 
Information, and 
Employee 
Participation, and 
Hazards 
Recognition 
- Number of operators 
or maintenance 
technicians involved in 
procedure reviews (as 
indicated by 
documentation of the 
review performed) 
- Number of operators 
or maintenance 
technicians  whose 
experience is that 
procedures are current, 
accurate, and effective 
(by survey) 
 
 
OP5- No procedure 
for abnormal 
conditions 
If procedures are written 
to anticipate and 
provide instructions for 
abnormal operating 
conditions, it will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
34.1% Training, Process 
Safety 
Information, and 
Employee 
Participation, and 
Hazards 
Recognition 
-%  procedures 
reviewed for content in 
a year 
OP6- Procedure 
does not contain 
PSI 
If operating procedures 
contain process safety 
information, it will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
29.3% Training, Process 
Safety 
Information, and 
Employee 
Participation, and 
Hazards 
Recognition 
-%  procedures 
reviewed for content in 
a year 
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Table 6-3 presents the proposed performance measures for maintenance issues.  
 
Table 6-3 | Proposed Performance Measures for Maintenance Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated Codes Related Preliminary 
Proposed 
Performance 
Measures 
MA3- Maintenance 
plan is LTA 
Adequate maintenance 
planning will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
41.5% Mechanical 
Integrity, 
Engineering 
Controls 
-Number of deferred 
maintenance requests 
as a percentage of total 
maintenance requests 
- Number of past due 
maintenance requests 
as a percentage of total 
maintenance requests 
(overdue) 
 
 
MA4- Performance 
of maintenance LTA 
Ensuring maintenance 
tasks are carried out as 
planned will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
41.5% Mechanical 
Integrity, 
Engineering 
Controls 
- Percentage of all 
planned maintenance 
accomplished in a 
given time period 
- Percentage of all 
safety systems and 
safety controls planned 
maintenance 
accomplished 
- Percentage of 
preventive 
maintenance work that 
results in corrective 
maintenance being 
required  
-Average amount of 
time between 
maintenance requests 
and completion of 
maintenance work 
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Table 6-4 presents the proposed performance measures for mechanical integrity issues.  
 
Table 6-4 | Proposed Performance Measures for Mechanical Integrity Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated Codes Related Preliminary 
Proposed 
Performance 
Measures 
MI5- No MI 
procedures in place 
Ensuring mechanical 
integrity procedures are 
in place will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities. 
26.9% Maintenance, 
Management 
Oversight, 
Engineering 
Controls 
- Number of 
mechanical integrity 
inspections completed 
during a time period 
vs. number of 
inspections due during 
that time period 
 
MI6- Equipment 
repeatedly causes 
issues 
Ensuring the mechanical 
integrity of all systems 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
24.4% Maintenance, 
Management 
Oversight, 
Engineering 
Controls 
- Amount of time plant 
is in operation with 
any safety component 
in an inoperable or 
degraded condition 
(broken down or failed 
inspection) 
 
- Percentage of plant 
start-ups with no safety 
problems 
 
MI8- Corrosion or 
degradation of 
materials 
Ensuring mechanical 
integrity programs 
monitor and correct 
corrosion and 
degradation problems in 
a timely manner will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at a nuclear chemical 
facility. 
36.6% Maintenance, 
Management 
Oversight, 
Engineering 
Controls 
- Amount of time plant 
is in operation with 
any safety component 
in an inoperable or 
degraded condition 
(broken down or failed 
inspection) 
 
- Percentage of plant 
start-ups with no safety 
problems 
 
MI10- Deficiencies 
corrected in timely 
manner 
Ensuring timely 
correction of 
deficiencies will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
29.3% Maintenance, 
Management 
Oversight, 
Engineering 
Controls 
- Amount of time 
between issuing 
corrective action and 
completing the 
corrective action 
(deficiencies corrected 
in a safe and timely 
manner) 
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Table 6-5 presents the proposed performance measures for hazards analysis issues.  
 
Table 6-5 | Proposed Performance Measures for Process Hazard Analysis Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated Codes Related Preliminary 
Proposed 
Performance 
Measures 
PHA1- Risks 
associated with the 
process not well 
analyzed by team 
members 
Ensuring that the right 
subject matter experts 
are involved in the 
hazards analysis will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
36.6% Safety systems in 
Engineering 
Controls, Training 
- Pertinent subject 
matter experts involved 
in the DSA 
development and 
maintenance (as 
indicated by document 
reviews)? 
- Number of operations 
and maintenance 
personnel involved in 
the DSA development 
and maintenance (by 
survey or documented 
records)? 
 
 
PHA2- PHA 
inadequate- i.e. 
acceptance of lower 
tier safety controls 
Reviewing the hazards 
analysis to determine if 
safety controls are 
appropriately matched 
to the hazards will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
41.5% Safety systems in 
Engineering 
Controls 
- Number of USQ 
process reviews that 
resulted in formal USQ 
Determinations 
(USQDs) 
- Of those USQDs, 
were positive USQs 
actually identified? 
(Percentage) 
 
 
PHA4- PHA results 
not used or updated 
Ensuring timely updates 
to the hazards analysis 
after changes have been 
made to the process will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
29.3% Safety systems in 
Engineering 
Controls, Training 
- Percentage of 
operators and 
maintenance techs who 
have formal training on 
the DSA? 
PHA7- No PHA 
performed 
Ensuring hazards 
analyses are performed 
on each process will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
46.3% N/A (not considered to be an 
issue in more regulated 
DOE environment) 
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Table 6-6 presents the proposed performance measures for incident investigation issues.  
 
Table 6-6 | Proposed Performance Measures for Incident Investigation Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated Codes Related Preliminary 
Proposed 
Performance 
Measures 
II1- Precursor 
accidents were 
ignored 
Ensuring accident 
history is studied and 
occurrences monitored 
at the facility, including 
near misses, will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
39.0% Process Hazard 
Assessment, 
Process Safety 
Information, 
Training 
Tracking achieved 
through ORPS 
system—no additional 
performance measure 
recommended 
II2- Lessons learned 
not applied to new 
situations in a timely 
manner, or at all 
Ensuring accident 
history is studied and 
used to improve 
existing operations will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
31.7% Process Hazard 
Assessment, 
Process Safety 
Information, 
Training 
- Number of lessons 
learned developed as a 
part of review of ORPS 
reports or other 
incident reporting 
- Percentage of 
operators and 
maintenance techs who 
are trained on lessons 
learned from accidents. 
(By training records) 
 
 
II3- No actions 
taken or tracked 
based on 
investigation of 
previous events 
Tracking action items to 
ensure timely resolution 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations 
at nuclear chemical 
facilities. 
24.4% Process Hazard 
Assessment, 
Process Safety 
Information, 
Training 
- Number of past due 
safety action items vs. 
total number of safety 
action items stemming 
from previous 
occurrences 
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Table 6-7 presents the proposed performance measures for emergency planning and response 
issues.  
 
Table 6-7 | Proposed Performance Measures for Emergency Planning and Response Issues 
Memo Theory Percentage of 
Chemical 
Industry 
Accident 
Reports 
Associated 
Codes 
Related Preliminary 
Proposed Performance 
Measures 
EPP1- Lack of 
emergency plan 
Developing and updating a 
formal emergency plan, as 
well as ensuring employees 
are familiar with this plan, 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities. 
24.4% Training, 
Hazard 
Recognition 
- Amount of time since 
last update of emergency 
plan 
- Number of workers in an 
operating facility who 
believe they can 
confidently execute their 
responsibilities in an 
emergency 
 
 
ERR5- 
Communication issues 
with local emergency 
response 
Training and drilling with 
local emergency responders 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities, 
particularly in emergency 
situations. 
22.0% Training, 
Hazard 
Recognition 
- Number of emergency 
drills performed in a time 
period vs. number 
scheduled (or required) 
- Number of personnel 
trained as point person 
responsible for facility 
emergency versus the 
number required? (and/or 
how many shift managers 
are trained in this 
capacity?) 
 
 
ERR6- Assistance 
necessary from 
additional local 
emergency crews that 
are untrained 
Providing training to local 
emergency response crews 
will improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities, 
particularly in emergency 
situations. 
51.2% Training, 
Hazard 
Recognition 
- Number of local 
(county? City?) 
Emergency Responders 
trained in facility (e.g. 
chemical or radiological) 
hazards and response? 
-Hours of training 
available to emergency 
responders vs. total hours 
taken 
 
ERR8- Offsite crews 
injured due to 
inexperience with 
hazards or attempting 
to rescue others 
without planning 
Training offsite crews and 
communicating with them 
in advance will improve 
safety and efficiency of 
operations at nuclear 
chemical facilities, 
22.0% Training, 
Hazard 
Recognition 
-Number of local (county? 
City?) Emergency 
Responders trained in 
facility (e.g. chemical or 
radiological) hazards and 
response? 
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particularly in emergency 
situations. 
 
ERT1- Emergency 
response crews 
participate in training 
with real drills and 
process information 
Providing training to offsite 
emergency responders on 
the facility hazards and 
response protocols will 
improve safety and 
efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities. 
31.7% Training, 
Hazard 
Recognition 
- Number of local 
(county? City?) 
Emergency Responders 
trained in facility (e.g. 
chemical or radiological) 
hazards and response? 
- Hours of training 
available to emergency 
responders vs. total hours 
taken 
- Number of emergency 
drills performed in a time 
period vs. number 
scheduled (or required) 
 
 
 
 
 
These proposed performance measures underwent a preliminary review to remove those deemed 
repetitive or not easily measured at a nuclear chemical facility. This reduction was performed by 
DOE senior safety and operations subject matter experts who commented on document versions 
of the performance measures in a guided interview process led by two researchers. The interview 
process involved a set of questions about areas to be measured, followed by a list of all proposed 
performance measures listed in the tables above. The senior safety and operations subject matter 
experts provided feedback on each individual proposed metric and selected a number on a scale 
for how practical and effective the performance measure would be. The selected numbers for 
each SME were averaged and the performance measures with a score higher than a 7 (the scale 
was out of 10) were carried through to the next stage. The interview document is included in 
Appendix C. The performance measures that were maintained after this process were used during 
the expert review of the performance measures detailed in Section 6.5. 
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6.5. Expert Review of Performance Measures 
 
Section 6.5 describes the expert review of the performance measures, both the SME elicitation 
and the Analytic Hierarchy Process exercise to determine the most practical and effective 
performance measures for implementation at a nuclear chemical facility. 
 
6.5.1. Introduction 
 
The overall goal of this research was to analyze accidents reports (documentation) from the 
chemical industry and nuclear chemical facilities (a subset of DOE occurrence reports and NRC 
abnormal occurrence reports to Congress) for trends to develop a set of predictive or leading 
safety and performance measures applicable to nuclear chemical facilities. The previous chapters 
described the data collection and analysis-- analyzing the information presented in the chemical 
industry accident reports through these varied lenses (i.e., applying the DOE methodology to 
incidents in the chemical industry, and analyzing the information from DOE occurrence reports). 
A set of potential safety and performance measures was developed from this process and 
described previously in Section 6.4. The goal of these integrated safety and performance 
measures for nuclear chemical operations is to assist in monitoring the safety of facility 
operations, and thus, help ensure safe and efficient operations at these facilities. 
 
The objective of the subject matter elicitation was the presentation of the derived, proposed 
performance measures to safety subject matter experts to give them an opportunity to provide 
factual feedback to further inform the selection of the performance metrics that were most 
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important. These survey responses were also used to refine understanding of proposed 
performance metrics and add a practical perspective to the qualitative analysis of accident 
reports. The people surveyed in this research were subject matter experts in the fields of nuclear 
safety, engineering, nuclear operations and chemical safety. Identified personnel for this study 
served in positions as DOE safety management professionals, engineers, and operations 
managers. The methodology for this subject matter expert elicitation was reviewed by the 
Vanderbilt Internal Review Board (IRB) and received an exemption. The IRB Exemption letter 
is found in Appendix B.  
 
6.5.2. Methodology 
 
The expert elicitation to improve the proposed performance measures and ensure that they were 
both practical and effective involved the development and application of a survey tool using 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and an online software program to perform the elicitation. 
The background and basics of AHP have been described in Chapter 3 of this study. The 
following sections describe the development and application of the AHP survey and the selection 
and elicitation of the subject matter experts interviewed in this process.  
 
6.5.2.1. Survey Development and AHP 
 
This application of AHP used the process to rank the overall impact of several categories of 
performance measures (the objectives), and then under each of those categories, to rank the 
impact of the proposed performance measures. The subject matter experts were to consider 
174 
 
themselves to be the facility manager of a nuclear chemical facility, and rank the objectives and 
performance measures, as to which would provide them information that would have greater 
importance to understanding the safe operation of the facility. 
 
The survey administered in the study is an Analytical Hierarchy Process elicitation using the 
Comparion by Expert Choice software. Participants were guided through the questions. In 
Comparion, subjects are asked to compare sets of criteria and subcriteria to determine which they 
considered to be most impactful to safety and efficiency of operations at a nuclear chemical 
facility. In this study, the criteria are safety management categories and the subcriteria are 
performance metrics. The structure of the hierarchy used in this analysis is pictured below in 
Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 | Structure of Analytical Hierarchy Process 
 
 
The goal of the survey was to analyze, with respect to safety and efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities, what category was the most impactful. Under this goal, there were 
five categories, composed of those areas from the results of the content analyses determined to 
be the most impactful to safety and efficiency of operations: engineering controls, operating 
procedures, maintenance, hazards analysis, and emergency planning. Under each of these 
objectives, the proposed performance measures were tied to that category.  
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6.5.2.2. Subject Matter Expert Selection 
 
The subjects that were surveyed in this research were subject matter experts in the fields of 
nuclear safety, engineering, nuclear operations and chemical safety including DOE safety 
management professionals, engineers, and operations managers. The participants were identified 
using a list of subject matter experts familiar with the field and the research objectives (via past 
interactions). Additional participants were also suggested by the invited subjects. The 
participation of the DOE subject matter experts included two sites, Hanford and Savannah River. 
At each facility, a contact was established who was familiar with the research objectives from 
previous interactions. The contact was selected due to their access to and knowledge of the 
workforce and ability to suggest knowledgeable subject matter experts to participate. The 
following list was provided to the two contacts to elicit SMEs for participation: 
1. Facility managers 
2. Chemical and nuclear safety subject matter experts  
3. The managers of the chemical and nuclear safety subject matter experts  
4. Experienced facility representatives or their managers  
5. Facility system engineers and their managers 
The contacts solicited participants from these areas and scheduled them into a multi-day 
interview visit.  
 
To ensure thoughtful and honest responses to the survey questions, the participants were 
interviewed one at a time in a private setting, and guaranteed anonymity. No personal data 
related to the subject was maintained as a part of the survey process. The survey response data 
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was not tied to the individual in any written or electronic documentation. Some data was 
monitored about the participant including the following metrics:  
1. DOE/Contractor 
2. Safety SME/Operations 
3. Manager/Employee 
4. Site or HQ 
This information was used for trending purposes only.  
 
A set of criteria paragraphs summarizing the results described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study 
was provided to the SMEs in advance of the survey to provide context and background 
information for the elicitation and responses. The SMEs were also provided the opportunity to 
discontinue participation in the study at any time, and provided verbal consent to participate, 
witnessed by two researchers present at the elicitation. The criteria paragraphs are included 
below in 6.5.2.b.1 
 
6.5.2.b.1 Criteria Paragraphs 
 
Criteria Paragraphs for SME elicitation 
 
Design and Engineering Controls 
 
Design and Engineering Controls is an OSHA Process Safety Management derived category that 
includes issues with process design and engineering as well as safety systems design and 
engineering. There are several requirements for design and engineering, including that the DOE 
contractor: document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practices and determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, 
inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner. For safety systems, the DOE contractor should 
ensure that there are engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their 
interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early 
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warning of releases.  A major program within the DOE that addresses this area is the Cognizant 
System Engineer program, which assigns engineers who are responsible for maintaining overall 
cognizance of assigned systems, providing systems engineering support for operations and 
maintenance, and technical support of line management safety responsibilities for ensuring 
continued system operational readiness. System design documents and supporting documents 
must be identified and kept current using formal change control and work control processes. 
DOE-STD-3024-2011, Content of System Design Descriptions, describes an acceptable 
methodology to achieve this function. DOE O 420.1C also establishes requirements for the 
design and construction of safety-SSCs, both safety-class and safety-significant, by identifying 
an applicable set of industry codes and standards, as well as Department of Energy (DOE) design 
criteria, standards and directives.  
This research has illustrated that design and engineering issues that result in accidents tend to be 
related to:  (1) a lack of design features or safety controls, (2) a lack of adequate participation 
from engineers and design experts in performing design calculations and developing the process 
design, and (3) failure of safety systems such as pressure relief devices or alarm systems and (4) 
underdesign of safety systems, i.e. insufficient layers of protection.  
 
Operating Procedures 
 
Operating Procedures is an OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) based category. To be 
consistent with PSM for operating procedures, a DOE contractor should develop and implement 
written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities 
involved in each covered process, that incorporates necessary process safety information and 
must address at least the following elements: steps for each operating phase, operating limits, 
safety and health considerations, and safety systems and their functions. Further, operating 
procedures must be readily available, reviewed as often as necessary to ensure accuracy, but no 
less than once per year, and safe work practices for control of hazards during operations must be 
established. DOE Order 422.1, Conduct of Operations, and DOE-STD-1029-92, Writer’s Guide 
for Technical Procedures, provide the Departments expectations regarding operating procedures 
and their implementation and involve similar considerations. DOE STD-1029-92 requires that a 
DOE contractor must establish and implement operations practices for developing and 
maintaining accurate, understandable written technical procedures that ensure safe and effective 
facility and equipment operation, addressing the following elements:  expectations for the use of 
procedures to perform operations; a process for procedure development; procedure content, 
including consistent format and use of terms (e.g. prerequisites, warnings, cautions, notes, hold 
points, etc.), detail sufficient for accomplishing the operation, technically accurate procedures 
capable of performance as written, and procedure conformance with the facility design and 
manufacturer documentation; a process for procedure changes (pen and ink or page changes) and 
revisions (complete reissues); a process for training personnel on new, revised, or changed 
procedures; a process for approval of new, revised, or changed procedures; initial-issue and 
periodic review and testing of procedures; availability and use of the latest revisions of 
procedures; and specified and defined procedure use requirements, i.e., reader-worker method, 
reference use only, use-each-time, and emergency response.  
 
In these reports, issues with operating procedure tend to be related to: (1) operators failing to 
follow procedures, (2) outdated or ineffective procedures, (3) a lack of safety information in the 
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procedure, and (4) a lack of procedural information for abnormal circumstances (such as a higher 
than anticipated temperature or pressure reading).  
 
Maintenance 
 
Maintenance is not an OSHA PSM category, although the related subject mechanical integrity is 
identified and has several requirements for compliance. Requirements related to maintenance 
include: that the DOE contractor will establish and implement written procedures to maintain the 
on-going operability of process and safety equipment and that the DOE contractor will train each 
employee involved in maintaining the on-going operability of process and safety equipment by 
providing an overview of the process and its hazards, and the applicable procedures to assure that 
the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. DOE Order 433.1B describes the 
maintenance management program required for maintenance and the reliable performance of 
structures, systems and components that are part of the safety basis required by at hazard 
category 1, 2 and 3 Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities. DOE G 433.1-1A, Nuclear 
Facility Maintenance Management Program Guide for Use with DOE O 433.1, provides 
acceptable approaches for meeting the requirements of the order using 17 elements, the most 
relevant to this work include: Planning, Scheduling, and Coordination of Maintenance; Types of 
Maintenance; Maintenance Procedures; Aging Degradation and Technical Obsolescence; and 
Performance Measures. 
Observed maintenance issues tend to be related to (1) a lack of maintenance planning, or (2) less 
than adequate performance of maintenance jobs.  
 
Hazards Analysis 
 
The category of hazards analysis is consistent with the OSHA PSM standard for Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA). To be in compliance with PSM, OSHA requires an initial process hazard 
analysis (hazard evaluation) on processes covered by the standard and that the process hazard 
analysis be appropriate to the complexity of the process and identify, evaluate, and control the 
hazards involved in the process. It further requires operators to determine and document the 
priority order for conducting process hazard analyses based on a rationale which includes such 
considerations as the extent of the process hazards, number of potentially affected employees, 
age of the process, and operating history of the process. The DOE requirements for Hazard 
Analysis reside in DOE-STD-3009, Section 3.1. DOE-HDBK-1100-2004 describes how various 
DOE programs combine to meet the intent of PSM. The Hazard Analysis is the initial analytical 
effort for all facilities that systematically identifies and evaluates facility hazards, potential 
accidents, and controls. The hazard evaluation focuses on evaluating the complete spectrum of 
hazards and accidents. The guidance in DOE-HDBK-1100-2004 uses the OSHA PSM Rule, 
discussed above, as a guide for developing DOE Chemical Hazards Analysis. 
The most common issue that we observed in the area of hazards analysis (HA) is that no hazards 
analysis was performed. While this may be less of an issue in the DOE environment; for 
example, due to the implementation of Integrated Safety Management (ISM), other observations 
included: (1) inadequacies in the HA, such as the acceptance of lower tier safety controls for 
certain scenarios and a (2) lack of necessary expertise in the team performing the assessment. We 
also observed that many facilities involved in accidents did not have a system in place to update 
these assessments and track the implementation of findings from them.   
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Emergency Planning 
 
Emergency Planning is an OSHA PSM based category that includes both planning and response 
for emergency situations. To be in compliance with OSHA PSM, an operator should establish 
and implement an emergency action plan for the entire plant and include procedures for handling 
small releases. DOE Guide 151.1-1A, The DOE Emergency Management Program Guide, offers 
guidance for Emergency Planning at DOE facilities. The major relevant components of the DOE 
Emergency Management Program are: Planning- determining, in advance, what will be done in 
response to specific emergencies; Preparedness- putting in place procedures, equipment, and 
personnel capabilities that will be needed to respond; and Readiness Assurance- the ongoing 
process of verifying and demonstrating readiness to respond. 
This research indicated that emergency planning and response issues in the chemical industry 
tend to be centered around: (1) a lack of emergency planning, (2) employees who are unsure of 
what to do or who to contact, and (3) communication issues and confusion among emergency 
responders; these are coupled with the emergency response issues concerning (4) a lack of 
training and lack of resources for emergency responders, leaving them unsure of the hazards and 
not able to provide the most efficient assistance to the facility. 
 
6.5.2.3. The Elicitation 
 
The elicitation involved the participation of two researchers in a private one on one setting with 
the SME. To perform the interviews, the two researchers traveled to the work site of the SMEs. 
During the elicitation, one researcher read from a script for consistency of delivery from subject 
to subject. This researcher also entered the data into the web based survey tool. The second 
researcher participated by responding to questions or comments throughout the process and 
notated verbal comments and suggestions. A copy of the survey tool is included at the end of this 
study in Appendix D.  
 
The survey tool asked three types of questions: 
The first set included comparative questions regarding focus areas: for example, "In 
regards to safety and efficiency of operations at a nuclear chemical facility, which of the 
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following types of performance measures would have a greater impact: (1) Mechanical 
integrity of safety systems or (2) Process Safety Information Availability?" The computer 
screen showed these two choices on either end of a sliding scale, and the SME would 
make a selection from the scale to fit their thoughts. 
In the second section, the focus area was replaced with the proposed performance metrics 
developed, and use the same sliding scale. For example, "In regards to safety and 
efficiency of operations at a nuclear chemical facility, which of the following 
performance metrics would have a greater impact: (1) Number of occurrences reported in 
the last calendar year or (2) Percentage of occurrences involving worker injuries in a 
calendar year?" The response was entered the same as before, on the computer using the 
sliding scale. 
The third section was an open ended question to gather feedback about the tool and any 
comments about performance measures that may be important to the SME but were not 
covered in the other areas. Also, throughout the elicitation, there was time provided for 
feedback and comments about the proposed metrics or the process. 
A screen shot of what the interviewee saw on the computer screen is included in Figure 6.3 
below. Adjustments to the scale were made toward the preferred performance metric.  
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Figure 6.3 | Screenshot of Comparion by Expert Choice Interview 
 
 
Upon completion of the survey, the participants were again invited to offer comments about the 
proposed performance metrics or the process, and offer feedback about additional or alternative 
performance measures currently employed at their facility.  
 
6.5.3. Results 
 
The results from the SME elicitation using an AHP architecture were collected during site visits 
to the locations and are presented below. The first results presented are the rankings of the 
categories of the performance measures. These are followed by the individual performance 
measures under each category. The final results of this SME elicitation include the shortened list 
of performance measures deemed practical and effective by the SMEs. Figure 6.4 illustrates the 
overall ranking of the categories for potential performance measures. 
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Figure 6.4 | Overall Ranking of the Potential Performance Measure Areas 
 
 
6.5.3.1. Performance Measure Preferences 
 
The SMEs interviewed Prioritized Engineering Controls Performance Measures above other 
categories of performance measures. They ascribed equal priority to Operating Procedures, 
Maintenance, and Hazards Analysis Performance Measures. The Emergency Planning 
Performance Measures were given lowest overall priority. In each of these areas, we will 
highlight those performance measures which were above the median value for the analysis.  
The Engineering Controls performance measures preferences are illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5 | Ranking of Engineering Controls Proposed Performance Measures 
 
 
Three performance measures in Engineering Controls were above the median value: 
• Pertinent SMEs involvement in process design and/or review changes 
• Percentage of operators and technical staff who are able to identify controls and 
believe that they understand their operations 
• Number of nuisance alarms or false alarms. 
 
These performance measures represented the most preferred engineering controls performance 
measures by the SMEs. They became the recommended engineering controls performance 
measures for nuclear chemical facilities, listed again in Section 6.6.  Recommendations for 
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measuring and tracking these performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility are discussed 
in Chapter 8.  
 
The Operating procedures performance measure preferences are illustrated in Figure 6.6. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 | Ranking of Operating Procedures Proposed Performance Measures 
 
 
Two performance measures were above the median value: 
• Number of operators or maintenance technicians who believe procedures are 
current, accurate, and effective 
• Pertinent SMEs involved in drafting procedures. 
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These performance measures represented the most preferred operating procedures performance 
measures by the SMEs. They became the recommended operating procedures performance 
measures for nuclear chemical facilities, listed again in Section 6.6.  Recommendations for 
measuring and tracking these performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility are discussed 
in Chapter 8.  
 
The Maintenance performance measure preferences are illustrated in Figure 6.7. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 | Ranking of Maintenance Proposed Performance Measures 
 
 
One performance measure was above the median value: 
• Amount of time the plant is in operation with any safety system in an inoperable 
or degraded condition. 
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This performance measure represented the most preferred maintenance performance measures by 
the SMEs. It became the recommended maintenance performance measure for nuclear chemical 
facilities, listed again in Section 6.6.  Recommendations for measuring and tracking this 
performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility are discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
The Hazards Analysis performance measure preferences are illustrated in Figure 6.8. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 | Ranking of Hazards Analysis Proposed Performance Measures 
 
 
Two performance measures were above the median value: 
• Pertinent SME involvement in DSA development and maintenance. 
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• Number of past due safety action items vs. total number of safety action items 
stemming from pervious occurrences 
 
These performance measures represented the most preferred hazards analysis performance 
measures by the SMEs. They became the recommended hazards analysis performance measures 
for nuclear chemical facilities, listed again in Section 6.6.  Recommendations for measuring and 
tracking these performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility are discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
The Emergency Planning and Response performance measure preferences are illustrated in 
Figure 6.9. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 | Ranking of Emergency Planning and Response Proposed Performance Measures 
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There were no emergency planning performance measures above the median. 
 
Thus, no emergency planning performance measures were recommended in the final list in 
Section 6.6. However, the fatalities of emergency responders in the studied chemical industry 
accident inspired a series of recommendations for emergency response and planning at nuclear 
chemical facilities. These recommendations are detailed in Chapter 7.  
 
6.5.3.2. Notes of Interest 
 
There was a slight difference in response depending on the background and experience of the 
SME. For example, Table 6-8 illustrates the difference in priorities from safety and operations 
SMEs.  
 
Table 6-8 | Operational Perspective vs. Safety Perspective Rankings of Top Level Criteria 
Top Level Criteria Operational Perspective Priorities Safety Perspective Priorities 
Engineering Controls 28.11% 29.37% 
Operating Procedures 24.06% 18.50% 
Maintenance 18.17% 15.35% 
Hazards Analysis 19.91% 27.46% 
Emergency Planning 9.75% 9.33% 
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Table 6-8 illustrates that the Operational perspective SMEs ranked operating procedures over 
hazards analysis by about 6%. The Safety perspective SMEs ranked hazards analysis over 
operating procedures by about 9%. Despite this difference, the other 3 areas were fairly 
consistently ranked, varying only 2-3%.  
 
Another comparison that yielded interesting results was the federal employee vs. the contractor 
priorities. These are displayed in Table 6-9 below. 
 
Table 6-9 | Federal Employee vs. Contractor Rankings of Top Level Criteria 
Top Level Criteria Federal Employee Priorities Contractor Priorities 
Engineering Controls 28.52% 28.87% 
Operating Procedures 21.43% 18.63% 
Maintenance 15.60% 16.59% 
Hazards Analysis 22.79% 27.88% 
Emergency Planning 11.67% 8.03% 
 
 
The contractors tended to place more emphasis on the hazards analysis performance measures 
than the federal employees and less on emergency planning and operating procedures. The two 
groups were in agreement over the relative importance of maintenance and engineering controls, 
as well as the overall ranking of the areas.  
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Another interesting result of the analysis was the preference of the SMEs for performance 
measures related to ensuring that the right people were involved in these areas. Of the 8 preferred 
performance measures, 3 related to SME participation and involvement in these areas and 2 
related to ensuring operators and maintenance technicians had an understanding and method to 
provide feedback. In other words, 5 of the 7 preferred performance measures were related to the 
people involved the in the processes, rather than the equipment or safety management systems in 
place.  
 
There were several potential biases involved in the survey results: 
1. Background Bias- Participants were asked to put themselves in the shoes of a facility 
manager to help them overcome the focus of their background 
2. Sequence Bias- Some participants compared the issues in the sequence in which they 
would approach them at the facility– Hazards Analysis Engineering Controls  
Operating Procedures  Maintenance  Emergency Planning. These SMEs tended to 
put more emphasis on the early sequence performance measures. 
3. Static vs. Dynamic Systems Bias- Some participants viewed some issues as static 
(Engineering Controls, Hazards Analysis) and others as dynamic (Maintenance, 
Operating Procedures, Emergency Planning). These SMEs tended to put more emphasis 
on dynamic areas that they felt required more focus from performance measures because 
they could change.  
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6.6. Most Impactful Performance Measures 
 
After collecting SME input and calculating the results, 8 proposed performance measures were 
carried through as being both practical and effective means of determining the status of safety at 
nuclear chemical facilities. These performance measures are listed below. 
 
• Engineering Controls 
• Pertinent SMEs involvement in process design and/or review changes 
• Percentage of operators and technical staff who are able to identify controls and 
believe that they understand their operations 
• Number of nuisance alarms or false alarms 
• Operating Procedures 
• Number of operators or maintenance technicians who believe procedures are 
current, accurate, and effective 
• Pertinent SMEs involved in drafting procedures 
• Maintenance 
• Amount of time the plant is in operation with any safety system in an inoperable 
or degraded condition 
• Hazards Analysis 
• Pertinent SME involvement in DSA development and maintenance 
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• Number of past due safety action items vs. total number of safety action items 
stemming from pervious occurrences 
 
The performance measures listed were further vetted using a quantitative application of 
probabilistic risk assessment. This process is described in Chapter 7 of this study. Chapter 7 also 
contains recommendations for applying these performance measures to a nuclear chemical 
facility.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
 
ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Chapters 4-6 laid the foundation and proceeded through the development of performance 
measures to improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities. The 
process of collecting feedback and input from subject matter experts at nuclear chemical 
facilities served as a quality check, to ensure that the performance measures proposed were 
practical and effective measures to monitor. However, the analysis to this point did not provide 
any information about quantifying the reduction in risk that could be achieved from these 
performance measures. Further, no information has been provided about applying these 
performance measures at a facility, for example, the collection of data and the formation of 
baselines that would be used to determine if safety conditions are degraded.  
 
The objectives of Chapter 7 are to answer two questions: (1) can we demonstrate that these 
performance measures could provide a measurable reduction in the risks associated with 
operating these facilities to illustrate their efficacy? and (2) what steps would we take, and what 
changes would we make to use these performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility? This 
chapter covers the efficacy of performance measures in reducing risk and improving safety at 
nuclear chemical facilities, as well as the practicality of measuring and monitoring the proposed 
quantities to make judgments on the safety status of the operating facility.  
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The outline of Chapter 7 is as follows: 
7.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment of Performance Measures 
7.3 Application of Performance Measures at DOE nuclear chemical facilities 
7.4 Additional considerations to improve safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical 
facilities 
 
7.2. Quantitative Risk Assessment of Performance Measures 
 
Section 7.2 describes the quantitative assessment of the impact of the performance measures 
through their application to a probabilistic risk assessment.  
 
7.2.1. Introduction 
 
One method to determine the quantitative risk associated with an operating facility is to use 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), a process described in Chapter 3 of this study. In order to 
determine the quantitative effect of the proposed performance measures on risk at a nuclear 
chemical facility, one such PRA was used. The PRA for the Defense Waste Processing Facility 
(DWPF) at the DOE Savannah River was completed in 1995 by a team of government and 
contractor experts to provide a quantitative measure of the risk associated with DWPF operations 
(Sarrack, 1995).  
 
DWPF is an operational facility at the Savannah River Site, and meets the definition in the 
context of this study as a nuclear chemical facility, meaning its process intertwines complex 
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chemical operations with radiological materials and associated hazards. The purpose of DWPF is 
to convert liquid high level nuclear waste, stored at the tank farms at the Savannah River Site, 
into a solid glass form that is stable for long term storage or disposal. DWPF has been 
operational since 1996, and some of the nuclear chemical occurrences studied in Chapter 5 
occurred at DWPF.  
 
Safety of operations is and was a predominant concern for the DOE. As a part of the safety 
analysis process for DWPF, several hazards analyses were conducted to determine hazards to 
human health or the environment. These fed into the safety analysis report, which identifies and 
quantifies the consequences and frequency of studied accident sequences and ensures adequate 
controls are available, active and passive, engineered and administrative, to reduce the likelihood 
and consequences of these events. As a part of this safety assurance process, a PRA was 
completed for DWPF, providing a probabilistic representation of the accident sequences that 
may be involved in one of these events. The PRA cites the three barriers to the release of fission 
products to the environment at DWPF, to include: the process vessels and piping [the primary 
barrier], the DWPF buildings, and the ventilation/filter system. The main accidents of concern 
are energetic events from the deflagration or detonation of hydrogen or benzene vapors produced 
in the process vessels Taylor and Massey, 1996, Page 1).  
 
The PRA contains several accident progression event trees (APET) that illustrate possible 
progression of the events. In the development of an APET, a series of events [questions] was 
postulated that could occur during progression of the accident. These events pertain to (Taylor 
and Massey, 1996, Page 2): 
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1. the cause of the accident [i.e., initiating event], 
2. the status of the plant at the time of the accident, 
3. the energetics of the accident, 
4. the impact of the accident on adjacent equipment/processes, and 
5. the response of the Confinement System to the challenge posed by the energetics 
accompanying the accident and/or the radionuclides that breach the primary barrier. 
 
In the APET, a probability of occurrence was assigned to each of the events above based on: 
known information related to the condition of the facility or the accident under consideration, 
fault tree analysis of active systems within the facility, the answers to previous questions [i.e., 
accident progression is sequence dependent], and/or mechanistic analysis of accident phenomena 
and confinement response (Taylor and Massey, 1996, Page 2). Several APETs from this PRA 
formed the basis for the quantitative demonstration of risk reduction from the proposed 
performance measures that follows. The APETs were analyzed to determine if the addition of the 
performance measures affected the quantitative probability of the accident. Modeling of the 
APETs with revised nodes reflected in the error probabilities was performed to illustrate that the 
performance measures could have an impact on the quantitative risk at a nuclear chemical 
facility. The analysis described hereafter is for illustrative, and not regulatory purposes. The 
quantitative changes were not designed to have an effect on the operational safety basis of the 
facility, rather to further inform performance measure development and implementation.  
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7.2.2. Quantitative Assessment 
 
The PRA for the DWPF at the Savannah River Site was used in this analysis to determine 
whether the proposed performance measures resulted in quantitative risk reductions. From this 
PRA, three APETs were chosen representing three separate event scenarios at DWPF: these 
included a steam explosion in the melter (Sarrack et al, 1995, Page 364), an explosion in the low 
point pump pit in the precipitate pump tank (Sarrack et al, 1995, Page 414), and a benzene 
explosion in the salt processing cell (Sarrack et al, 1995, Page 446). Each of these events are 
described in more detail below. The full APETs for these three events are included in Appendix 
D of this study. 
 
For each APET, the first process was to take one performance measure and select nodes that 
could potentially be impacted by monitoring the data recommended for that measure. Once the 
nodes were identified, each node was traced back to the source of the data for the quantitative 
frequency. This frequency was then evaluated to determine whether it could be adjusted based on 
improvements in operations/safety produced by implementing the performance measure.  
 
7.2.2.1. Steam Explosion in the Melter 
 
The following discussion of the steam explosion in the melter is described in the DWPF Event 
Tree Report (Sarrack et al, 1995, Page 12): 
“Conditions that could lead to a steam explosion in the melter require the presence of 
both water and partially melted excess salt. Water is a normal constituent of the-process. 
Melter feed is a slurry which is approximately 50% water. Also procedures require 
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flushing of the feed tube with water before and tier each feed operation. Salt content is 
monitored by sampling and controlled by procedures in both the Liquid Radioactive 
Waste Handling Facilities (LRWHF) and DWPF.” 
 
The APET for the steam explosion in the melter contains both human errors and sampling 
equipment errors. There are several nodes which could be impacted by the proposed performance 
measures. Table 7-1 lists the nodes and proposed changes to the probabilities associated with 
them and can be used to estimate how a nuclear chemical facility functioning with the 
recommended performance measures might have a reduced probability of the event. Table 7-1 
also shows the sensitivity of this overall probability change for each potentially affected node. In 
total, this APET had 18 input nodes. Of these 18, 9 were modeled improved by the performance 
measures.  
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Table 7-1| Steam Explosion in the Melter Affected Nodes and Probability Changes 
Node Source of data for 
probability and 
assumptions 
Impact of 
performance 
measure on 
assumptions 
Rationale Revised 
probability 
estimate 
 
Percent 
Change of 
Overall 
Event 
Probability 
for node 
(%) 
Node 1 
 
The source of the 
current error 
probability is the 
Sensor Level Failure 
LST-FA-1 in the 
Savannah River Site 
Generic Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value (as 
shown above) is 
2.15E-5, which 
assumes a 5.0E-7H 
failure rate where H 
is 86 hours for the 
analyzer (43 hours 
for both). 
With the addition of 
Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject matter 
experts, and 
maintenance 
controls to ensure 
the analyzers are 
maintained, the 
analyzer could be 
assumed to be more 
reliable. 
According to the 1996 
version of the 
Savannah River Site 
Generic Database 
Development 
document, a 50% to 
75% reduction in 
component failure rates 
has been observed in 
system/facilities with 
successful predictive 
and/or precision 
maintenance program 
(Blanchard, 1996, Page 
11). Thus, with the 
increased engineering 
design protocol and 
addition of 
maintenance 
performance measures, 
we will model a 
reduction of 50% of the 
current failure rate. 
1.1E-5 
 
 
2.16 
Node 2 
 
The source for the 
current error 
probability is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 4 of that report 
(Benhardt et al, 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Failure of an 
Administrative 
Control. 
With the addition of 
the two operating 
procedures 
performance 
metrics, the sample 
preparation 
procedure should be 
current, accurate 
and effective and 
revised or 
developed using the 
right subject matter 
experts. With these 
additional controls 
in mind, a reduction 
in probability for 
this node may be 
warranted. 
Benhardt recommends 
the use of the high 
value for unusual 
circumstances. The use 
of the nominal value, 
rather than the high 
value is modeled, as 
recommended in 
Benhardt for typical 
circumstances.  
5.0E-03 
 
 
4.30 
Node 3 The source for the 
current error 
With the addition of 
the two operating 
With these additional 
controls in mind, a 
3.0E-04 
 
201 
 
 
probability is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 4 of that report 
(Benhardt et al., 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Laboratory 
Analysis Error. 
procedures 
performance 
metrics, the sample 
analysis procedures 
should be current, 
accurate and 
effective and 
revised or 
developed using the 
right subject matter 
experts. 
reduction in probability 
for this node may be 
warranted. For the high 
estimate, the error of 
omission or 
commission was used 
directly, which implies 
no check of the analysis 
(Benhardt, 1994). The 
use of the nominal 
value, rather than the 
high value is modeled. 
 
 
0.27 
Node 4 
 
The source of the 
current error 
probability is the 
Sensor Level Failure 
LST-FA-1 in the 
Savannah River Site 
Generic Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value is 
2.15E-5, which 
assumes a 5.0E-7H 
failure rate where H 
is 86 hours for the 
analyzer (43 hours 
for both). 
With the addition of 
Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject matter 
experts, and 
maintenance 
controls to ensure 
the analyzers are 
maintained, the 
analyzer could be 
considered to be 
more reliable. 
This would be similar 
in improvement to 
Node 1.  
1.1E-5 
 
 
1.62 
Node 5 
 
Node 5 is 
functionally the 
same as Node 4. See 
above.  
Node 5 is 
functionally the 
same as Node 4. 
See above. 
Node 5 is functionally 
the same as Node 4. 
See above. 
1.1E-5 
 
 
1.62 
Node 6 
 
The source for the 
current error 
probability is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 4 of that report 
(Benhardt et al., 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Laboratory 
Analysis Error. 
With the addition of 
the two operating 
procedures 
performance 
metrics, the sample 
analysis procedures 
should be current, 
accurate and 
effective and 
revised or 
developed using the 
right subject matter 
experts. 
With these additional 
controls in mind, a 
reduction in probability 
for this node may be 
warranted. For the high 
estimate, the error of 
omission or 
commission was used 
directly, which implies 
no check of the analysis 
(Benhardt, 1994). The 
use of the nominal 
value, rather than the 
high value is modeled. 
3.0E-04 
 
 
0.98 
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Node 7 
 
The source for the 
current error 
probability is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 3 of that report 
(Benhardt et al., 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Incorrect 
Reading or 
Recording of Data. 
With the addition of 
the two operating 
procedures 
performance 
metrics, and the 
engineering controls 
metrics, the analyst 
will find analysis 
procedures that are 
effective and be 
familiar with these, 
and will also be 
familiar with the 
controls on the 
system and 
understand the 
important of 
checking and 
double checking 
this measurement. 
With these additional 
controls in mind, a 
reduction in probability 
for this node may be 
warranted. The high 
value is recommended 
for a poorly designed 
display, under very 
high stress conditions 
inside a control room, 
or for a poorly designed 
display, under nominal 
conditions outside the 
control room 
(Benhardt, 1994). The 
use of the nominal 
value (a good display), 
rather than the high 
value is modeled. 
1.0E-02 
 
 
88.1 
Node 8 
 
The source for the 
current error 
probability is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 4 of that report 
(Benhardt et al., 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Checker 
Verification Error. 
With the addition of 
the two operating 
procedures 
performance 
metrics, the sample 
analysis procedures 
should be current, 
accurate and 
effective and 
revised or 
developed using the 
right subject matter 
experts. 
With these additional 
controls in mind, a 
reduction in probability 
for this node may be 
warranted. The high 
value includes as 
assumption that written 
materials are not used 
(Benhardt, 1994). The 
use of the nominal 
value (alerted, but not 
active participant), 
rather than the high 
value is modeled. 
1.0E-01 
 
 
60.0 
Node 9 
 
The source for the 
current reading is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 3 of that report 
(Benhardt et al., 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Incorrect 
Reading or 
Recording of Data. 
With the 
engineering controls 
metrics, the 
engineer will be 
familiar with the 
controls on the 
system and 
understand the 
importance of 
checking and 
double checking 
this measurement. 
With these additional 
controls in mind, a 
reduction in probability 
for this node may be 
warranted. The use of 
the nominal value 
(good display), rather 
than the high value 
(poor display) is 
modeled. 
1.0E-02 
 
 
88.1 
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With all potentially affected nodes included in the analysis, the new probability of the steam 
explosion in the melter may be as low as 1.22 E-6 per year. This compares to the previous 
probability of 1.82E-5 per year without the changes implemented due to the performance 
measures. 
 
7.2.2.2. LPPP PPT Explosion 
 
The following description of the Explosion in the Low Point Pump Pit (LPPP) in the Precipitate 
Pump Tank (PPT) is provided the DWPF Event Tree Report (Sarrack et al, 1995, Page 16): 
“Benzene vapor explosion is the-safety concern for the Precipitate Pump Tank (PPT) in 
the Low Point Pump Pit (LPPP). PPT is operated with a primary nitrogen gas purge to 
keep the oxygen concentration from reaching MOC. The primary nitrogen source.is the 
bulk nitrogen gas system; the backup nitrogen sources area bank of high pressure 
nitrogen cylinders and the local LPPP nitrogen tank supply. The backup system actuates 
automatically upon loss of primary purge supply. Instruments monitor oxygen 
concentration in the effluent stream from PPT which goes to the Process Vessel Vent. 
System (PWS).  If the oxygen level gets too high, an outlet control valve closes 
automatically isolating the tank from the PWS, to allow nitrogen gas pressure to buildup 
in the vessel, thereby preventing leakage of air into the PPT.” 
 
The APET for the benzene vapor explosion in the PPT contains 4 nodes which could be 
impacted by the proposed performance measures. Table 7-2 contains a list of nodes and proposed 
changes to the probabilities associated with them that might be used to estimate how a nuclear 
chemical facility functioning with the recommended performance measures might have a 
reduced probability of the event. Table 7-2 also shows the sensitivity of this overall probability 
change for each potentially affected node. 
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Table 7-2 | Explosion in the Low Point Pump Pit Affected Nodes and Probability Changes 
Node Source of data for 
probability and 
assumptions 
Impact of 
performance 
measure on 
assumptions 
Rationale Revised 
probability 
estimate 
 
Percent 
Change of 
Overall 
Event 
Probability 
for Node 
(%) 
Node 1 
 
The source of the 
current failure 
probability is the 
Valve (control) 
motor operated fails 
closed, CMV-FC-C 
in the Savannah 
River Site Generic 
Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value is 
1.2E-5, which 
assumes a 3E-6H 
failure rate where H 
is 4 hours. 
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject matter 
experts, the 
pressure control 
valve may be less 
likely to fail 
closed. 
Using the same rationale 
of increased maintenance 
and engineering 
programs described in 
the previous APET: a 
50% to 75% reduction in 
component failure rates 
has been observed in 
system/facilities with 
successful predictive 
and/or precision 
maintenance program 
(Blanchard, 1996, Page 
11), a 50% reduction in 
the failure rate might 
better represent the 
probability of this 
failure. 
6E-6 
 
 
1.49 
Node 2 
 
The source of the 
current failure 
probability is the 
Safety/Relief Valve 
rupture (internal) 
SRV-RI-G in the 
Savannah River Site 
Generic Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value is 
1.2E-5, which 
assumes a 5E-7H 
failure rate where H 
is 24 hours. 
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject matter 
experts, the 
pressure safety 
valve may be less 
likely to rupture. 
See above for the 50% 
guideline to reduce the 
failure rate for the 
pressure safety valve 
rupture. 
6E-6 
 
 
0.25 
Node 3 
 
See Node 1 for a 
similar scenario. 
See Node 1 for a 
similar scenario. 
See Node 1 for a similar 
scenario. 
6E-6 
 
 
1.49 
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Node 4 
 
See Node 2 for a 
similar scenario. 
See Node 2 for a 
similar scenario. 
See Node 2 for a similar 
scenario. 
6E-6 
 
 
0.25 
 
With all potentially affected nodes included in the analysis, the new probability of the LPPP PPT 
explosion may be as low as 1.88E-6 per year. Without any of the additional considerations, the 
probability was 1.94E-6 per year. In total, this APET had 17 input nodes. Of these 17, 4 were 
modeled improved by the performance measures. 
 
7.2.2.3. Benzene Explosion in the SPC 
 
The following description of the benzene explosion in the Salt Processing Cell (SPC) (Sarrack et 
al, 1995, Page 18): 
“The Zone 1 ventilation system purges the Salt Processing Cell (SPC) which prevents the 
accumulation. of potentially flammable benzene vapor within the cell volume. 
Ventilation system failure with either SPC vessel over-pressurization, vessel overheating, 
or spill of waste solution into the SPC sump without pumping to the PR could result in 
benzene vapor concentrations reaching LFL within the SPC. Pressurization of process 
vessels in SPC is a safety response to detected high oxygen levels within, any of these 
vessels. However, this increases the risk of benzene vapor accumulation in the cell 
volume outside the vessels. While explosion prevention by inerting is the main concern 
within SPC vessels, the concern in the Process Vessel Vent Header (PVVH) is LFL 
(dilution) control. The off-gas ventilation from SPC, combines with the flow from CPC, 
thus diluting the benzene concentration in PVVH. If the PVVH flow gets too low, an 
automatic interlock closes two valves and isolates SPC from PVVH. This interlock also 
turn off CO2 supply pressure to SPC vessels. SPC vessels are protected from reaching 
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MOC by a nitrogen purge. Pressure interlocks stop the supply of steam to PR and OE and 
starts cooling water flow to these vessels. Since the seismic trigger interlock is designed 
to isolate the SPC from the PVVH and supply a constant flow of nitrogen to SPC vessels, 
the SPC Explosion seismic fault tree models benzene to always enter the cell following 
an earthquake. The fault tree concludes that if Zone 1 ventilation fails, a cell explosion 
occurs. SPC system boundaries include support systems, such as: Zone 1 -ventilation 
system components, instrument air system, cooling tower water system, normal and 
backup electric power systems, and the control instrumentation associated with the 
PVVH low flow interlock.” 
 
The APET for the benzene explosion in the SPC contains 10 nodes which could be impacted by 
the proposed performance measures. Table 7-3 contains the list of nodes and proposed changes 
to the probabilities associated with them that might be used to estimate how a nuclear chemical 
facility functioning with the recommended performance measures might have a reduced 
probability of the event. Table 7-3 also shows the sensitivity of this overall probability change 
for each potentially affected node. 
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Table 7-3 | Benzene Explosion in the Salt Processing Cell Affected Nodes and Probability 
Changes 
Node Source of data for 
probability and 
assumptions 
Impact of 
performance 
measure on 
assumptions 
Rationale Revised 
probability 
estimate 
 
 
Percent 
Change in 
Overall 
Event 
Probability 
for Node 
(%) 
Node 1 
 
The source of the 
current probability is 
the Flow Failure 
recommended value 
with a failure rate of 
3.0E-6H where H is 
8 hours in the 
Savannah River Site 
Generic Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). 
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject 
matter experts, the 
flow monitor may 
be less likely to 
fail. 
According to the 1996 
version of the Savannah 
River Site Generic 
Database Development 
document, a 50% to 
75’% reduction in 
component failure rates 
has been observed in 
system/facilities with 
successful predictive 
and/or precision 
maintenance program 
(Blanchard, 1996 Page 
11).  We can therefore 
assume that with the 
increased engineering 
design protocol and 
addition of maintenance 
performance measures, 
we might model a 
reduction of 50% of the 
current failure rate. 
1.2E-5 
 
 
2.48 
Node 2 
 
For details about 
Node 2, see Node 1 
above. 
For details about 
Node 2, see Node 
1 above. 
For details about Node 
2, see Node 1 above. 
1.2E-5 
 
 
2.48 
Node 3 
 
The source of the 
current probability is 
the valve (control) 
motor operated fails 
closed with a failure 
rate of 3.0E-6H 
where H is 43 hours 
in the Savannah 
River Site Generic 
Database 
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
With the addition of the 
new performance 
measures we might 
apply the 50% failure 
rate reduction proposed 
previously. 
6.45E-5 
 
 
2.48 
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Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). 
right subject 
matter experts, the 
purge isolation 
valve may be less 
likely to fail. 
Node 4 
 
For details about 
Node 4, see Node 3 
above. 
For details about 
Node 4, see Node 
3 above. 
For details about Node 
4, see Node 3 above. 
6.45E-5 
 
 
2.48 
Node 5 
 
The source of the 
current probability is 
the Fan/blower fails 
to run, MDF-FR-H in 
the Savannah River 
Site Generic 
Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value is 
7.19E-4, which 
assumes a 3E-5H 
failure rate where H 
is 24 hours.  
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject 
matter experts, the 
pressure control 
valve may be less 
likely to fail 
closed. 
We might model the 
improvement to this 
node using the 50% 
reduction to the failure 
rate proposed 
previously. 
3.6E-4 
 
 
0.33 
Node 6 
 
The source of the 
current probability is 
the Fan/blower fails 
to start, MDF-FS-H 
in the Savannah 
River Site Generic 
Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value is 
5.00E-3, which 
assumes the nominal 
failure rate of 5E-3. 
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject 
matter experts, 
standby blower 
may be less likely 
to fail to start. 
Because we are using 
the nominal failure rate, 
we will not assume any 
reduction in probability 
for this node. 
5E-3 
 
 
0 
Node 7 
 
Node 7 is similar to 
Node 5. See Node 5 
above for more 
information about the 
backup fan failing to 
run. 
Node 7 is similar 
to Node 5. See 
Node 5 above for 
more information 
about the backup 
fan failing to run. 
Node 7 is similar to 
Node 5. See Node 5 
above for more 
information about the 
backup fan failing to 
run. 
3.6E-4 
 
 
0.02 
Node 8 The source for the 
current reading is the 
With the addition 
of the engineering 
The use of the nominal 
value (several 
1.0E-02 
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Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 4 of that report 
(Benhardt et al, 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Failure to 
Respond to 
Compelling Signal. 
controls metric to 
ensure nuisance 
alarms are not 
desensitizing 
operators, a 
reduction in 
probability for this 
node may be 
warranted. 
competing signals), 
rather than the high 
value (many competing 
signals) is modeled. 
 
10.0 
Node 9 
 
The source for the 
current reading is the 
Savannah River Site 
Human Error Data 
Base Development 
for Nonreactor 
Nuclear Facilities 
from 1994, listed in 
Table 4 of that report 
(Benhardt et al, 
1994). The current 
value is the high 
probability estimate 
for Miscalibration. 
With the addition 
of the two 
operating 
procedures 
performance 
metrics, the 
sample analysis 
procedures should 
be current, 
accurate and 
effective and 
revised or 
developed using 
the right subject 
matter experts. 
With these additional 
controls in mind, a 
reduction in probability 
for this node may be 
warranted. . The major 
contribution to this 
failure probability 
involves failure to use 
the calibration 
procedure, failure to use 
a checklist properly 
when using the 
procedure, an error of 
omission or commission 
during the calibration 
procedure, and failure of 
the operator to detect the 
error by comparing 
before and after 
instrument readings 
(Benhardt, 1994). The 
use of the nominal value 
(single person, operator 
check), rather than the 
high value (single 
person, no checks) is 
modeled. 
5.0E-03 
 
 
2.59 
Node 10 
 
The source of the 
current probability is 
the Level Failure 
LST-FA-I in the 
Savannah River Site 
Generic Database 
Development from 
1993 (Blanton and 
Eide, 1993). The 
current value is 
2.19E-3, which 
assumes a 5.0E-7H 
and is checked 
annually. The hours 
input was 4,380 hrs. 
With the addition 
of Maintenance 
and Engineering 
Controls 
performance 
measures to ensure 
safety systems are 
maintained and 
controls are 
designed by the 
right subject 
matter experts, the 
level element may 
be less likely to 
fail low. 
We might reduce the 
failure rate associated 
with the level element 
similarly to the previous 
nodes by 50%. 
1.1E-3 
 
 
0.22 
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With all potentially affected nodes included in the analysis, the new probability of the SPC 
Explosion may be as low as 8.27E-5 per year. This compares favorably to the 1.08E-4 per year 
without the improvements. In total, this APET had 29 input nodes. Of these 29, 10 were modeled 
improved by the performance measures. 
 
7.2.3. Results 
 
The results of the application of the developed performance measures and their potential areas of 
improvement on the three select probabilistic risk assessments demonstrated a potential decrease 
in the probability of all three studied events. The three decreases are included in Table 7-4 
below.  
 
Table 7-4 | Percentage Change for each APET with Proposed Performance Measures 
Event Probability prior to 
performance measure 
considerations 
Probability including 
performance measure 
considerations 
Percentage decrease in 
probability 
Steam explosion in the 
melter 
1.82E-5 6.29E-8 93.3% 
Explosion in LPPP PPT 1.94E-6 1.85E-6 3.09% 
SPC Explosion 1.08E-4 8.27E-5 23.5% 
 
 
Each of the analyzed events experienced a reduction in the probability of the event per year by 
applying reductions using the developed performance measures. The most useful performance 
measures for the reductions were the operating procedures measures and the maintenance 
procedures, both of which had strong ties to human error probability nodes in the event trees 
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including failure to follow procedures, failure to perform tasks correctly, such as sample analysis 
and calibration of equipment. The engineering controls performance measures also had ties to 
many of the nodes, in particular those related to the reliability of equipment such as analyzers, 
flow monitors, isolation valves and pressure control valves, but at a pre-operational stage, so 
they were not directly impactful to the overall event probability. The hazards analysis 
performance measures are similar—they impact the development of controls, which reduce the 
probability, but were not represented by individual nodes as frequently.  
 
The take away from this exercise is further illustration of the overall value of the proposed 
impactful performance measures to a nuclear chemical facility such as DWPF. Some of the 
proposed performance measures had a high impact on the overall probability of the event 
modeled. For example, the engineering controls and operating procedures measures nodes in the 
Steam Explosion in the Melter APET described above, modeled a change in the event probability 
up to 88%, demonstrating their impact at nuclear chemical facility. This exercise provided 
another method for analyzing the potential impact of a performance measure using probabilistic 
risk assessment. The methods used in this analysis could also benefit industry by providing a 
way to determine impact of performance measures where a probabilistic risk assessment is 
available.  
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7.3. Application of Performance Measures at DOE nuclear chemical facilities 
 
The objective of 7.3 is to provide facilities with guidance for the implementation of these 
performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility.  
 
7.3.1. Introduction 
 
The performance measures recommended for application at nuclear chemical facilities were 
checked for quality by the subject matter expert review, and tested using a quantitative reduction 
in risk at a nuclear chemical facility using the DWPF Probabilistic Risk Assessment described in 
section 7.2. However, the specific application of these performance measures at a facility may 
provide some uncertainty or be the source of some questions. For instance, many of the 
recommended performance measures relate to getting the “right people” involved in the various 
processes, while this was deemed very important, it could be difficult to measure and monitor. 
Further, once the data is collected, it may be difficult to determine how to turn the data into a 
single metric, and how to determine the health of the system based on this metric. For instance, 
when collecting data about the involvement of subject matter experts in the hazard analysis, there 
may be multiple data points such as training and qualification records to ensure expectations for 
subject matter expertise are met, potential process metrics to track their involvement in the 
hazards analysis, and potentially self-assessment data to ensure the process metrics are trending 
in a positive direction. In order to effectively monitor this data, it may be necessary to combine 
these data points into a single metric. Further, it will be necessary to establish a baseline, a point 
that can be deemed “safe,” and a range of values for safe operation. In the SME involvement in 
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the hazards analysis described above, a baseline would be required for training and qualification 
expectations, as well as the process metrics and self-assessment values. By definition, anything 
outside of this range would then be “unsafe” or veering in the direction of unsafe operating 
conditions. Baseline values may be site or process dependent, but some general guidelines are 
offered in this report. 
 
This section resolves to answer these questions about the proposed performance measures and 
provide recommendations for measuring and monitoring the health of a nuclear chemical facility 
over time. For each performance measure, recommendations are provided for how the data could 
be collected, and developing a baseline and operating range.  
 
7.3.2. Application Recommendations for Performance Measures at DOE Nuclear Chemical 
Facilities 
 
The following sections describe the implementation of the Performance Measures at DOE 
Nuclear Chemical facilities.  
 
7.3.2.1. Engineering Controls Performance Measures 
 
Performance Measure: Pertinent SMEs involvement in process design and/or review changes 
 
Data to be collected: The process of determining if the right people are involved in the process 
design or review changes could be accomplished in a few ways.  
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The first step in determining if the right people were involved in the process design and 
reviewing any potential changes to it would be determining what types of SMEs would be 
necessary to ensure that the process design or change review could be deemed safe, for example, 
what types and how many engineers, health and safety professionals, operators, etc. The next 
step would involve determining what training and qualifications are expected to be classified as 
an SME. This would entail developing official expectations on training and qualifications 
required and updating and maintaining these expectations at a set frequency. 
 
Once expectations are set, the next step is to track the completion of the training and 
qualifications program by the SMEs. When all of the official expectations determined in the first 
step are met, SMEs must have concurrence on the process design or change review which could 
be documented. SME involvement in process design and/or reviewing changes can be tracked. 
The following methods could be used to track SME concurrence in process design or change 
reviews.  
 
One method would be to develop a template for each process design or change review meeting 
and require the signature of the SME that meets each required area of expertise (e.g. nuclear 
safety, industrial hygiene, etc.). In this case, a document review performed at a designated 
interval could be used to verify that signatures were achieved on this template in all of the 
processes, the data would be: 
1. Percentage of signatures collected per form—would have to be go/no-go 
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Another method would be a periodic self-assessments or independent assessments of the 
documentation of the design documents or change documents to collect information about the 
personnel involved in the development of these documents. The data associated with this method 
might include: 
1. The number of documents analyzed 
2. For each expertise, the number of authors or contributors associated with the 
documentation 
3. Qualification/training of required reviewers established and accomplished 
 
Either of these methods might also require the occasional review of technical qualifications of 
the participants, for instance, the qualifications of the particular signatories or participants in 
either method might be reviewed for a certain number of meetings or documents in a given year. 
The data collected for this analysis might include: 
1. Areas of subject matter expertise with established training and qualification programs 
2. Percentage of experts trained or qualified 
3. Percentage of meetings which had trained/qualified attendees 
 
Developing a Baseline: The baseline for these reviews to determine if the right experts were 
involved in the process design and to review proposed changes to the system would be the lowest 
percentage of participation at which the design or changes to it could be deemed safe and 
reliable. The goal would be to have 100% participation at all meetings. However, this might not 
be feasible. If participation is regularly low, an assessment may be required to determine which 
specialties are regularly missing from the documentation and work to resolve this issue. 
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Performance Measure: Percentage of operators and technical staff who are able to identify 
controls and believe that they understand their operations 
 
Data to be collected: The percentage of operators and technical staff who are able to identify 
controls and believe that they understand their operations could be monitored using a self-
assessment or survey of the operators and technical staff. This survey could be administered as a 
part of annual training (e.g. safety training, rad con training, etc.) and could include technical 
questions about the controls associated with a system and/or questions about the confidence of 
the operators and technical staff in their understanding. For example: 
Technical question: Which of the following control(s) is/are associated with maintaining the 
containment of X: 
(a) Elevated design of ammonia tank 
(b) Pressure relief device 
(c) Temperature control 
(d) Vehicle barricade 
Subjective question: Do you believe you understand the operation of the controls associated with 
X system? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
 
The data collected for this measure would then be the percentage of operators and technical staff 
who responded either correctly to the technical question, or affirmatively to the subjective 
question during each assessment application.  
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1. Percentage of operators and technical staff who correctly responded to the technical 
question(s) 
2. Percentage of operators and technical staff who responded affirmatively to the subjective 
question(s) 
 
 
Developing a Baseline: The goal for the assessment of the operators and technical staff would be 
to have 100% be able to identify the important controls at their facility and respond affirmatively 
that they understand operation and control of the system and process. However, 100% may not 
be possible. A minimum level of technical understanding and affirmative responses would need 
to be determined, based on the highest percentage received during a time period of safe operation 
(no occurrences) and a dip below this could be a red flag for the safety of operating the system.  
 
Performance Measure: Number of “nuisance alarms” or false alarms 
 
Data to be collected: The data collected for this metric would be as follows: 
1. The total alarms actuated during the prescribed time period 
2. The number of alarms actuated during the prescribed time period labeled as false alarms 
or “nuisance alarms” 
 
Recommended Calculations: 
The percentage of actuated alarms that were “nuisance” or false alarms 
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Developing a Baseline: The baseline for the percentage of nuisance or false alarms would be set 
at a percentage which is deemed distracting or dangerous for operation of the process. The 
baseline could be developed by collecting 6 months of data and then establishing improvement 
strategies and goals.  
 
7.3.2.2. Operating Procedures Performance Measures 
 
Performance Measure: Number of operators or maintenance technicians who believe procedures 
are current, accurate, and effective 
 
Data to be collected: The percentage of operators or maintenance technicians who believe 
procedures are current, accurate, and effective could be collected using an assessment with a 
question similar to the following: 
Assessment questions:  
Based on your experience with procedures, do you believe that operating procedure X is current 
and accurate (does the written procedure represent the procedure performed)? 
Based on your experience with procedures, do you believe that operating procedure X is 
effective (does procedure X accomplish the task it is designed to accomplish)? 
Based on your experience with procedures, do you believe that operating procedure X achieves 
the goal in the safest way? 
The data would then be the percentage of operators and maintenance technicians who responded 
affirmatively to the questions in the prescribed time period. This data could also be trended over 
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a longer timeframe, for instance years, and if the responses began trending down, it may be a 
sign that procedures are becoming outdated.  
 
Developing a Baseline: The goal for the assessment of the operators and technical staff would be 
to have 100% respond affirmatively that operating procedures are current, accurate, and 
effective. However, 100% may not be achievable at the facility. A minimum percentage of 
responses would need to be determined, based on the highest percentage for safe operation, and a 
dip below or above this could be a red flag for the safety of operating the system. To achieve this 
baseline, data could be collected for a prescribed time period and a target improvement trend 
could be set to ensure the organization is staying on target for improvement.  
 
Performance Measure: Pertinent SMEs involved in drafting procedures 
 
Data to be collected: The process of determining if the right people are involved in drafting 
procedures is similar to the first performance measure discussed (SME involvement in process 
design and/or review changes) and could be accomplished in a few ways.  
 
The first step in determining if the right people were involved in the development of operating 
procedures would be determining what types of SMEs would be necessary to ensure that the 
operating procedure could be deemed safe, accurate, and up to date, for example, what types and 
how many engineers, health and safety professionals, operators, etc. The next step would involve 
determining what training and qualifications are expected to be classified as an SME. This would 
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involve developing official expectations on training and qualifications required and updating and 
maintaining these expectations at a set frequency. 
 
Once expectations are set, the next step is to track the completion of the training and 
qualifications program by the SMEs. When all of the official expectations determined in the first 
step are met, SMEs must have concurrence on the operating procedure which could be 
documented. SME involvement in developing operating procedures can be tracked using the 
following methods.  
 
One method would be to develop a template for each operating procedure development or 
change meeting and require the signature of the SME that meets each required area of expertise 
(e.g. nuclear safety, industrial hygiene, etc.). In this case, a document review performed at a 
designated interval could be used to verify that signatures were achieved on this template in all 
of the processes, the data would be: 
2. Percentage of signatures collected per form—would have to be go/no-go 
 
Another method would be a periodic self-assessments or independent assessments of the 
documentation of the operating procedures to collect information about the personnel involved in 
the development of these documents. The data associated with this method might include: 
4. The number of documents analyzed 
5. For each expertise, the number of authors or contributors associated with the 
documentation 
6. Qualification/training of required reviewers established and accomplished 
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Either of these methods might also require the occasional review of technical qualifications of 
the participants, for instance, the qualifications of the particular signatories or participants in 
either method might be reviewed for a certain number of meetings or documents in a given year. 
The data collected for this analysis might include: 
4. Areas of subject matter expertise with established training and qualification programs 
5. Percentage of experts trained or qualified 
6. Percentage of meetings which had trained/qualified attendees 
 
Developing a Baseline: The baseline for these reviews to determine if the right experts were 
involved in the development and maintenance of operating procedures would be the lowest 
percentage of participation at which the operating procedure could be deemed safe and reliable. 
The goal would be to have 100% participation at all meetings. However, this might not be 
feasible. If participation is regularly low, an assessment may be required to determine which 
specialties are regularly missing from the documentation and work to resolve this issue. 
 
7.3.2.3. Maintenance Performance Measure 
 
Performance Measure: Amount of time the plant is in operation with any safety system in an 
inoperable or degraded condition 
 
Data to be collected: The amount of time the plant is in operation with any safety system 
inoperable or in a degraded condition could be tracked in a few different ways: 
222 
 
 
The first method would be to monitor the amount of time spent in a limited condition of 
operation (LCO) (defined by the Atomic Energy Act as the lowest functional capability or 
performance levels of structures, systems, components, and their support systems required for 
normal safe operation of the plant) in a designated timeframe: 
1. Percentage of time spent in an LCO during each year or quarter 
 
The second method would be to monitor entry into a grace period (additional time allowed to 
complete the requirement before taking the required action of an LCO; does not exist for all 
systems): 
2. Number of times a grace period is entered in a given year or quarter 
 
The third method would be to monitor the amount of time the grace period is utilized during a 
designated timeframe, for instance, if a facility regularly gets to the end of the grace periods, this 
may be an indication of degraded safety conditions.  
3. Percentage of grace period utilized during each entry into a grace period in a given time 
period 
 
Developing a Baseline: The goal would be to minimize the amount of time that the plant is in 
operation in a grace period or LCO. A low percentage could be developed, based on the most 
successful and safe phases of operation data, over which a flag would be raised to the safety of 
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the operation of the system. Additionally, improvement strategies could be developed and the 
baseline to the improvement track monitored to ensure compliance with the targeted trend.  
 
7.3.2.4. Hazards Analysis Performance Measures 
 
Performance Measure: Pertinent SME involvement in DSA development and maintenance 
 
Data to be collected: The process of determining if the right people are involved in DSA 
development and maintenance is similar to the first performance measure discussed (SME 
involvement in process design and/or review changes) and could be accomplished in a few ways.  
 
 
The first step in determining if the right people were involved in the DSA development and 
maintenance would be determining what types of SMEs would be necessary to ensure that the 
safety analysis could be deemed thorough, for example, what types and how many engineers, 
health and safety professionals, operators, etc. The next step would involve determining what 
training and qualifications are expected to be classified as an SME. This would involve 
developing official expectations on training and qualifications required and updating and 
maintaining these expectations at a set frequency. 
 
Once expectations are set, the next step is to track the completion of the training and 
qualifications program by the SMEs. When all of the official expectations determined in the first 
step are met, SMEs must have concurrence on the operating procedure which could be 
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documented. SME involvement in DSA development can be tracked using the following 
methods.  
 
One method would be to develop a template for each safety documentation or hazards 
assessment meeting and require the signature of the SME that meets each required area of 
expertise (e.g. nuclear safety, industrial hygiene, etc.). In this case, a document review performed 
at a designated interval could be used to verify that signatures were achieved on this template in 
all of the processes, the data would be: 
1. Percentage of signatures collected per form—would have to be go/no-go 
 
Another method would be a periodic self-assessments or independent assessments of the DSA 
documentation to collect information about the personnel involved in the development of these 
documents. The data associated with this method might include: 
1. The number of documents analyzed 
2. For each expertise, the number of authors or contributors associated with the 
documentation 
3. Qualification/training of required reviewers established and accomplished 
 
Either of these methods might also require the occasional review of technical qualifications of 
the participants, for instance, the qualifications of the particular signatories or participants in 
either method might be reviewed for a certain number of meetings or documents in a given year. 
The data collected for this analysis might include: 
1. Areas of subject matter expertise with established training and qualification programs 
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2. Percentage of experts trained or qualified 
3. Percentage of meetings which had trained/qualified attendees 
 
Developing a Baseline: The baseline for these reviews to determine if the right experts were 
involved in the development and maintenance of the DSA would be the lowest percentage of 
participation at which the facility operations could be deemed safe and reliable. The goal would 
be to have 100% participation at all meetings. However, this might not be feasible. If 
participation is regularly low, an assessment may be required to determine which specialties are 
regularly missing from the documentation and work to resolve this issue. 
 
Performance Measure: Number of past due safety action items stemming from previous 
occurrences 
 
Data to be collected: A couple of data sources for the measurement of past due safety action 
items stemming from previous occurrences could be achieved using the un-reviewed safety 
question (USQ) process. The USQ process occurs when a contractor identifies an unexpected 
situation that is inconsistent with the approved safety basis. A USQ is opened, but the contractor 
may be granted approval to continue operation while the USQ is resolved and corrective actions 
are put into place. This approval is called a justification for continued operation (JCO) and is 
limited to a pre-defined time period.  An un-reviewed safety question determination (USQD) 
must be made to determine if there could be an effect on safe operation of the facility. This can 
be negative (no effect) or positive (potential effect). Three items related to the USQ process can 
be measured to determine if there are past due safety action items. These include: 
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1. Average length of time (in a given time period) before USQD is reached 
2. The percentage of positive USQD corrective actions that are overdue 
3. The percentage of JCOs that have to be extended—indicating that the corrective actions 
have not been completed in the allotted time 
 
Developing a baseline: The baseline for the three data sources mentioned above should be 
developed by collecting available data (or, if there is none available, a year or two of data) and 
then establishing a target for improvement of these areas. Each reporting period, the data should 
be measured against the target to ensure improvement is occurring.  
 
7.4. Considerations to Improve Safety and Efficiency of Operations at Nuclear Chemical 
Facilities 
 
The previous chapters in this text have taken us through the development and finalization of a set 
of performance measures with the intent to improve safety and efficiency of operation at nuclear 
chemical facilities. However, the translation from the data collection to the development of 
theories about safety and efficiency of operation at nuclear chemical facilities to the list of final 
performance measures required the study to focus on a few key issues and theories about safety, 
leaving many other issues which were important in the data unexpressed. This section contains 
some recommendations for safety and efficiency of operations at nuclear chemical facilities that 
did not translate into the final performance measures.  
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Each of the themes that occurred with a high frequency in the chemical industry accident reports 
were reviewed in detail to develop ideas for areas of potential focus for thought regarding safety 
at a chemical or nuclear chemical facility. The following questions should be considered when 
evaluating the safety status of the facility or considering changes that might provide an 
opportunity to improve in some of these areas. These ideas can be tailored to the specific 
operations of the given industry. 
 
If the answer to any of the questions is “no,” it may be an important step to consider the rationale 
for that answer and if there are any steps that should be taken to improve process safety in that 
particular area. Considering that the source of the data for these suggestions was an exhaustive 
database of accident reports, focusing in on the addressed areas may reduce the likelihood of a 
similar occurrence at your facility.  
 
If the answer to these questions is “yes,” that suggestion has been considered at your facility, it is 
important to continue on and evaluate actions you are taking to address this consideration. If 
your facility is not currently addressing the issues raised in the questions, evaluate the 
improvement to the safety management program that could be achieved by implementing the 
industry ‘best practices’ that form the bases for the questions. 
 
7.4.1. Design and Engineering Recommendations 
 
Design and engineering issues had the highest frequency of occurrence in the studied accidents. 
Several performance measures for design and engineering are described in 7.3, and can be used 
228 
 
to determine the health and safety of the facility with regards to its engineering controls and 
safety systems. Some observations were made in addition to these performance measures, and 
considerations related to these additional areas are detailed below.  
 Are designs consistent with current industry standards (for instance, pressure vessel 
design should contemplate the most updated pressure vessel code of the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers)? 
 Do you enlist the assistance of a qualified team of people to perform peer review of 
engineering and design calculations for a new system or when making changes to an 
existing system.  
 Does your engineering process evaluate scaling effects on the system when increasing the 
capacity or throughput of the processes? 
 Do your safety-related systems implement the “multiple layers of protection” concept 
using both active (e.g. monitoring systems and alarms) and passive (e.g. containment) 
safety systems, as appropriate? 
 
7.4.2. Standards Recommendations 
 
Standards issues occurred frequently in the studied chemical industry accidents, but were 
significantly less frequent in the nuclear chemical facility occurrences, warranting their omission 
from the performance measure development phase. One potential reason for this difference could 
be the differences in regulation between the nuclear and chemical industries described in Chapter 
2; nuclear facilities are highly regulated and regularly tracked and audited, while chemical 
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facilities do not receive the same attention. Whatever the reason, there are some considerations 
any facility could take to improve safety and efficiency of operations with regard to standards: 
 Do you regularly monitor the issuance and modification of technical and safety standards 
applicable to your facility?   
 When compliance audits are performed, do you develop corrective actions and work to 
implement changes where they are deemed necessary? 
 Do you participate in community planning; e.g., zoning laws and local emergency 
response plans can benefit from participation and information sharing by the chemical 
facilities in the community? 
 
7.4.3. Process Hazard Analysis Recommendations 
 
Two performance measures were developed to help measure the health and safety status of the 
facility hazard analysis. However, the additional considerations below may provide areas for 
improvement of this process and its associated documentation.  
 Is your Process Hazard Analysis updated regularly, especially when changes are made to 
a process or facility (at a minimum, the PHA should be updated every 5 years, as required 
by OSHA)? 
 Have you enlisted the assistance of a diverse team of experts when performing or 
updating the PHA to maximize the recognition of potentially hazardous scenarios?  
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7.4.4. Emergency Planning and Response Recommendations 
 
Emergency Planning and Response was one of the most common issues identified in the analysis 
of the chemical industry accidents but performance measures related to this area were 
continuously ranked as the least practical and the least effective for determining the health and 
safety status of a facility by the SMEs surveyed. In the chemical industry accident reports 
studied, emergency responders made up a large percentage of the fatalities and severe injuries 
associated with the accident. The SMEs interviewed frequently commented on the available 
resources on site for emergency response, however, some sites have agreements with the local 
emergency responders in which they will provide on-site assistance if necessary; and this area 
might warrant a closer look. In addition to the research from this study about emergency 
planning and response, the DNFSB produced recommendation DNFSB 2014-1- Emergency 
Preparedness and Response in 2014. In this recommendation, DNFSB observed the “inability of 
sites with defense nuclear facilities to consistently demonstrate fundamental attributes of a sound 
emergency preparedness and response program, e.g., adequately resourced emergency 
preparedness and response programs and proper planning and training for emergencies” 
(DNFSB, 2014). As such, the following considerations related to emergency planning and 
response may be helpful in improving safety and efficiency of operations at a nuclear chemical 
facility.  
 Has your facility recently reached out to emergency responders in the community to 
maximize effectiveness and communication? 
 Does your facility have a means to ensure that adequate information about hazards 
present at the facility is available to emergency response teams?  
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 Have you developed and do you regularly update your facility’s plan for emergency 
response, and run drills that involve the facility employees? 
 
7.4.5. Hazard Recognition Recommendations 
 
Hazard recognition was another area, similar to standards, which was more prevalent in the 
chemical industry accidents than the nuclear chemical facility accidents. Some additional 
considerations about hazard recognition are listed below: 
 Are your employees thoroughly familiar with the process hazard documentation, as well 
as process safety information for the facility through formal and informal training 
programs?  
 Are hazards clearly identified on operating procedures (for example, if a particular 
hazardous chemical is used in a process, include an attachment of the MSDS)?  
 Do your procedure revision and design change processes encourage employees to 
participate in work planning and controls and use their operating and/or maintenance 
expertise to identify additional hazards and improve the process? 
 
7.4.6. Observations for Regulators and Safety Oversight Organizations 
 
In the process of completing this analysis, a few additional observations were made which could 
potentially improve safety in the chemical industry, and could also be applicable to other 
industries. These are ideas for regulators and safety oversight organizations to evaluate for 
implementation as they continuously improve their processes: 
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 Does your organization develop and release safety bulletin-type information regarding 
accidents or groups of accidents under your purview?  
 Do your incident reporting procedures and accident analysis processes use a consistent 
set of Key Issues (like the major PSM topics) to facilitate monitoring of trends in these 
accidents? 
 Do you revise your standards/processes, as necessary, when new guidance that could 
improve safety is released by industry groups, or when new technology or information 
becomes available through other sources, such as lessons learned from accidents? 
 Do your oversight processes ensure standards are being implemented and followed at the 
required facilities and follow up as necessary on issues discovered during this process? 
 
7.4.7. Development of Performance Measures for Areas Screened Less Impactful 
 
The previous sections provide a starting point for developing measures for those areas deemed 
impactful through subject matter expert elicitation and the exercise with the DWPF PRA. 
However, the data was derived from accident analysis, and all performance measures developed 
were based on high impact issues from the accidents. All developed performance measures could 
have an impact on the safety of a nuclear chemical facility, and it is up to the facility to choose a 
list of measures that would be most effective given the unique set of operating conditions. The 
following paragraphs provide discussion on implementing the performance measures deemed 
less impactful by the SMEs.  
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The Engineering Controls performance measure that was considered less impactful by the SMEs 
and the PRA exercise was the amount of time in between inspections and tests of safety systems. 
To collect this data, the facility would first need to determine which systems constitute the safety 
systems described herein. In a DOE facility, these might be defined by safety significant or 
safety class systems. The facilities have a detailed schedule of inspections and tests, the 
completion of which are tracked. The data for this performance measure could include a 
percentage of these inspections or tests that are overdue during a given time period, and the time 
that has lapsed since the previous inspection. A baseline for this metric could be determined by 
comparing the industry standard inspections frequency with the actual frequency measured on 
the site, on a system by system basis.  
 
The Operating Procedures performance measure that was considered less impactful by the SMEs 
and the PRA exercise was the percentage of procedures reviewed for content in a year. Data 
collection for this metric would include the total number of procedures, and the percentage of 
those that were reviewed in a given time period, in this case, one year. Another aspect of this 
data source might require review by specific SMEs, which is tied to SME involvement in 
drafting procedures, a measure described in Section 7.3.2. A baseline for this measure would be 
the minimum percentage of procedures reviewed in the time period to ensure safe and efficient 
operations. In an ideal setting, all active procedures would be reviewed on a frequent basis. It 
might also be useful in procedure review to establish improvement goals and targets for 
procedure review and measure the accomplishment of these targets.  
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In the area of Maintenance, there were two performance measures deemed less impactful by 
SME review and the PRA exercise. The number of past due maintenance requests as a 
percentage of total maintenance requests is a way to measure the overall maintenance backlog at 
a facility. The data required for this measure would be the number of maintenance requests that 
went past their scheduled due date in the maintenance tracking system and the overall number of 
maintenance requests accomplished during the same time period. The goal for this measure 
would be to have 100% of maintenance accomplished within the scheduled time period. 
However, this goal may not be practical, and it would be necessary to set improvement goals and 
targets and monitor the trajectory required to accomplish these goals.  
 
The second Maintenance measure, the percentage of all safety systems and safety controls 
planned maintenance accomplished is similar to the past due maintenance requests, but focusing 
on safety systems. The first step in monitoring this area would be the development of the list of 
safety systems to be included; for instance, at a DOE facility, these might include Safety Class 
and Safety Significant systems. These systems would need to be separated in the maintenance 
tracking system, and the number of maintenance requests on these systems that are past due 
would need to be measured in a predetermined time period as well as the overall number of 
maintenance requests on safety systems. The goal would be to accomplish 100% of the safety 
systems maintenance within the scheduled time period. However, this goal may not be practical, 
and it would be necessary to set improvement goals and targets and monitor the trajectory 
required to accomplish these goals. 
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Two Hazards Analysis performance measures were determined to be less impactful by the SMEs 
and the PRA exercise. The first of these was the percentage of operators and/or maintenance 
technicians with formal training on the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA). The first step in this 
process would be to determine whether or not formal training of operators and maintenance 
technicians covers the safety basis for the facility, and in particular, the DSA. If it currently does 
not, the development of such a course would be required. Once a course is either verified or 
established, the data for this measure would include the training records for the operators and 
maintenance technicians who completed the course and are up to date on the training 
requirement. The goal would be to have 100% of operators and maintenance technicians receive 
and maintain formal training on the DSA. In order to achieve this goal, targets could be set for 
each year until completion and the achievement of these targets tracked.  
 
The number of operations and maintenance personnel involved in DSA development and 
maintenance is similar to pertinent SME involvement in DSA development described in 7.3.2. 
Once expectations for operations and maintenance personnel involvement are set, there are 
several options for tracking their participation in DSA development and maintenance. One 
method would be to develop a template for each safety documentation or hazards assessment 
meeting and require the signature of the operator or maintenance technician that meets each 
required area of expertise. In this case, a document review performed at a designated interval 
could be used to verify that signatures were achieved on this template in all of the processes, the 
data would be the percentage of signatures collected per form—and would have to be go/no-go. 
The site could also perform a periodic self-assessments or independent assessments of the DSA 
documentation to collect information about the personnel involved in the development of these 
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documents. The data associated with this method might include the number of documents 
analyzed and the number of signoffs by operators or maintenance technicians. The baseline for 
these reviews to determine if operators and maintenance technicians were involved in the 
development and maintenance of the DSA would be the lowest percentage of participation at 
which the facility operations could be deemed safe and reliable. The goal would be to have 100% 
participation at all meetings. However, this might not be feasible. If participation is regularly 
low, an assessment may be required to determine which specialties are regularly missing from 
the documentation and work to resolve this issue. 
 
As discussed in Section 7.4.4, none of the Emergency Planning and Response performance 
measures were deemed impactful by SME review or through the quantitative PRA exercise. 
However, these performance measures were developed due to the high frequency of emergency 
response issues in analyzed chemical industry accidents. The first recommended performance 
measure is the number of local emergency responders trained on the facility hazards response. 
This performance measure is designed to provide information on the training of offsite 
responders, such as city or county responders, and their familiarity with the site hazards and 
appropriate response actions. The data for this measure would be training records for the 
surrounding emergency responders, within a predetermined geographical area (defined in the site 
Emergency Response Plan). Data would include the total number of responders and the number 
with up to date training on site emergency response. The goal would be to have 100% 
participation in site training by any emergency responder that might be asked to enter the site in 
the case of an emergency. This goal may require a set of annual targets, and the site should 
ensure it is meeting the targets each year until the goal is achieved. 
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The second emergency planning and response performance measure is the Number of emergency 
drills performed in a time period vs. number scheduled (or required). This measure is getting at 
the timely performance of drills. The data to be collected would include the number of drills 
scheduled, the number of drills required, and the number of drills successfully accomplished 
during a prescribed time period.  The goal would be for the site to be completing 100% of the 
required drills, and 100% of the scheduled drills. If these numbers are not the same, a first target 
would be to schedule 100% of the drills required. Once this target is met, targets would include 
increments of increased drills accomplished until all scheduled drills were accomplished.  
 
The last emergency planning performance measure is the number of workers in the facility who 
believe that they can execute their responsibilities in the case of an emergency. Data for this 
measure would be accomplished by survey, with questioning similar to this example: Do you 
believe that you understand your responsibilities in an emergency? Do you believe that you are 
capable of fulfilling these responsibilities? The goal for this measure would be to have 100% of 
respondents affirm both of these areas. If the percentage of affirmative responses is low, targets 
could be set to achieve this goal and their accomplishment tracked to demonstrate improvement.  
 
7.4.8. Considerations Conclusions 
 
The results of analyzing the data contained in the chemical industry accident reports  and nuclear 
chemical facility occurrence reports identified several themes that can be used to develop a better 
understanding of chemical industry accidents and aid in continuous improvement of safety 
management programs; thus, potentially preventing future accidents from occurring or reducing 
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their impacts. From the results of this analysis, performance measures were developed and vetted 
to use as leading indicators of process safety, and implementation guidelines were provided for 
both the most impactful and less impactful measures. Due to the nature of the list of performance 
measures, some important themes from the accident analysis were left out. Therefore, a list of 
recommended considerations was developed to encourage the facility managers to think about 
some other themes and issues at their facilities.  
 
The analysis that resulted in these considerations evaluated experience from a broad spectrum of 
facilities in the chemical industry and nuclear chemical facilities from the DOE and NRC. 
Facilities, companies and industry groups may be more interested in experience specific to their 
portions of either industry. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The subsequent chapters have provided the details of the accident analysis, grounded theory 
development, and performance measure development and vetting. The goal of Chapter 8 is to 
provide conclusory remarks on this research. Chapter 8 will reiterate the accomplishments of this 
work and provide ideas for the continuation of this research and performance of future work.  
 
8.2. Conclusions 
 
The rich database available in the chemical industry accident reports and occurrence reports from 
nuclear chemical facilities operated by the DOE and NRC contains valuable organizational 
learning information that can be used to help improve the safety and efficiency of operations at 
nuclear chemical facilities. The work presented in this study illustrated the usefulness of these 
reports through the semi-quantitative analysis of textual data: key issues and content. A content 
analysis of these reports was performed to highlight the common causes and themes of accidents 
in the chemical industry and occurrences at operating nuclear chemical facilities. The codes and 
memos marking these issues were used to develop grounded theory about safety at nuclear 
chemical facilities. One theory was developed for each of the predominant issues from the 
accident reports, 29 in total.  
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Once the theories were developed, a set of leading performance measures was postulated relating 
the issue, the most commonly associated codes from the content analysis, and the theory. These 
leading performance measures were reviewed by a set of industry subject matter experts through 
two iterations to revise wording and highlight the most impactful performance measures that 
were both practical and effective for a nuclear chemical facility. The subject matter experts 
narrowed the list to 17 performance measures and selected 8 performance measures that were 
considered the most impactful to safety and efficiency of operations at a nuclear chemical 
facility. 
 
The list of performance measures follows, where the bolded measures are the most impactful: 
• Engineering Controls: 
• Pertinent subject matter expert involvement in process design and/or review 
changes 
• Percentage of operators and technical staff who are able to identify controls 
and believe that they understand their operation 
• Amount of time in between inspections or tests of safety systems  
• Number of nuisance alarms or false alarms vs. number of valid alarms 
• Operating Procedures 
• Percentage of procedures reviewed for content in a year 
• Number of operators or maintenance technicians who believe that 
procedures are current, accurate, and effective (by survey) 
• Pertinent SMEs involved in drafting procedures 
• Maintenance 
• Percentage of all safety systems and safety controls planned maintenance 
accomplished 
• Number of past due maintenance requests as a percentage of total maintenance 
requests 
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• Amount of time the plant is in operation with any safety system in an 
inoperable or degraded condition 
• Hazards Analysis 
• Percentage of operators and/or maintenance techs who have formal training on the 
Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) 
• Pertinent subject matter expert involvement in the DSA development and 
maintenance 
• Number of operations and maintenance personnel involved in DSA development 
and maintenance 
• Number of past due safety action items vs. total number of safety action 
items stemming from previous occurrences  
• Emergency Planning 
• Number of local (county or city) Emergency Responders trained in facility (e.g. 
chemical or radiological) hazards and response 
• Number of emergency drills performed in a time period vs. number scheduled (or 
required) 
• Number of workers in an operating facility who believe that they can execute 
their responsibilities in the case of an emergency (by survey) 
 
A second exercise to determine the impact of the performance measures was conducted using a 
probabilistic risk assessment for an operational nuclear chemical facility. The performance 
measures were matched up to nodes in several accident progression event trees that they could 
impact and the nodes were then modeled with a reduction in the failure or error probability. The 
quantitative exercise provided an alternative way to measure the potential impact of the 
performance measures at a nuclear chemical facility, with maintenance, operating procedures, 
and engineering controls performance measures being the most impactful to the selected events.  
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Guidance was provided for the 18 performance measures to assist in implementing the 
performance measures at a facility. This guidance included a discussion about the data required, 
including a discussion of additional setup requirements (such as additional training or 
documentation) where they might not exist. Guidance was also provided to assist in setting a 
baseline for each of the performance measures. The next phase of this process will involve 
piloting the performance measures at nuclear chemical facilities. This is discussed further in 
Section 8.3. 
 
The performance measures resulting from this analysis, and subsequent ideas presented for 
improvement actions, can be used by facilities, companies, and industry groups—coupled with 
their own specific trend information—to evaluate and prioritize process safety at targeted nuclear 
chemical facilities and nuclear and chemical facilities, in general, to improve process safety and 
efficiency of operations. 
 
The results of analyzing data contained in the chemical industry accident reports identified 
several theories that can be used to develop a better understanding of chemical industry accidents 
and nuclear chemical facility occurrences and aid in continuous improvement of safety 
management programs; thus, potentially preventing future accidents from occurring, or reducing 
their impacts. From the results of this analysis, several performance measures were presented 
which could be applied as leading indicators of process safety health at a nuclear chemical 
facility. When tracked, these performance measures could provide a leading indication of 
degraded safety conditions which may prevent an occurrence or accident from occurring. 
Further, these performance measures have been shown to be practical and effective for 
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implementation at a nuclear chemical facility, and to have a quantitative reduction in risk for 
such a facility. The application of these performance measures at nuclear chemical facilities in 
the DOE complex was also discussed. The study presented measurable quantities and discussed 
the development of the recommended metric, as well as guidance for creating a baseline to 
determine the health of the process.  
 
Further guidance and recommendations for safety not represented in performance measures was 
also related. The analysis related in this study evaluated experience from a broad spectrum of 
facilities in the chemical industry and nuclear industry. Facilities, companies and industry groups 
may be more interested in experience specific to their portions of the industry. The 
categorization scheme in this study, which uses industry-standard terminology derived from the 
OSHA PSM Guide, and the facility-specific CSB and DOE accident/occurrence database, can be 
used as a starting point, or example, for future industry-specific studies, or studies about a 
specific industry issue.  
 
If applied as recommended, it is the hope of the authors that these performance measures will 
provide a leading indicator of unsafe operating conditions before an accident occurs. Considering 
that the source of the data for these performance measures and recommendations was an 
exhaustive database of accident reports, using the performance measures and focusing in on the 
addressed areas may reduce the likelihood of a similar occurrence at similar facilities. 
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8.3.  Future Work 
 
The research study that has been presented in this dissertation has elicited many thoughts for 
future work, both using the methods described in this study, and work on safety at nuclear 
chemical facilities.  
 
Continuing the process of implementing the performance measures at nuclear chemical facilities 
will require piloting the recommended measures at several facilities. The first step in this process 
will be to work with the facilities to tailor the performance measures to the specifics of their 
operation, and then to assist in developing the programs to track the data. Data collection over 
several years will provide feedback necessary to make improvements before the rollout of the 
performance measures will be final.  
 
The content analysis methodology used in this study has already been used in various alternate 
projects at Vanderbilt University. For instance, content analysis has been used to extract theories 
out of comments from an expert elicitation about fuel cycle preferences. There have also been 
discussions about applying this methodology to reviewing documents from other data sources to 
develop theories. The Electric Power Research Institute has expressed an interest in using a 
similar content analysis methodology to extract data from public comments on their reports to 
develop theories and themes in the data. Other industry groups, such as the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board have also expressed an interest in using the methodology to assess report 
text.  
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There are many other potential sources of data that could be analyzed to provide insights 
regarding safety in the nuclear industry. There is data available to analyze accidents from all 
types of fuel cycle facilities, from mining and milling to long term storage and disposal. This 
data could be similarly used to develop theories about safety at any type of facility at any stage 
of the fuel cycle process, and eventually to develop performance measures similar to those 
developed in this study. In addition to mining the operating histories mentioned above using 
content analysis, there is the potential to perform a scraping analysis of these reports to 
determine the safety temperature of a specific industry, company, or facility. Additionally, web 
scraping analysis using the coding structure as a basis for the search, could increase the breadth 
of data covered and provide a more global look at process safety. 
 
This work has also opened up the potential of working with the chemical industry, to provide 
feedback about accident conditions and lessons learned from a larger collection of accidents than 
those chosen for this study. In fact, the chemical industry accident analysis provided a list of 
recommendations that could apply to a chemical facility as well as the targeted nuclear chemical 
facilities. These recommendations could be expanded and broadcast to the chemical industry, or 
be reworked to develop a list of potential performance indicators that chemical facilities might 
use to improve safety and efficiency of operations.  
 
Further work could also be done in studying nuclear chemical facilities.  There are a host of 
international accidents and studies from the American Chemistry Council and the American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers available to study for the chemical aspects of operations, as well 
as many international nuclear chemical facilities with operating histories.  Additionally, OSHA 
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has a record of reportable accidents that goes back many years. Mining this data, if incident 
histories from these sources were available, could provide a tailored set of performance measures 
that could be used to improve safety and efficiency of operations at such facilities.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
CODING NOTES FOR THE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
The contents of this Appendix are the coding notes used during the coding process to memo 
issues that were associated with each code.  
 
Coding Notes 
 
I. Hazards 
a. Hazard Recognition (PSM derived) 
1. HR1- Employees not made aware of hazards 
2. HR2- Hazards in design not understood 
3. HR3- Local potentially impacted people not aware of facility 
hazards 
4. HR4- No system or inadequate system to control hazards 
5. HR5- Hazard understood but not lessened 
b. Process Hazard Analysis (PSM) 
1. PHA1- Risks associated with the process not well analyzed 
2. PHA2- PHA inadequate 
3. PHA3- PHA does not involve literature review 
4. PHA4- PHA results not used 
5. PHA5- PHA process not defined 
6. PHA6- PHA requires revision or out of date 
7. PHA7- No PHA performed 
8. PHA8- PHA team not qualified to perform review 
II. Standards 
a. Standards (Not PSM) 
1. ST1- Guidance for review of facility is insufficient 
2. ST2- Standards are not implemented at facility 
3. ST8- Standard not applied consistently throughout facility 
operations and facilities 
4. ST14- Standard limits occurrence 
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ii. Recognition 
1. ST10- Design standards not recognized or understood 
iii. Implementation 
1. ST6- Facility or building siting 
iv. Oversight 
1. ST11- Fire protection organizations do not monitor adherence to 
fire codes and standards 
v. LTA 
1. ST3- Standards do not address all relevant issues 
2. ST4- Standards are not up to date 
3. ST7- Standard does not apply to a facility but should 
4. ST9- Standard does not exist 
vi. Enforcement 
1. ST5- Standards not well enforced 
2. ST12- No inspections to ensure implementation 
3. ST13- No actions taken from enforcement 
III. Safety Management 
a. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSM) 
i. Performed before new or modified facilities 
1. PSSR1- Confirmation of safety systems performed LTA 
2. PSSR2- PSSR staff not experienced or knowledgeable 
3. PSSR3- Not signed off on 
4. PSSR4- Accident occurs during PSSR 
ii. Confirms safety 
b. Incident Investigation (PSM) 
1. II4- Not timely in investigation and communication 
ii. Previous incidents investigated 
1. II1- Previous accidents were ignored 
2. II5- Other facility incidents not looked into 
3. II6- Investigations into incidents were not thorough 
iii. Lessons learned collected 
1. II2- Lessons learned applied to new situations 
iv. Actions based on incident investigation taken 
1. II3- Actions taken based on investigation 
2. II7- Actions and recommendations are not thorough 
c. Process Safety Information (PSM) 
1. PSI1- PSI not available to relevant people 
2. PSI2- PSI not used in design 
3. PSI3- PSI not comprehensive 
4. PSI4- PSI out of date 
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ii. Written PSI compiled before PHA 
iii. PSI provided to employer and employees 
iv. PSI Complete 
d. Compliance Audits (PSM) 
1. COM1- Audits not timely 
2. COM2- Recommendations from audit not utilized 
3. COM3- Audit fails to address issue 
4. COM4- Audits not performed by knowledgeable people 
5. COM5- No program for audits exists 
IV. Maintenance and Operations 
a. Hot Work Permitting (PSM) 
i. HW1- Flammable conditions inside a container 
ii. HW2- Permits signed and checked 
iii. HW3- Lack of controls for HW 
iv. Permit issued 
v. Permit complete 
b. Mechanical Integrity (PSM) 
1. MI1- Inoperable equipment 
2. MI2- Lack of preventative maintenance program 
3. MI3- Equipment issues caused by accident worsened accident 
conditions 
4. MI8- Corrosion or degradation of materials 
ii. Written procedures established 
1. MI5- No MI procedures in place 
iii. Employees trained in maintenance 
iv. Inspections and tests performed and documented 
1. MI4- Inspections and tests performed after the fact 
2. MI7- Inspections and tests too infrequent 
3. MI9- Lack of inspection plans 
4. MI11- Inspections and tests did not find issues 
5. MI12- No inspections performed 
v. Deficiencies corrected in safe and timely manor 
1. MI6- Equipment repeatedly causes issues 
2. MI10- Deficiencies corrected in timely manner 
vi. Equipment checked prior to startup 
1. MI13- Equipment or conditions not checked before startup 
vii. Counterfeit materials 
c. Management of Change (PSM) 
1. MOC1: Shift turnover changes 
2. MOC2- reconfiguration without instructions 
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3. MOC4- incorrect characterization of big change as subtle change 
4. MOC5- Prompt MOC process 
5. MOC6- Change effects not fully understood 
6. MOC9- MOC review not performed 
ii. Written MOC procedures established 
1. MOC7- Procedures not established 
iii. Procedures altered in consideration of change 
1. MOC8- Procedures adjusted with changes 
iv. Employees affected or involved informed and trained 
1. MOC3- Employees informed of changes 
d. Maintenance (Not PSM) 
1. MA6- Inconsistent staffing 
ii. Conduct of Maintenance LTA 
iii. Maintenance Planning 
1. MA-1: Maintenance not alerted of issue 
2. MA-2 Maintenance software issues 
3. MA-3 Maintenance plan is LTA 
4. MA4- Performance of maintenance LTA 
5. MA5- Housekeeping is LTA 
6. MA6- Communication about maintenance tasks 
7. MA7- Maintenance spending 
8. MA8- Endangerment of maintenance workers 
iv. Housekeeping 
e. Operating Procedures (PSM) 
1. OP1- Inadvertent addition of material not in procedure 
2. OP2- Procedure does not contain clear instructions for a part of the 
process 
3. OP3- Procedure not followed by operators 
4. OP5- No procedure for abnormal conditions 
5. OP6- Procedure does not contain PSI 
6. OP7- Procedure includes equipment no longer in service or 
obsolete 
7. OP8- Inconsistent procedures used by different operators 
8. OP9- Revisions to operating procedures 
9. OP10- Procedures not analyzed for safety 
ii. Written Clearly and Concisely 
1. OP4- Procedures rely on memory of facility workers and are not 
written 
2. OP11- No written procedure 
iii. Accessible to Employees 
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iv. Reviewed and Updated as Necessary 
V. Design and Engineering (Not PSM) 
a. Engineering Controls 
1. EC1- System does not contain design features necessary for safe 
operation 
2. EC2- Physical failure due to underdesign 
3. EC3- Failure to control equipment 
4. EC4- Materials or equipment design issues 
5. EC5- Represented need for more engineer participation in design 
or process 
6. EC6- Design drawings or information not complete 
7. EC7- System to correct design deficiencies 
8. EC8- Design hazard recognition 
9. EC9- System not installed according to design or other 
requirements 
10. EC10- Engineers or professionals participation in design process 
and knowledge of design standards 
11. EC11- Scale up issues 
12. EC12- Computer Controls 
13. EC13- Building siting 
14. EC14- Manufacturing defect 
b. Safety Systems 
1. SS1- Failure to wear PPE 
2. SS2- Lack of remote equipment for process safety 
3. SS3- Ventilation system insufficient 
4. SS4- Failure of a backup safety system (cooling) 
5. SS5- Lack of controls 
6. SS6- Lack of alarm system 
7. SS7- Reliability of safety controls 
8. SS8- Nuissance alarms or desensitization to alarms 
9. SS9- Pressure relief devices 
10. SS10- Fire protection systems 
11. SS11- Vehicle controls 
12. SS12- Emergency lights 
13. SS13- Personnel safety equipment (safety showers) 
VI. Human Factors 
a. Contractors (PSM) 
1. CON1- Poor communication between contractors and operators 
2. CON2- Contractor understanding of process safety 
3. CON3- Unauthorized contractor work 
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ii. Contractors Informed of Potential Hazards 
iii. Illness and Injury Log Maintained 
iv. Contractor Employees Familiar with PSI and Emergency Protocol 
v. Contractors Document Training 
b. Training (PSM) 
1. TR1- Employees not trained in use of maintenance requests or 
maintenance 
2. TR2- Training lacks process safety information (use of cautions 
and warnings, equipment purposes etc) 
3. TR4- MOC training 
4. TR5- Training is largely informal and may not cover all situations 
5. TR6- Training not offered with enough frequency 
6. TR7- Lack of training records 
7. TR8- No training offered on a particular piece of equipment or 
process 
8. TR9- Training not well planned or designed 
9. TR10- Inspector training for compliance 
10. TR11- Simulation training or training methods 
ii. All Employees Trained 
iii. Refresher Training 
1. TR3- Refresher training provided for hazards 
iv. Training Recorded and Verified 
v. Emergency Crews Trained 
1. ERT1- Emergency response crews participate in training with real 
drills and process information 
vi. 911 Personnel Trained 
c. Management Oversight (Not PSM) 
1. MO1- Managers on site 
2. MO2- Manager knowledge of process and design 
3. MO3- Manager sign off and approve process 
4. MO4- Management implements process safety actions 
5. MO5- Managers lack safety concern 
d. Employee Participation (PSM) 
1. EP1- Employees participate in incident investigation and planning 
of actions to correct incident conditions 
2. EP2- Employees participate in work planning 
ii. Employer Plan of Action 
iii. Employees consulted in hazard analysis 
VII. Emergency Planning and Response (PSM) 
a. Emergency Planning (Broken Down from PSM) 
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i. Plan Established 
1. EPP1a- Lack of emergency plan 
2. EPP1b- Drills relating to plan performed 
3. EPP1c- Plan clarifies roles and responsibilities 
ii. Employees Aware of Plan 
iii. Plan Followed in Emergency 
1. EPP3a- Failure to account for all personnel 
2. EPP3b- Failure to sound alarm system 
3. EPP3c- Community and other responders aware of and involved in 
emergency planning 
4. EPP3d- Failure to follow plan 
5. EPP3e- Information for response and treatment of injured 
b. Response (Broken Down from PSM) 
1. ERR1- Failure to establish safety of environment at facility 
2. ERR4- Community evacuation issues 
3. ERR5- Communication issues with local emergency response 
4. ERR6- Assistance necessary from additional emergency crews 
5. ERR10- Desire to help others overwhelms training or response 
instinct 
ii. Point Person Available 
1. ERR7- No one assigned to point person 
iii. Emergency Responders 
1. ERR2- Offsite responders participate in drills 
2. ERR3- Site information shared with emergency responders 
3. ERR8- Offsite crews injured 
4. ERR9- Insufficient resources 
VIII. Other 
a. Safety Culture (Not PSM—DOE G 450.4-1C) 
i. Leadership 
1. L1- Risk informed decision making 
2. L2- Staff recruitment, selection, retention, development 
3. L3- Management engagement and time in field 
4. L4- Open communication and environment free from retribution 
5. L5- Demonstrated Safety Leadership 
6. L6- Clear expectations and accountability 
ii. Employee Engagement 
1. EE1: Personal commitment to safety—did not heed caution 
statements, did not perform work in accordance to standards 
2. EE2- Mindful of hazards and controls 
3. EE3- Participation in work planning and controls 
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4. EE4- Teamwork and Mutual Respect 
iii. Organizational Learning 
1. OL1- Previous accidents were ignored 
2. OL2- Effective resolution of reported problems 
3. OL3- Credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems 
4. OL4- Use of operational experience 
5. OL5- Questioning attitude 
6. OL6- Performance monitoring through multiple means 
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APPENDIX B 
 
VANDERBILT INTERNAL REVIEW BOARD EXEMPTION 
 
The following Appendix contains the Vanderbilt University Internal Review Board Exemption 
Letter for the Subject Matter Expert Survey portion of this analysis.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT INTERVIEW 
 
Subject Matter Expert Questions and Discussion 
Lyndsey Fyffe Dissertation Objective- SME Interviews 
6/13/15 
 
First, let me just thank you for letting us take up some of your time today to have this 
conversation.  We are hoping that this work that we’ve done will help improve operations at your 
facility, so your input is so valuable in the process.  
I’ll start out by telling you a little bit about what we’ve done as a part of this research and then 
I’d love to have a conversation about a few areas we feel would make the most impact in terms 
of improving safety and efficiency of operations.  
This research consisted of several phases of analysis of accident reports, including accidents 
investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board, DOE Occurrence Reports for a few selected 
nuclear chemical operations and NRC occurrences from nuclear chemical facilities. For each 
report, we went through the process of analyzing its content. For the CSB reports, this involved 
looking at the staff-identified Key Issues, and then performing a content analysis of the text. We 
used a coding structure similar to OSHA’s Process Safety Management Guidelines as they 
transition well into the chemical and nuclear fields. We repeated this coding process for the NRC 
and DOE occurrences and then grouped the occurrences into common issues that we could focus 
in on to make improvements.  
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What you will see during this conversation, is that for these key areas, we have a few of the most 
common issues highlighted. This is followed by a discussion of some metrics we think might be 
measurable and usable as indicators of an unsafe environment. As we go through, we are 
interested to know what your experience has been with the issue and what metrics, if any, you 
are already collecting or could collect. We would also like to gauge your opinion on using some 
of these in your operation.  
 
1. From your operating experience, what are some of the more common issues that you face 
during operation, in particular, what are the most common causes of occurrences? 
2. Engineering Controls: 
a. We have observed that design and engineering issues tend to be related to a lack 
of design features or safety controls, a lack of participation from engineers and 
design experts, and failure or underdesign of safety systems such as pressure 
relief devices or alarm systems. We have theorized that measuring and monitoring 
some of the following metrics would improve safety and efficiency in this area– 
do you agree, is it impactful? 
i. Amount of time since previous reviews of process or design 
ii. Number of processes or designs reviewed in a year 
iii. Number of engineers involved in process review or design 
iv. Number of controls for each possible event 
v. Number of identified hazards and controls reviewed in a given time 
(relatable to PHA) 
vi. Amount of time in between inspections and tests (mechanical integrity 
related) 
vii. Planned maintenance that occurs vs unplanned (maintenance related) 
3. Operating Procedures 
a. We have observed that operating procedure related issues tend to be related to 
operators failing to follow the written procedure, outdated ineffective procedures, 
a lack of safety information in the procedure, and a lack of procedural information 
for abnormal circumstances (such as a higher than anticipated temperature or 
pressure reading). We have theorized that measuring and monitoring some of the 
following metrics would improve safety and efficiency in this area– do you agree, 
is it impactful? 
i. Number of procedures reviewed or updated in a given year 
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ii. Number of operators or maintenance techs involved in procedure review 
(by survey?) 
iii. Number of procedures reviewed for content in a year 
iv. Number of operators or maintenance techs who believe procedures are 
current, accurate, and effective (by survey?) 
4. Maintenance 
a. We have observed maintenance issues tend to be related to a lack of maintenance 
planning, or less than adequate performance of maintenance jobs. We have 
theorized that measuring and monitoring some of the following metrics would 
improve safety and efficiency in this area– do you agree, is it impactful? 
i. Number of safety critical plant items that have undergone maintenance vs. 
number of planned maintenance items 
ii. % of planned maintenance accomplished 
iii. Number of deferred maintenance requests or past due maintenance 
requests 
iv. Amount of time between maintenance requests and completion of 
maintenance work 
5. Mechanical Integrity 
a. We have observed mechanical integrity issues that are particularly insightful in 
the discussions of aging infrastructure and facility degradation. Some of the 
highest contributors to mechanical integrity issues in the accidents we analyzed 
were degradation of materials and inoperable equipment, with an additional issue 
of these issues not being corrected in a timely manner. On top of these, we also 
found issues with a lack of inspections and tests to ensure integrity of systems. 
We have theorized that measuring and monitoring some of the following metrics 
would improve safety and efficiency in this area– do you agree, is it impactful? 
i. Number of inspections completed during a time period vs. number of 
inspections due during that time period 
ii. Amount of time between issuing corrective action and completing the 
corrective action (deficiencies corrected in a safe and timely manner) 
iii. Amount of time plant is in operation with any safety component in a failed 
state (broken down or failed inspection) 
iv. Percentage of plant start-ups with no safety problems documented or 
realized 
6. Hazards Analysis 
a. The most common issue that we observed in the area of hazards analysis, is 
simply that no hazards analysis was performed. While this may be less of an issue 
in the DOE environment, other observations included inadequacies in the HA, 
such as the acceptance of lower tier safety controls for certain scenarios and a lack 
of necessary expertise in the team performing the assessment. We also observed 
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that many facilities involved in accidents did not have a system in place to update 
these assessments and track the implementation of findings from them.  We have 
theorized that measuring and monitoring some of the following metrics would 
improve safety and efficiency in this area– do you agree, is it impactful? 
i. Number of identified hazards and controls reviewed in a given time 
(relatable to safety systems) 
ii. Amount of time since previous review of process hazards 
iii. Number of operators and maintenance techs who have been trained on the 
PHA 
iv. Pertinent subject matter experts involved in the PHA development 
v. Operations and maintenance personnel involved in the PHA development 
7. Incident Investigation 
a. We observed incident investigation issues across many of the accidents in the 
chemical industry. In many cases, there was a less severe precursor accident in the 
time leading to the major accident that was not investigated or remediated. In 
many cases, the larger accident occurs before follow-up on action items for the 
precursor. We have theorized that measuring and monitoring some of the 
following metrics would improve safety and efficiency in this area– do you agree, 
is it impactful? 
i. Number of open action items vs. total number of action items from 
previous occurrences  (ties to safety culture- organizational learning) 
ii. Number of lessons learned developed as a part of ORPS reports or other 
incident reporting 
iii. Frequency of updates to controls or procedures 
iv. Number of operators and maintenance techs who are familiar with 
operating history of facility and lessons learned from accidents (by 
survey?) 
8. Emergency Planning 
a. Understanding that DOE sites have a different protocol for emergency response 
than a private chemical operation, we have observed that emergency planning and 
response issues tend to be centered around a lack of emergency planning, leaving 
employees unsure of what to do or who to contact, causing communication issues 
and confusion among responders, and a lack of training and resources for 
emergency responders, leaving them unsure of the hazards and not able to provide 
the most efficient assistance to the facility. We have theorized that measuring and 
monitoring some of the following metrics would improve safety and efficiency in 
this area– do you agree, is it impactful? 
i. Number of local (county? City?) Emergency Responders trained in facility 
(e.g. chemical or radiological) hazards and response? 
ii. Hours of training available to emergency responders vs. total hours taken 
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iii. Number of emergency drills performed in a time period vs. number 
scheduled 
iv. Amount of time since last update of emergency plan 
v. Number of personnel trained as point person responsible for facility 
emergency 
vi. Number of workers who feel confident following emergency plan in 
emergency (survey?) 
9. What metrics that we haven’t discussed, if any, are you currently analyzing as leading 
performance indicators?  
10. Are there any lagging indicators we should be knowledgeable about that might also 
provide some insight into this research? 
11. Do you have any questions or concerns about the analysis we’ve done or the discussion 
we’ve had today? 
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APPENDIX D 
 
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT SURVEY TOOL 
 
Survey Tool Questions- Nuclear Safety Subject Matter Expert Elicitation for Improvement of 
Performance Measures 
Note: This survey tool is web-based, and therefore is interactive with participants. The following 
screenshots represent the questions the subjects will answer and the screens they will view as 
they work through the survey. There are screens that provide a review of their responses at the 
end of each section (screens 12, 19, 23, 27, 34, 38). 
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APPENDIX E 
 
DEFENSE WASTE PROCESSING FACILITY APETS 
 
The following Appendix contains the 3 APETs used to determine the quantitative risk reduction 
potentially afforded by applying the developed performance measures to a nuclear chemical 
facility. All event trees are copied from the DWPF Event Tree Report (DWPF 1993).  
The three events are as follows: 
1. Steam Explosion in the Melter  
2. Low Point Pump Pit in the Precipitate Pump Tank Explosion 
3. Benzene Explosion in the Sludge Precipitate Tank (SPT) 
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E.1 Steam Explosion in the Melter APET 
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E.2 Low Point Pump Pit in the Precipitate Pump Tank Explosion APET 
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E.3 Benzene Explosion in the Sludge Precipitate Tank (SPT) APET 
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